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FOREWORD
The Environmental Quality Laboratory (EQL) traces its origins to a series of
discussions initiated by Caltech President Harold Brown on the feasibility of
a Caltech Air Pollution Laboratory aimed at alleviating the smog problem in
the South Coast Air Basin. In an address to the Institute for the Advancement
of Engineering on February 28, 1970,1 Dr. Brown summarized the main con-
clusions of a faculty-JPL study group on smog led by Professor Carver Mead
that preceded the formation of the EQL. To quote from Dr. Brown's address,
the most important conclusion "is that there are other factors which are as
important or more important than the technological ones.... Unless expert
social scientists are available-and I mean not only economists to examine
the economic balance, but political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and
so on-the study will be done in too narrow a context. Although it will give
the right answers to its own questions, it will prove to have overlooked ques-
tions more important than those which it asked."
Our experience in working on the smog problem over the past year fully
confirms Dr. Brown's observations. The EQL team engaged in this study
included social scientists, lawyers, engineers, and graduate and undergradu-
ate students. Each of us had to learn that the social, cultural, legal, economic
and technical factors interact strongly and therefore cannot be treated separ-
ately. In addition to innumerable internal debates, seminars and memos, we
had the benefit of numerous discussions with people in industry, in environ-
mental action groups, and in government at all levels who are concerned with
air pollution.
At the outset of the EQL study we made the decision to consider only those
air pollution control strategies that comply with the spirit (if not the letter)
of the Clean Air Act of 1970. In the spirit of that act this report describes a
"management standards" approach for achieving drastic reductions in the
,number of "smoggy" days in the South Coast Air Basin of California by the
end of 1977. In order to illustrate the kinds of control measures that are
required if the management air qijality standards are to be satisfied, we chose
one particular control strategy for detailed study. This strategy, called EQL
Strategy # 1, is based on new "technical" control measures on stationary
sources and used motor vehicles, combined with a set of social and economic
incentives and disincentives designed to encourage the shift to low-pollution
motor vehicles, to encourage the use of multiple-occupancy vehicles (buses,
carpools, etc.), and to halt or at least reduce the annual rate of increase in
gasoline consumption in the Basin. 2 If EQL Strategy # 1 is followed, we
estimated that the average number of days per year on which the California
'Brown, H.: "The University and Environmental Research," Bulletin of the California Institute
oj Technology, Vol. 79, No. I, 'March 7, 1970.
2Some of these technical control measures are also included in the Implementation Plan sub-
mitted by the State to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in February, 1972.
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ambient air quality standard on photochemical oxidants is violated would be
reduced from 241 days in 1970 to 50 days by the end of 1975, and to 25 days
by the end of 1977.
The measures we propose are neither painless not inexpensive. We did
not find any "magic solutions." For example, the cost of EQL Strategy # 1
for this Basin is estimated at about one billion dollars through the end of
1975, or about $100 per head. Whether or not the results that could be
achieved are worth the effort and expense is up to the people of the South
Coast Air Basin to decide.
An earlier version of this report called EQL Report # 4, dated January 15,
1972, consisted of Part I, which contained a summary of EQL Strategy 1,
and Part II, which briefly outlined the legislative and administrative actions
required. The present final edition of the EQL air pollution report contains
a revised and updated version of Part I and a new Part II, entitled "Support-
ing Information and Analysis."
Our work on the short-term (1972-1977) air pollution control problem
raised important and difficult questions about the long-range (1982-2000)
problem of controlling air pollution in the South Coast Air Basin. Members
of the EQL staff are studying new technologies, social and economic incen-
tives, modes of transportation and patterns of land use and development in
an attempt to formulate a long-range strategy.
LESTER LEES
Director, Environmental Quality Laboratory
Pasadena, California
June 15, 1972
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PART I
EQL STRATEGY NO. I-A SUMMARY
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PART 1: SUMMARY
In 1970, 25 years after California enacted its first air pollution control law,
LOg Angeles County stal had a~r that d~d not meet state air quality standards
for pnotocnemical oxidants (such as ozone) on 65% of the days, for carbon
monoxide on 55% of the days, and for nitrogen dioxide on 31 % of the days.
Clean air was three decades behind us, and state and local enforcement
agencies estimated that it was two decades ahead-in 1990. The federal gov-
ernment said otherwise. With the enactment of the Clean Air Amendments
of 1970 the timetable for clean air was moved ahead to 1975-or 1977, at the
latest.
The California strategy, on one hand, and the federal requirements, on the
other, seemed to represent two extremes. One was so slow that the time when
economic and population growth would overtake control measures could be
readily predicted. This would happen sometime in the middle of the 1980's.
The other was so rapid that only a sudden and wrenching curtailment of
transportation and economic activity could produce the required results. In
the latter case, the cure might be worse than the disease.
An interdisciplinary team of researchers at the Environmental Quality
Laboratory concluded that for air basins with critical air pollution problems-
like that of Los Angeles and surrounding areas-a compromise was needed.
The team put together a strategy that seemed practical and-when added to
pollution control measures presently in effect or planned-would reduce the
number of substandard, smoggy days 80% by 1975 and 90% by 1977.
EQL Strategy #I-so designated since it was only one of many possible
combinations-would introduce several novel features to air pollution control.
It would focus on the millions of motor vehicles presently on the road instead
of relying, as has been the case heretofore, only on increasingly stringent
control of new cars. Engine and evaporation emissions from the existing
stock of cars would be reduced by a number of practical means: changing
the fuel from gasoline to the cleaner-burning natural gas or propane; retrofit
devices and engine modification; mandatory inspection and testing of vehicle
emissions. Somewhat more radical were socio-economics policies that would
reduce use of motor vehicles significantly and thus, for the first time, test the
motorist's determination to reduce air pollution by asking of him a personal
sacrifice of a measure of his freedom in deciding where, when, and how he
would use his car. Stationary sources would be recognized as significant
causes of pollution in the Basin and efforts to make further emission reduc-
tions at power plants, industry, and even service stations, would be redoubled.
The cost of such a program is not small-about $1 billion for those tech-
nical measures to which a dollar value can be attached. That's about $100 a
head for everyone in the South Coast Air Basin, or, looked at another way,
it's less than 35 miles of a new freeway in Los Angeles.
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1/1 NEED FOR A NEW AIR POLLUTION CONTROL STRATEGY
IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN
Twenty five years ago the California State Legislature passed its first air
pollution control legislation. During the last quarter-century California has
come to be recognized as a world leader in air pollution control. Yet in 1970
the California state ambient air quality standard on photochemical oxidants
(including ozone), chosen so that it lies "below that (level) associated with
aggravation of respiratory diseases,"l was violated on 241 days in the South
Coast Air Basin. In that same year the standard on nitrogen dioxide was ex-
ceeded on 115 days and the standard on carbon monoxide (12 hour average)
was violated on 203 days.2
Without the air pollution control measures on stationary sources and new
motor vehicles now in effect the situation would be even worse. But if the
State and local control program in effect in 1971 were to be followed for the
rest of this decade, it would lead at best to a relatively slow improvement
in air quality in this Basin. For example, it is estimated that the California
standard on oxidents would still be violated on 140 days in 1975 and on 85 days
in 1980. The two principal reasons for this slow progress are: (I) the low "death
rate" of dirty old cars and the low "birth rate" of new motor vehicles that
meet stringent exhaust emission and evaporative control standards; (2) the
increase in gasoline consumption at a rate of about 4% per year. The EQL is
certainly not the only group to conclude that a new air pollution control strat-
egy that would deal effectively with these two problems is urgently needed
(Section III 1.1).
While the EQL study of the "smog" problem was in progress, the federal
government began to exert pressure for a much faster rate of improvement
in air quality than the 1971 State and local strategy could possibly provide
(Section III 1.2). On April 30, 1971, the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, acting under the provisions of the Federal Clean Air Act
of 1970 (as amended), published new federal air quality standards that are
even more stringent than the California standards. Except for the standard
on nitrogen dioxide, the federal standards are not to be exceeded more than
once a year. These standards must be attained within three years of the date
of final approval of the state plan, except that an extension of up to two years
may be granted by the Administrator.
Thus, the South Coast Air Basin is required to meet the new federal
ambient air quality standards by 1975, except in the case of photochemical
oxidants, for which the EPA granted a two-year extension.
If the state agencies do not prepare a satisfactory implementation plan,
the Act empowers the Administrator of EPA to develop such a plan, and if
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
broad authority to the Administrator. Even if the Administrator does not act,
I Air Resources Board, Annual Report to Governor Ronald Reagan and the Legislature, entitled
Air Pollution Control in California. 1970, January, 1971, Table 1, p. 24.
'Profile of Air Pollution Control, Los Angeles APeD, 1971.
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private citizens and groups can sue under the Act to force compliance with
federal ambient air quality standards.
In contrast to these new federal requirements the Los Angeles County Air
Pollution Control District stated in its 1971 annual reportJ that the present
matew would brin.g llir CJU9.l~ty up to the Cal:£ornla state standards by 1990!
Thus, the present California control program places "clean air" so far in
the future that any improvements in air quality might well be overtaken by
population and economic growth long before the distant "target date" is
reached. But to reduce violations of air quality standards from the present
level of 241 days per year for photochemical oxidants (for example) to liter-
ally one day per year within the period allowed by the Clean Air Act would
require drastic curtailments in the rates of consumption of gasoline, natural
gas and residual oil in the Basin, and a sudden brake on economic activity.
The most effective practical approach must lie somewhere in between these
two extremes.
The approach adopted in this report occupies this "middle ground." We
recognize that the South Coast Air Basin in California is faced with a uniquely
difficult air pollution control problem. Because of its special meteorology
and topography, and the enormous rate of consumption of fossil fuels,4 even
the best technology likely to be available in this decade would not reduce the
average number of days per year on which State air quality standards on
photochemical oxidants are violated below a lower bound of 10-15 days.5 We
chose for detailed study a particular control strategy (called EQL Strategy
# 1) designed to drive toward these lower limits as rapidly as feasible in the
spirit (if not the letter) of the Clean Air Act of 1970 (as amended).6 In sum-
mary, EQL Strategy # 1 is based partly on new "technical" control measures
to reduce emissions from stationary sources and used motor vehicles.? But
even in the short run (1972-1977) we found it necessary to combine these
technical measures with a set of social and economic incentives and disincen-
tives designed to encourage the shift to low-pollution motor vehicles, to
encourage the use of multiple-occupancy vehicles (buses, carpools, etc.),
and to reduce the annual rate of increase in gasoline consumption in the
Basin. These control measures are not supposed to be all-inclusive, and the
"mix" is not optimized for minimum cost to achieve a given level of air
quality. 8 But they are representative of the kinds of measures that are
required.
'Profile of Air Pollution Control, Los Angeles APCD, 1971.
'List, E. J., Energy Use in California: Implications for the Environment, EQL Report # 3,
December, 1971.
5The California ambient air quality standard states that the maximum daily one-hour average
oxidant level should not exceed 0.10 ppm (parts per million).
'Later (Section III 1.1) this strategy is compared with a strategy that relies mainly on new car con-
trols and does not meet the requirements of the Clean Air Act of 1970 (as amended) even in spirit.
'Some of these measures are included in the new State Implementation Plan (February, 1972)
'Cost optimization for a wide range of strategies is treated in some detail by Trijonis, John, An
Economic Air Pollution Model. Application: Photochemical Smog in Los Angeles County in 1975,
Summer, 1972.
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1/2 EQL STRATEGY NO.1
1/2.1 General Features
The EQL strategy depends on the concept of "management standards,"
based on technical, economic and social feasibility, that would serve as mile-
stones enroute to the clean air required by both the California and federal
ambient air quality standards. These management standards would set a
first "target date," by which time significant percentage reductions are to be
achieved in the number of days per year that ambient air quality standards
are violated in the Basin. By the second "target date" substantial percentage
reductions would have to be made in the remaining number of these
"objectionable" days, etc. This approach provides the flexibility required,
and allows for "feedback" from the public as it assesses the beneficial
effects of specific control measures, measured against the economic and
social costs of these measures.
The Clean Air Act of 1970 (as amended) appears to give the Administrator
of the EPA discretionary authority to approve such an approach by a state
during the period in which a time extension is in effect. Such extensions can
be granted when (among other reasons) the necessary technology is unavail-
able; when the state has implemented reasonable alternatives (as would be
the case if a strategy similar to EQL Strategy # 1 were adopted); when
reasonable interim measures are provided for (the basis of the EQL strategy).
EPA regulations published in the Federal Register on August 14, 1971 en-
courage each state "to consider the socio-economic impact and the relative
costs and benefits" of alternative strategies. Public welfare and productive
capacity are to be weighed as well as public health.
Before discussing specific control measures contained in EQL Strategy #1,
certain desirable main features of any such strategy are outlined as follows:
1. In order to be credible the "target dates" for the achievement of manage-
ment standards ought to be set well within the present decade and not in
the vague future one or two decades hence. December 31, 1975 is a
reasonable first target date (corresponding roughly to the end of the 3-year
period allowed under the Clean Air Act), and December 31, 1977 is a
reasonable second target date (corresponding to the end of the 2-year
extension period).
2. These management standards should be expressed in terms of percentage
reductions in the average number of days per year on which the Califor-
nia (or federal) standards on oxidants, nitrogen dioxide and carbon mon-
oxide are exceeded. For example, a reasonable goal is to reduce these
"objectionable" days in the South Coast Air Basin from the 1970 level of
241 per year to a level of 50 days per year by the end of 1975 (a reduction
of 80%). By the second target date, at the end of 1977, the objectionable
days should be reduced to 25 (an additional redu~tion of 50foF
'If desired a third target date could be set at the end of 1979 by which time a reduction of 50% in
the remaining number of these "objectionable" days must be achieved (to about 13 days per year).
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3. Because of the relatively short time periods involved, the "technical" con-
trol measures required to reach these management standards will have to
be based mainly on existing technology that can be developed and intro-
duced within the next 2-4 years.
4. Any strategy must rely on a number of different control measures, each
of which provides a modest improvement. It is the cumulative effect
which is significant. There is no one "magic solution."
One such strategy (EQL Strategy # 1) is described in the next sub-section.
The control measures that are proposed are not supposed to be all-inclusive,
nor are control costs supposed to be minimized. Our purpose is to illustrate
the kinds of measures that must be taken if the requirements listed above
are to be met. In most of the discussion to follow we are making the "con-
servative" assumption that new motor vehicles for model years beyond 1974
will meet the 1974 California exhaust emissions standards, but not the more
stringent 1975(76 federal standards. Some of the figures to be presented in
Part II will show the additional benefits to be gained (at additional cost!)
if new motor vehicles do in fact meet the federal standards beginning in 1975.
1/2.2 Specific Control Measures
The nature and extent of the specific control measures that are needed depend
on the magnitude of the reductions in emissions of reactive hydrocarbons and
nitrogen oxides that are required in order to meet the management air quality
standards set forth in EQL Strategy # 1. At present no general theory exists
that would enable us to predict ambient air quality for photochemical oxi-
dants, nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide in terms of the emissions level
of the primary contaminants. In lieu of such a theory, the relationship between
air quality and emissions levels is here established by means of a statistical
analysis of air quality monitoring data obtained at the ground-level stations
of the Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District over the last several years. 10
An important simplifying physical assumption is made that for given meteo-
rological conditions the atmospheric concentrations of carbon monoxide and
the "early morning"!l concentrations of reactive hydrocarbons and nitrogen
oxides are directly proportional to their respective emissions levels.
The application of this simple idea to the statistical data is best illustrated
by dealing first with the contaminant nitrogen dioxide, which tends to be
approximately proportional to the total input of nitrogen oxides. Statistical
data is displayed in terms of the average number of days per year that the
maximum atmospheric concentration exceeds a given level for at least one
hour, plotted against the concentration (Figure 1). (The solid curve in
lOThis analysis was carried out by Mr. John Trijonis as part of his Caltech PhD thesis research on
the economics of air pollution control.
II By "early morning" we mean before 9:30 A.M., in Los Angeles, or before photochemical
reactions have begun.
Figure 1 corresponds to the 1969 average of about 1000 tons per day of
nitrogen oxides emissions in the Basin.) As expected, "low" one-hour maxi-
mum concentrations of nitrogen dioxide around 10 pphm12 are exceeded
quite frequently, but "high" concentrations around 50 pphm are rarely ex-
ceeded at this emissions level. These observations correspond roughly to
the relatively high frequency of occurrence of maximum mixing layer heights
(or heights of the base of the infamous inversion layer) that are 3500 feet or
less, compared to the infrequent appearance of maximum mixing layer heights
that are 700 feet, or less. These relatively infrequent low inversion layers
markedly concentrate the pollutants near the ground.
Suppose that by means of a set of control measures the level of emissions
of nitrogen oxides in the Basin is reduced by 50% to 500 tons per day. For the
same meteorological conditions, atmospheric conce~trationsof nitrogen diox-
ide are also cut in half (dashed curve in Figure 1). In other words, if emissions
are reduced by 50%, the simple rule to follow is that the number of days per
year on which a particular maximum one-hour concentration of nitrogen diox-
ide is exceeded is the same as the number of days per year on which twice
this concentration was exceeded at twice the emission level (horizontal
dashed line in Figure 1). By following this rule, we see that at the new
emissions level, a concentration of 25 pphm for one hour (California state
standard) is exceeded on the same number of days per year as a concentra-
tion of 50 pphm was exceeded at the old emissions level. A 50% reduction in
emissions level leads to a 90-95% reduction in days per year of violations of
the state standard (vertical dashed line in Figure 1).
The situation for photochemical oxidants is more complicated than for
nitrogen dioxide because the peak one-hour oxidant level depends on "early-
morning" concentrations of reactive hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides, on
sunlight intensity, temperature and other variables in a complex manner. In
spite of this difficulty, by using the Los Angeles APCD data Trijonis was able
to work out "summer" and "winter" correlations between daily one-hour
average oxidant level and "early-morning" concentrations of reactive hydro-
carbons and nitrogen oxides. The effect of reductions in emissions levels on
the concentrations of these two substances is calculated just as nitrogen
dioxide was analyzed in the simple illustrative example given earlier. 13
Our calculations show that in order to reduce from 241 to 50 the average
number of days per year on which the maximum daily one-hour average oxi-
dant concentration of 0.10 ppm is exceeded14 (first "target" of EQL Strategy
# 1) the total emissions of reactive hydrocarbons from all sources in the Basin
must be reduced to 28% of present levels, and emissions of nitrogen oxides
"parts per hundred million.
13Estimates of the number of objectionable days per year for each pollutant were obtained for
Central Los Angeles. The average number of days per year on which the California ambient air
quality standards are violated at some station in the entire Basin is significantly higher. For photo-
chemical oxidant the number of objectionable days for the entire Basin is 1.7 times higher on the
average than in Central L.A., and for nitrogen dioxide the number of such days is 2.3 times hiBher
on the average.
I'California State ambient air quality standard.
22
must be reduced to about 45% of present levels. If these reductions were
made, the California ambient air quality standards for nitrogen dioxide of
25 pphm for one hour would be exceeded on 10 days per year as compared
with 130 days in 1970. Th~ "h~t\lth wllrning"l5 lcvcl of aonc'hour average
oxidant concentration of 0.20 ppm (twice the State standard) for persons
with coronary artery diseases or chronic respiratory diseases would be
exceeded on 15 days per year, as compared with 150 days per year in 1970.
Thus, Phase 1 of EQL Strategy # 1 is designed to reduce total emissions
of reactive hydrocarbons to 28% of present levels and nitrogen oxide emis-
sions to 45% of present levels by December 31, 1975.
These objectives would be accomplished by means of the following Phase 1
control measures, combined with the effects of the new cars introduced into
the Basin.
A. Motor Vehicles
1. Mandatory conversion of all gasoline-burning commercial motor vehicles
of model years 1970 and later in both small and large fleets (trucks, taxis,
buses, cars) to burn a gaseous fuel, such as compressed natural gas or
liquid propane gas, by December 31, 1973, in the South Coast Air Basin.
This measure means that about 33% of the gasoline now burned in the
Basin would be replaced by gaseous fuels.
2. (a) Mandatory installation on 1960-1965 gasoline-powered cars of a cur-
rently available control device that reduces hydrocarbon emissions by
about 60% and NOx emissions by about 35% on pre-1966 cars. 16
(b) Mandatory installation on 1966-1970 gasoline-powered cars of a con-
trol device that reduces nitrogen oxides emissions by a substantial
amounLI?
3. Mandatory installation of an evaporative control device on gasoline-
powered 1966-1969 vehicles that reduces fuel tank evaporative emissions
by 90%. (Starting with the 1970 models new cars have such controls.)
Since this device is estimated to cost approximately $150 to purchase
and install, some subsidy or cost-sharing would be required. (Less expen-
sive retrofit devices are currently under study at the EQL.) If such a
subsidy were to be paid to vehicle owners for installation of this device,
an equal subsidy ought to be made available to vehicle owners who elect
any other step that would reduce reactive hydrocarbon emissions in the
15Proposed by the Los Angeles County Medical Association.
16The State Air Resources Board has approved the General Motors vacuum spark advance
disconnect device and the Air Quality Products capacitor discharge, ignition optimization system
for these cars (Section Uj3A).
"In November 1971 Governor Reagan signed the Sieroty-Cologne Bill, which requires that
beginning in 1973 all 1966-1970 cars must be equipped with a device that will "significantly"
cut nitrogen oxide emissions. The certification that such a device is installed on the car is to be made
on initial registration, on transfer of ownership, or on renewal of registration. A limit of $35 is set
on the initial cost of such a device, induding installation charges, and the bill specifies that it
should not require maintenance more than once every 12,000 miles at a maximum cost of $15. The
State Air Resources Board must now set the standards for such equipment.
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Basin by a comparable amount. Example: purchase of a post-1969 vehicle
to replace an older vehicle that is sold to a new owner who lives and works
outside the Basin.
4. A mandatory vehicle emissions inspection system that would: (1) insure
that new and used gasoline-powered vehicles meet the emissions standards
set for them by present and proposed control measures; (2) insure that
vehicles operating on gaseous fuels are properly tuned to achieve the low
exhaust emissions levels qualifying them for the 7 cents/gallon (equiva-
lent) State fuel tax remission;18 (3) form the basis for a system of emis-
sions taxes.
5. Social and economic incentives and disincentives designed to encourage
the shift to low-pollution motor vehicles by motorists and vehicle manu-
facturers, to encourage the use of multiple-occupancy vehicles, and to halt
or at least reduce the annual rate of increase in gasoline consumption.
Such measures include: (1) emissions taxes assessed on car owners in
proportion to the amount of emissions their cats discharge into the air;
(2) reserved "fast lanes" on freeways for buses and carpools; (3) controlled
access to freeways so that buses and carpools are given priority during
rush hours; (4) free or subsidized parking for carpoolers; (5) buses and
demand-jitneys partially subsidized by revenues collected from emissions
taxes; (6) as a last resort, additional gasoline taxes and/ or a limit on the
total consumption of gasoline in the Basin at 2.7 billion gallons per year
by a system of freely auctioned coupons, giving motorists in the Basin
gasoline purchase rights up to this total amount, but no more. 19
In our calculations we assumed that by December 31, 1975, the com-
bined effect of all the measures under # 5 amounts to a 20% reduction in
the motor vehicle pollution remaining after measures # 1-4 are put into
practice.
B. Stationary Sources
1. Nitrogen Oxides. Mandatory installation of two-stage combustion and/ or
gas recirculation (or other control devices) designed to cut NOx emissions
by 50% by the end of 1973 in all fossil-fuel power plants.2o Mandatory use
of low "excess" air in industrial boilers and heaters using natural gas with
a rating in excess of 30 million BTU/hour (about 8.5 megawatts).
"California law presently exempts vehicles operating with propane or natural gas conversion
systems approved by the Air Resources Board from the State tax on vehicle fuel.
19According to E. J. List, the actual rate of gasoline consumption in 1969 was 4 billion gallons
a year. The figure of 2.7 billion gallons represents what is left after one-third of current gasoline
demand is converted to gaseous fuels.
'OSuch control devices are now being installed in the large electric power plants of Southern
California Edison and the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.
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2. Hydrocarbons. (a) Substitution of nonreactive materials by users of
organic solvents emitting "high reactivity" HC (as defined by the Los
Angeles APCD) in order to cut these emissions by 50% by 1973.21 (b) Man-
datory recirculation of vapors from gasoline storage tanks in filEng sta-
tions back to tanker trucks during filling operations.
c. Phase Two
Phase 2 of EQL Strategy # 1 consists of a limited number of "smog alerts" to
be called in the Basin during the period July through September when the
oxidant level exceeds 0.20 ppm at any station in the Basin, or when early
morning inversion layer height and temperature indicate a high probability
that this level will be exceeded. 22 Beginning in 1973 two or three such alerts
would be called, and by 1975 the number of such alerts would be increased
to 6-8.
Although we do not attribute any specific reduction in the number of "ob-
jectionable" days to Phase 2, it seems clear that the two phases of EQL
Strategy # 1 are mutually reenforcing. Incentives for reducing emissions are
created by calling smog alerts that shut down or curtail emission sources,
while reductions in emissions require fewer smog alerts. If our target of about
15 days per year for an oxidant level of 0.20 ppm is reached by the end of
1975, these smog alerts could be discontinued.
1. During these smog alerts only "low emission" vehicles,23 vehicles with
two or more passengers, and buses and jitneys would be permitted on
the freeways.
2. During an alert all stationary sources of "high reactivity" HC emissions
would be shut down.
Rough estimates indicate that the cost of Phase 1 of EQL Strategy # 1 for
the South Coast Air Basin is about one billion dollars through December 31,
1975, which amounts to about $100 per head, or $300 per household ($25
per head per year or $75 per household per year). The cost breakdown is as
follows: (1) loss of federal and State tax revenues by conversion to gaseous
fuels-$400 million; (2) Vacuum Spark Advance Disconnect-$70 million;
(3) evaporative control retrofit-$225 million; (4) mandatory motor vehicle
21Approximately 100 tons/day of "high reactivity" HC are emitted by these sources. Another
550 tons/ day of "low reactivity" HC emissions from stationary sources would not be affected by
this program.
"At present first stage smog alerts are called when the oxidant level exceeds 0.50 ppm (five
times the State air quality standard). No emissions sources are curtailed during these alerts.
lJThese vehicles could be identified by means of special windshield stickers.
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inspection program-$200 million; (5) controls for stationary sources-$lOO
million.24
By the second target date of December 31,1977, EQL Strategy #1 calls for
no more than 25 days per year on which the California ambient air quality
standards for oxidants is violated in the Basin. Our calculations show that in
order to achieve this objective the total emissions of reactive hydrocarbons in.
the Basin must be reduced to about 22% ofpresent levels and nitrogen oxides
emissions must be reduced to about 38% ofpresent levels. If the Phase 1 con-
trol measures are successful in reaching their targets by the end of 1975, it
turns out that the additional reductions in total emissions that are required
by the end of 1977 could be achieved by means of two specific control meas-
ures: (I) continued conversion of gasoline-burning commercial vehicles to
burn a gaseous fuel, as long as emissions from new vehicles are significantly
higher than emissions from gaseous-fueled vehicles (maintaining the level
of one-third of the gasoline replaced by gaseous fuels at all times); (2) contin-
uation of mandatory vehicle emissions inspection program (AA of Phase I).
The social and economic incentives and disincentives listed under A.5 of
Phase I would almost certainly be necessary in the long run (Section 1/3),
but no additional reductions in emissions after 1975 are attributed to these
measures in the present "conservative" calculations. The additional cost of
this program from the end of 1975 to the end of 1977 is estimated at about
$380 million. (The total cost of the emission controls for new cars for 1976
and 1977 is estimated at about $300 million in this Basin.)
In Section II/2 of this report the reductions in emissions from motor vehi-
cles and stationary sources that can be achieved by each of the control meas-
ures in EQL Strategy # 1 are discussed in detail. In Figures 3 and 4 we show
the breakdown in reductions in reactive automotive hydrocarbons and nitrogen
oxide emissions for L.A. County. Figures 5 and 6 show the contribution from
stationary sources and the reductions in total reactive automotive hydrocar-
bons and nitrogen oxide emissions. Based on these reductions the projected
improvement in ambient air quality for photochemical oxidant and nitrogen
dioxide are calculated by methods already outlined and described in detail
in Section II/2.2. In Figures 7 and 8 the results of these calculations are
illustrated for the "present strategy" (1971) and for EQL Strategy # 1. Fig-
ure 9 shows the projected reductions in the number of "health warning" days
(proposed by the Los Angeles County Medical Association for persons suffer-
ing from coronary artery diseases or chronic respiratory diseases).
Control measures A.l and A.5 on motor vehicles will also greatly reduce
carbon monoxide emissions into the atmosphere of the Basin, as shown in
24The costs to the buyers of new cars that meet the California exhaust emission standards is
estimated at approximately $400 million over this same period. This estimate is based on an addi-
tional cost of pollution controls of $50jcar in 1972, $150jcar in 1973 and $300jcar in 1974 and
1975. Detailed cost calculations contained in Trijonis' thesis based on "harder" data later shows
that the cost of Phase I in the South Coast Air Basin is about $1.8 billion, including new car con-
trols. This cost amounts to about $45 per capita per year, or about 1.2% of disposable income per
capita after taxes.
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Figure 10. In Figure 11 we show the corresponding projected improvements
in ambient air quality for carbon monoxide according to the "present strat-
egy" and EQL Strategy # 1. By 1977 EQL Strategy #1 would virtually elim-
in!lt~ th~ ~1lrbllt1 m~Mxlde problem ;n L.A. County.
In Sections II/3 and II/4 the feasibility of the "technical" control measures
A.I-A.4 and B.l and 2 for motor vehicles and stationary sources is examined.
By feasibility we mean supply, distribution and marketing of gaseous fuels;
economics of conversion to gaseous fuels; safety, insurance and reliability
of gaseous-fueled motor vehicles; economics and performance of "retrofit"
devices on used cars; availability and performance of control devices for
stationary sources. No important technical or economic difficulties were un-
covered in this study. However, a considerable amount of "risk capital" and
organizational effort is required to put these control measures into effect on
the time schedule adopted in EQL Strategy # 1. On the other hand, the pro-
gram provides some attractive opportunities for profitable business ventures
and for employment of presently under-employed or unemployed skilled
people in the Los Angeles area.
In Section II/3 the controversial question of the conversion of commercial
motor vehicles to burn a gaseous fuel is discussed in some detail. The supply
problems for compressed natural gas (CNG) and propane (LPG) in this Basin
were studied carefully, not only by the EQL staff but also independently by a
well-known oil and gas consulting firm retained by the EQL-The Pace Com-
pany of Houston, Texas. The Pace Company report concluded that supplies
of CNG and LPG are adequate to replace up to 33% of the gasoline burned
in the Basin. 25 The report recommended a "mix" of 25% CNG and 8% LPG
to make up the figure of 33%. This amount of CNG is equivalent to 250 million
cubic feet per day. In the "smoggy" summer months "firm" customer demand
for natural gas is about 500 million cubic feet per day, leaving about 2.5 billion
cubic feet .per day for "interruptible" users (Figure 12). About 10% of the
"interruptible" supply would have to be diverted from electric power plants
and industrial users to motor vehicles. Such a diversion could be accom-
plished by means of a small price differential. In the relatively "smog-free"
winter months natural gas is in short supply because of large "firm" customer
demand. Thus motor vehicles converted to CNG are almost always equipped
with "dual-fuel" systems that allow them to switch to gasoline in the winter
months, or when they are outside the Basin.
If 8% of the projected gasoline consumption in the Basin is replaced by
propane by 1975, the requirement for propane amounts to about 10 million
barrels per year, a quantity equal to the total consumption of propane in
California in 1970 (Figure 13). However, propane supply is increasing rapidly
in the 1970's, Canadian propane supplies are available, and the figure of 8%
is regarded by the Pace Company as a reasonable initial target that would not
place too great a strain on refineries and other sources (mainly natural gas
fields).
25The major conclusions of the Pace Report are discussed in Section IIj3.!.
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So far as distribution of CNG is concerned commercial fleets generally
would have their own fueling facility, including compressor and storage tank.
Recently the Union Oil Co. and Pacific Lighting Corp. announced a coopera-
tive pilot program whereby two service stations in Riverside, California, will
sell CNG to motor vehicles.26 This system could be expanded rapidly to in-
clude a certain fraction of the service stations in the Basin. Propane, on the
other hand, is already available at about 64 stations in the Los Angeles area,
and a number of other stations now selling propane to campers could easily
obtain the necessary permit to sell this fuel to motor vehicles. This distribu-
tion system could also be expanded once the demand was established.
Similar conclusions about feasibility were reached regarding the possible
rate of conversion of motor vehicles to burn a gaseous fuel. After several days
of training, a good mechanic can convert one vehicle in about one working
day. Thus 1000 mechanics working 250 days per year could convert the
estimated 500,000 commercial fleet vehicles in the Basin in about two years.
In contrast to these technical-economic measures, the detailed effects of
the social and economic measures listed under A.5 (and discussed in detail in
Section II/5) are very difficult to forecast. The whole purpose of this set of
incentives and disincentives is to provide alternate modes of transportation
and to influence human behavior. Lacking a predictive theory of human be-
havior we need to introduce demonstration or "pilot" programs in order to
obtain "feedback" from the public in a reasonably short time period. In the
case of the emissions tax, for example, an iterative procedure could be util-
ized, in which a certain reasonable tax schedule is set and the effects observed
for one year, after which the schedule is revised as needed. These pilot and
iterative programs are necessary first steps toward a long-range strategy for
the post-1982 period.
"These stations began selling eNG to motor vehicles in May, 1972.
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1/3 A GLIMPSE AT THE POST 1982 PERIOD AND
LONG·RANGE NEEDS
Sometime in the early 1980's emissions of reactive hydrocarbons, nitrogen
oxides and carbon monoxide into the atmosphere and the number of smoggy
days in the Basin will begin to increase again, even if EQL Strategy #1 is
fully implemented (Figure 14). The projected growth in population and in the
rate of consumption of gasoline, natural gas and oil in the Basin makes this
outcome inevitable-if no new steps are taken. Section II/6 of this report
contains a brief discussion of some possible approaches to the long-term air
pollution problem in the Basin, including (I) introduction of new technology,
e.g., electric commuter cars, replacement of natural gas and oil-fueled indus-
trial burners by electric-powered devices, replacement of electric power
plants inside the Basin by new power plants located outside the Basin;
(2) limitations on population, industry and commerce in the Basin, provision
for a balanced transportation system, and important changes in life-style.
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PART II: SECTION 11/1
These days one hears much of WhatAlvinToffler has called "future shock."
Change comes at an accelerating rate-faster than many can assimilate it.
Such cannot be said of California's efforts to control air pollution. There
"future shock" gives way to "slow history." The consensus that the automo-
bile is the principal source of pollution in the Basin was slow to emerge, and
it was not until the mid-sixties that the first effective exhaust emission con-
trols were required for new cars. By 1970 hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide
automotive emissions had declined about 20% from their 1965 peak, but ox-
ides of nitrogen were not controlled until the 1971 model year. Hopefully
official projections are correct and we are now on the down side of the 1971
NOx peak. From now until 1976 California and Federal automotive emis-
sions control requirements become progressively tighter until 1976 levels are
down 90% from the 1970. This would seem to take care of the air polllltion
problem, so can't we stop worrying?
Even if we assume that the complicated and cumbersome control tech-
nology for new cars is completely successful, there are two reasons why \the
answer to the question above must be "no." One is that it takes so long to re-
place the present motor vehicle population with the new clean cars. (AbolUt
7% of all cars in California retire to the junkyard every year, and they are
replaced by new cars that account for about 11% of the car population in the
state every year.) The other reason is growth. The consumption of gasoline
is increasing about 4% every year. (Look at the difference in the death rate of
old cars and the birth rate of new ones.)
The present control strategy for the South Coast Air Basin-relying as it
does on controlling only the new cars as they are built and holding the line
on stationary source emissions-will reduce the 241 days of violating the
state oxidant air quality standard to 140 in 1975 and 85 in 1980. It will re-
duce the days of exceeding the state nitrogen dioxide air quality standard
from 115 in 1970 to 50 in 1975 and 12 in 1980. This assumes our best hopes
for clean new cars are realized.
The EQL study proposes some ways of accelerating clean air history by
using the best available, practical technology for controlling emissions of
cars presently on the road; by reducing the use of those cars; and by further
reductions in emissions from stationary sources. The result in 1975 would be
50, instead of 140 days of violating the state oxidant air quality standards,
and by 1977, 25 days instead of 85. This is 24 days more than the Environ-
mental Protection Agency says that its own air quality standards-which are
slightly lower than the California standards used in this report-can be ex-
ceeded. The accelerated results outlined in this report represent a good faith
effort which, in the judgement of the EQL team, is probably as far as the
South Coast Air Basin can go within the time allowed by the Clean Air
Amendments.
This conservative program should be kept in mind by those who find the
measures proposed in the EQL program radical and disturbing.
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11/1 A NEW AIR POLLUTION CONTROL STRATEGY FOR
THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN
1111.1 The Present Control Strategy and Its Deficiencies
The Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act of 1967 created the State Air
Resources Board (ARB) and charged it with the responsibility for setting and
enforcing exhaust emission standards for all new motor vehicles sold in
California. l By 1970 the control measures established by the Board on tail-
pipe, crankcase and evaporative emissions had reduced total hydrocarbon
(HC) and carbon monoxide (CO) emissions in the South Coast Air Basin
by 20% from the peak values reached in 1965. This reduction was achieved
in spite of an increase in gasoline consumption of about 4% per year in the
Basin. In 1970 the ARB established exhaust emission standards for oxides
of nitrogen (NOx) for all new light-duty motor vehicles, beginning with the
1971 model year. Total NOx emissions in the Basin should begin to decline
from the peak reached in 1971 as older motor vehicles are replaced year by
year by new vehicles meeting the increasingly stringent California standards.
Stationary sources in the South Coast Air Basin are controlled fairly
strictly. They account for about 10% of the "reactive" hydrocarbon emissions
and about 35% of the nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions at 1971 levels. In
mid-1971 the Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District (APCD) announced
that it would formulate a program to cut emissions from stationary sources
in half by the end of 1973.
These are impressive programs and important accomplishments. Yet, if
the present course of action is followed for the rest of the decade, it will lead
at best to a relatively slow rate of improvement in ambient air quality.
(Dr. Burton Klein of Caltech refers to this type of strategy as "slow history".)
According to our predictions (Section 11/2) the average number of days per
year on which various California State standards are exceeded at some loca-
tion in the South Coast Air Basin will still be discouragingly high by the
year 1975, as shown in Table 1. Even as late as the year 1980, thirteen years
after the passage of the Mulford-Carrell Act, the maximum daily one-hour
average oxidant level (including ozone) of 0.10 ppm, chosen so that it lies
"below that associated with aggravation of respiratory diseases,"2 will be
exceeded an average of 85 days per year at some location in the South Coast
Air Basin. The two principal reasons for this slow rate of improvement in
ambient air quality are: (1) the slow rate of attrition of "dirty" old cars
(about 7% of all cars "die" each year in California), and the slow birth rate
of new "cleaner" cars (about 11 % of the car population per year); (2) the
IUntil 1970 exhaust emission standards were adopted only for new light-duty motor vehicles
under 6000 pounds gross weight. In that year the ARB establisb.ed standards and test procedures
for hydrocarbons, oxides of nitrogen and carbon monoxide exhaust emissions from heavy-duty,
diesel-powered and gasoline-powered vehicles over 6000 pounds gross weight, to become effective
in the 1973 model year.
'Air Resources Board, Annual Report to Governor Ronald Reagan and the Legislature, entitled Air
Pollution Control in California, 1970, January, 1971 [Table I, p. 24].
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YEAR
STANDARD
TABLE 1
Present Strategy (1971)1
1970 1975 1980
Nitrogen dioxide concentration
0.25 ppm for 1 hr.1
Maximum daily 1 hr. average
oxidant level
0.10 ppm1
0.20 ppm5-
Eye Irritation
115/days/year
241
150
130
50
140
35
50
12
85
20
15
increase in gasoline consumption at the rate of about 4% per year. Beyond
1980 the average number of days per year on which the California State
standard on photochemical oxidant is exceeded reaches a minimum of
about 80 days per year in 1982, and then increases again because of the
expected increase in annual gasoline consumption.
The EQL is certainly not the first group to call attention to deficiencies in
the present air pollution control strategy. In September, 1970, the Technical
Advisory Committee (TAC) of the ARB concluded that the present strategy
is wholly inadequate to meet State ambient air quality standards on oxidants
and nitrogen dioxide (N02) in the foreseeable future. 6 The TAC report
recommended drastic changes that would "have direct and jarring effects on
residents of the South Coast Air Basin." These changes included suggestions to
limit the number and use ofautomobiles, trucks and aircraft, to remove or make
essentially emission-free all industries and fossil-fuel power plants in the Basin,
and to limit the growth of population, industry and commerce.
In February, 1971, the State Environmental Quality Study Council (EQSC),
acting on the basis of its own studies and the TAC report, called for an Emer-
gency Air Quality Measure to be enacted by concurrent resolution of the
State Legislature. This measure would "direct the ARB to conduct intensive
studies to determine means of bringing the earliest possible emergency relief
to the most critical air basins, and to determine what long-term continuing
measures are necessary to deal with air pollution imperiling health."7 In rec-
ommending long-term measures of its own, the EQSC adopted all of the sug-
gestions made by the TAC report, and added another-development of clean
sources of energy.
'Based on the "conservative" assumption that new motor vehicles for model years beyond 1974
meet the California 1974 exhaust emission standards, but not the more stringent 1975/76 federal
standards. "Present Strategy (1971)" refers to the 1971 California strategy before the adoption
of the State Implementation Plan submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in
February, 1972.
'California State ambient air quality standard.
'''Health Warning" level recommended by Los Angeles County Medical Association for persons with
coronary artery diseases or chronic respiratory diseases.
6Recommended Ambient Air Quality Standards Applicable to AllAir Basins, a report to the Califor-
nia Air Resources Board by the Technical Advisory Committee, September, 1970.
'State of California, Environmental Quality Study Council, Progress Report, February, 1971.
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On November 12, 1970, the highly respected legislative analyst, Mr. A. Alan
Post, called attention to the TAC report in a lengthy statement on the ARB
submitted to the Subcommittee on Air Pollution of the Assembly Transpor-
tation Committee. Mr. Post drew a distinction between short-term manage-
ment standards based on technical, economic and social feasibility, and
ambient air quality standards defined as goals to be reached over a longer
period of time. While he did not go as far as the TAC report, Mr. Post recom-
mended important changes in the organization and functions of the ARB,
and he concluded that "logically the Board should undertake an intensive
effort to reduce the emissions of used vehicles (emphasis ours) in Califor-
nia ... We now know that control of new car emissions is not capable of
producing significant improvement in air quality in the Los Angeles and San
Francisco areas within a matter of years8 ••• If any significant short-term
improvement is to be made in air quality during the next several years, it will
have to be accomplished by controls on vehicles now in operation" (empha-
sis Mr. Post's). "
The ARB itself recognizes the importance of older cars in urban areas.
Following the guidelines set by the California Legislature in the Pure Air Act
of 1968, as amended in 1969, the Board in 1970 accredited one exhaust con-
trol device for 1955-1965 cars.9 In cooperation with the Division of Highways,
the ARB is also testing motor vehicles burning liquid petroleum gas or natural
gas as a fuel. Several such systems were approved as meeting the Board's
1974 exhaust emission standards, and therefore eligible for exemption from
the 7-cent per gallon State tax, as provided by the Legislature in 1970.
The drive to control exhaust emissions from older cars was given additional
weight by Governor Reagan's Special Message to the Legislature on "Smog"
(March 11, 1971). The Governor's message called for "authority to require
immediate installation of a device to control nitrogen oxide discharges in
1966-1970 model cars when it becomes available,"\O and asked also for
"realistic emission standards and pollution control device requirements for
1955-1965 used cars."Il
Meanwhile, impetus to clean up the air we breathe came from a new
direction. On April 30, 1971, the Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, acting under the provisions of the Federal Clean Air Act of 1970
(as amended), published new federal ambient air quality standards that are
'On the basis of observations made on a recent air shuttle between Los Angeles and San Fran-
cisco, several members of the EQL staff concluded that Mr. Post's statement applies as well to the
wbole region between the two cities.
9Unfortunately, certain difficulties with this device, developed by Air Pollution Controlled
(Denver, Colorado), led Norris Industries to withdraw from its manufacturing and marketing agree-
ment with the Denver firm.
lOIn November 1971 Governor Reagan signed the Sieroty-Cologne Bill, which requires that
beginning in 1973, all 1966-1970 cars must be equipped with a device that will "significantly" cut
nitrogen oxide emissions. (See footnote on page l23: Part I). It is expected that the first such devices
will be available by September, 1972.
"The ARB has approved both the General Motors device and the. Air Quality Products device
for these cars (see Section Uf3.4).
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even more stringent than the California standards (Table 2). Except for the
standard on NOz the federal standards listed in Table 2 are not to be ex-
ceeded more than once a year.
CALIFORNIAPOLLUTANT
TABLE 2
Comparison of California State Ambient Air Quality Standards
and Federal Standards (April 30, 1971)
FEDERAL
(Primary andSecondary)
Nitrogen Dioxide 0.25 ppm for 1 hr. 0.05 ppm (annual
average)
Photochemical Oxidant
Carbon Monoxide
0.10 ppm for 1 hr.
40 ppm for 1 hr. and
10 ppm for 12 hrs.
0.08 ppm for 1 hr.
35 ppm for 1 hr. and
9 ppm for 8 hrs.
The Clean Air Act now requires "prompt and effective action" by the states
to develop an air pollution abatement plan that will meet these standards.
This law is bound to have a profound effect not only on air pollution control
strategy, but on life in the South Coast Air Basin.
11/1.2 Implications of the Clean Air Act of 1970 for Air
Pollution Control Strategy in the South Coast
Air Basin
The Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 USC 1857-1857 1 as amended by Public Law
91-604,12 is an exacting federal statute which requires every state to develop
an adequate air pollution abatement plan by 30 January, 1972. The plan must
provide for the implementation, enforcement and maintenance of national
ambient air quality standards promulgated by the Administrator of the EPA
(Table 2). These air quality standards must be attained within three years of
the date of approval of such plan or any revision thereof. 13 The Administrator
of the EPA may, in his discretion, grant an extension of up to two years in
time allowed for the attainment of the primary standards. 14.
Under Final EPA Requirements for preparation, adoption, and submittal
of implementation plans,15 states must develop a far-reaching control
strategy for attaining the national primary ambient air quality standards.
"Control strategy" means a combination of measures designated to achieve
"Hereafter referred to as "the Act."
13Section 110 (a)(2) of the Clean Air Act (1970); 40 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) 51.10(b)
I4Section llO(e)(I) of the Act; 40 CFR 51.30(a) (1971).
"40 CFR 51 (1971),36 Fed. Reg. 22398-22417 (25 November 1971).
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the aggregate reduction of emissions necessary for attainment and mainte-
nance of a national standard, including, but not limited to, measures such as:
1. Emission limitations.
2. Federal or State emission charges or taxes or other economic incentives or
disincentives.
3. Closing or relocation of residential, commercial or industrial facilities.
4. Changes in schedules or methods of operation of commercial or industrial
facilities or transportation systems, including, but not limited to, short-
term changes made in accordance with standby plans.
5. Periodic inspection and testing of motor vehicle emission control systems,
at such time as the Administrator determines that such programs are
feasible and practicable.
6. Emission control measures applicable to in-use motor vehicles, including,
but not limited to, measures such as mandatory maintenance, installation
of emission control devices, and conversion to gaseous fuels.
7. Measures to reduce motor vehicle traffic, including, but not limited to,
measures such as commuter taxes, gasoline rationing; parking restrictions,
or staggered working hours.
8. Expansion or promotion of the use of mass transportation facilities
through measures such as increases in the frequency, convenience and
passenger-carrying capacity of mass transportation systems or providing
for special bus lanes on major streets and highways.
9. Any land use or transportation control measures not specifically delin-
eated herein. 16
In regions where national standards will not be met by application of the fed-
eral motor vehicle emission standards alone, "... the control strategy shall
provide for application of such other measures as may be necessary for attain-
ment and m·aintenance of such national standard."l?
Each plan must show that the State has legal authority to carry out the
plan, including authority to:
1. Adopt emission standards and limitations and any other measures neces-
sary for attainment and maintenance of national standards.
2. Enforce applicable laws, regulations, and standards, and seek injunctive
relief.
3. Abate pollutant emissions on an emergency basis to prevent substantial
endangerment to the health of persons, i.e., authority comparable to that
available to the Administrator under section 303 of the Act.
1640 CFR Sl.I (n)(l971).
1740 CFR 51.14(b)(1971).
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4. Prevent construction, modification, or operation of any stationary source
at any location where emissions from such source will prevent the attain-
ment or maintenance of a national standard.
&. Obia~n ~nformai~on necessary to determ;ne whether a;r pollut:on sources
are in compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and standards, includ-
ing authority to require record keeping and to make inspections and con-
duct tests of air pollution sources.
6. Require owners or operators of stationary sources to install, maintain, and
use emission monitoring devices and to make periodic reports to the State
on the nature and amounts of emissions from such stationary sources; also
authority for the State to make such data available to the public as re-
ported and as correlated with any applicable emission standards or
limitations. 18
The plan must also provide for public availability of emission data reported
by source owners or operators or otherwise obtained by a State or local
agency. 19
Regions such as Los Angeles, where existing ambient levels of pollutants
exceed the levels specified by applicable national standards, must develop a
plan that "... shall set forth a control strategy which shall provide for the
degree of emission reduction necessary for attainment and maintenance of
such national standard, including the degree of emission reduction necessary
to offset emission increases that can reasonably be expected to result from
projected growth of population, industrial activity, motor vehicle traffic, or
other factors that may cause or contribute to increased emissions."2o
The Administrator has ample powers of enforcement under the Act. The
Administrator may issue orders requiring any person to comply with an im-
plementation plan whenever he finds that such person is in violation of
any requirement of an applicable implementation plan under the Act, Sec-
tion 113 (a). He may also order any state to enforce the plan effectively if he
finds that the state has failed to act 30 days after being notified of such fail-
ure by the Administrator. Instead of issuing an order, the Administrator may
bring a civil action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary
injunction.
The Act provides penalties of up to $25,000 per day of violation and one
year in prison for persons knowingly violating requirements of the Act more
than 30 days after notification of the violation by the Administrator. These
penalties apply also to persons acting in violation of an order of the Adminis-
trator. Subsequent violations may subject the wrongdoer to a fine of $50,000
per day and two years in prison.
"40 CFR 51.11(a)(l971).
"40 CFR 51.10(c) (1971).
2040 CFR 51.12(a)(1971).
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The Act provides emergency powers for the Administrator under Section 303.
Upon receipt of evidence that a pollution source presents an imminent and
substantial endangerment to the health of persons, and that the appropriate
state or local authorities have not acted to abate such sources, the Adminis-
trator may bring suit in the name of the United States to restrain immediately
any person causing or contributing to the pollutant.
Any person may bring a civil action in his own behalf under Section 304 of
the Act against any person who is alleged to be in violation of an emission
standard or limitation under the Act, or an order of the Administrator or a
State with respect to such a standard or limitation. A person may also bring
suit against the Administrator for failure to perform an act which is not dis-
cretionary. Any person may also intervene as a matter of right in an action
brought by the Administrator or a State.
Thus, the Act, administered by Mr. William Ruckelshaus, requires prompt
and effective action to develop a viable air pollution abatement plan for the
South Coast Air Basin. If the State ARB and the Los Angeles APCD do not
develop an imaginative and comprehensive plan, the Federal Government
will develop such a plan. Even if the Administrator does not act, private
citizens and groups can sue under the Act to force compliance with federal
emission standards and limitations [(sec. 304 (a) (l»)].
11/1.3 Short-term (1972-1977) Objectives and
Management Air Quality Standards
The California and federal ambient air quality standards (Table 2, Section III
1.1) are absolute standards, in the sense that certain prescribed pollutant
levels must not be exceeded more than once a year. No attempt is made to
assess the damage to health, property or esthetic v41ues if these standards are
exceeded more often, nor is there any analysis of the control costs associated
with measures designed to reduce the number of violations to one day per
year. No "middle ground" is recognized between the present unsatisfactory
situation (Table I) and the attainment of ambient air quality standards.
The approach adopted in this report occupies this "middle ground." We
recognize that the South Coast Air Basin in California is faced with a
uniquely difficult air pollution control problem. Because of its special
meteorology and topography, and the enormous rate of consumption of fossil
fuels,21 even the best technology likely to be available in this decade cannot
reduce the average number of days per year on which State air quality stand-
ards on photochemical oxidants are violated below a lower bound of 10-15
days.22 Drastic curtailments in the rates of consumption of gasoline, natural
"List, E. J., Energy Use in California: Implications for the Environment. EQL Report #3,
December 1971.
"The California ambient air quality standard states that the maximum daily one-hour average
oxidant level should not exceed 0.10 ppm (parts per million).
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gas and residual oil, and sharp reduction in economic activity would be
needed in order to bring the number of "objectionable" days down to (liter-
ally) one day per year within a five-year period, as required by the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970. However, the f~ct that th~ f~utral stanuards are
unattainable within this Basin by the end of 1977 should in no way excuse us
from making a maximum effort to drive toward the lower bound of 10-15
objectionable days per year as rapidly as feasible.
Our strategy for air pollution control is based on the concept of "manage-
ment standards" that take into account the technical, economic and social
feasibility of achieving substantial improvements in air quality. These man-
agement standards are stated in terms of a series of definite "target dates,"
by which times certain percentage reductions are to be achieved in the aver-
age number of days per year on which the California ambient air quality
standards for oxidants, nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide are violated.
For example, our proposed goal is to reduce the number of these "objection-
able" days for photochemical oxidants in the South Coast Air Basin from the
1970 level of 241 days per year to a level of 50 days per year by the end of
1975 (a reduction of 80%). By the second target date, at the end of 1977, these
objectionable days should be reduced to 25 days per year (an additional re-
duction of 50% and an overall reduction of 90%).23
The Clean Air Act appears to give the Administrator of the EPA discretion-
ary authority to approve an alternative approach similar to the one we pro-
pose during the period in which a two-year time extension is in effect (from
1975 to 1977). Such extensions can be granted when (among other reasons)
the necessary technology is unavailable; when the State has implemented
reasonable alternatives (as would be the case if a strategy similar to EQL
Strategy #1 were adopted); when reasonable interim measures are provided
like those in EQL Strategy #1. EPA regulations published in the Federal
Register on August 14, 1971, encourage each state "to consider the socio-
economic impact and the relative costs and benefits" of alternative strategies.
Public welfare and productive capacity are to be weighed as well as public
health.
While the management standards approach honors what we believe to have
been the intent of Congress, it also responds in a rational and justifiable way
to a serious shortcoming found in the Clean Air Act: the imposition of uni-
form standards. The Clean Air Act's provision for uniform air quality stand-
ards is a serious shortcoming in the near term. Uniform standards, because
they overlook the fact that air pollution costs and control costs vary from area
to area, have been criticized for their gross inefficiencies. See, for example,
the article by Teller, "Air Pollution Abatement: Economic Rationality and
Reality," in Volume 96 of Daedalus, page 1082 (1967); and the book by J. H.
Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices (University of Toronto Press, 1968).
231f desired, a third target date could be set at the end of 1979, by which time an additional
reduction of 50% in the number of the remaining "objectionable" days (to about 13 days per
year) must be achieved.
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Adoption of management standards provides for an individualized approach
to California's unique set of problems.
In order to remove a possible ambiguity in the interpretation of the Clean
Air Act, we have suggested24 that the Act be amended to give the EPA
Administrator the option in each air basin EITHER to enforce the national
primary and secondary air quality standards, which are not to be violated
more than one day per year as the Act presently provides, OR to enforce man-
agement standards in selected problem air basins as follows:
For each air basin in the U.S. in which one or more of the ambient air
quality standards announced by the Environmental Protection Agency on
April 30, 1971, was violated on more than ten days during calendar year 1970
or 1971, the EPA Administrator shall require that
1. An 80% reduction in the number of "objectionable" days below the 1970
or 1971 level must be achieved by December 31, 1975;
2. An additional 50% reduction in the remaining number of such days must
be achieved by December 31, 1977.
Adoption of these management standards would require equal levels of effort
for all sections of the country, without imposing an unrealistic, uniform
nationwide standard of a certain fixed number of "objectionable" days per
year..
In California, for example, such an approach is applicable not only to the
South Coast Air Basin, but also to the San Diego County Air Basin, the Sac-
ramento Valley Air Basin, and the San Francisco Bay Area Basin.
In all of the EQL studies the assumption is made that the California State
ambient air quality standards are adequate. Our studies have convinced us
that no useful purpose is served by the current differences between the Cali-
fornia and federal ambient air quality standards on nitrogen dioxide, photo-
chemical oxidants and carbon monoxide (Table 2). The California oxidant
level was chosen so that it lies "below that associated with aggravation of
respiratory diseases." No new medical evidence has come to light that would
suggest that any lower level is justified. The controversy over the differences
between the California and federal ambient air quality standards tends to
obscure the fact that both of these standards are being violated at least two-
thirds of the year in this Basin, and that a major effort is required to reduce
the number of "objectionable" days by 90% by 1977. Similar remarks apply
to the nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide standards.
One set of specific control measures that would enable the South Coast Air
Basin to achieve the management air quality standards just described are
listed in Section 1/1.2 and are discussed in detail in Sections II/3 and II/4. In
summary, EQL Strategy #1 is based partly on new "technical" control meas-
ures to reduce emissions from stationary sources and used motor vehicles. 25
24Lees, L.: Statement on Implementation of Clean Air Amendments of 1970 to Subcommittee
on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works at hearing in Los Angeles,
California on March 25, 1972.
"Some of these measures are included in the new State Implementation Plan (February, 1972).
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But even in the short run (1972-1977) we found it necessary to combine these
technical measures with a set of social and economic incentives and disincen-
tives designed to encourage the shift to low-pollution motor vehicles, to en-
courage the use of multiple-occupancy vehicles (buses, car pools, etc.), and
to reduce the annual rate of increase in gasoline consumption in the Basin.
These control measures are not supposed to be all-inclusive, and the "mix" is
not optimized for minimum cost to achieve a given level of air quality.26 But
they are representative of the kinds of measures that are required to reach
the proposed management standards.
"Cost optimization for a wide range of strategies is treated in some detail by Trijonis, John, An
Economic Air Pollution Model. Application: Photochemical Smog in Los Angeles County in 1975,
Summer, 1972.
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PART II: SECTION 11/2
Emissions of various pollutants frolll aUsources determine air quality, but it
is not easy to predict from emissions what the quality of the air will be at
different times in different places. Normally, emissions don't change radi-
cally from day to day but air quality does because it is affected by meteoro-
logical variables like temperature, winds, rain, and inversion layer.
Despite these complications, in order to plan an air pollution control strat-
egy we must know what "clean air" means in terms of reducing emissions.
For the EQL work, this was done by comparing statistics for emissions, pollu-
tant concentrations, and weather conditions for a number of years. For car-
bon monoxide, which does not change when exposed to sunlight, it was
fairly simple to discern the patterns of emissions/ air quality relationships.
For photochemical oxidants, which result from the reaction of two types of
emissions~reactive hydrocarbons and oxides of nitrogen~in sunlight, the
problem was quite complex.
The calculations based on the statistical model showed that in order to
reach the air quality goals set out in EQL Strategy # I it would be necessary
to reduce total emissions of reactive hydrocarbons in the Basin 72% by 1975
and 78% by 1977, and oxides of nitrogen 55% by 1975 and 62% by 1977. For-
tunately, the model showed that the pay-off for reducing emissions is some-
what greater than might be expected. The 78% reduction in reactive hydro-
carbon emissions and the 72% reduction in oxides of nitrogen, lead to a 90%
reduction in days when the oxidant air quality standard is exceeded and a 96%
reduction in the nitrogen dioxide violations by 1977.
Using the same model, it was also possible to estimate roughly how the
various proposed means of reducing emissions would contribute to clean air.
You will recall that in 1970 the Los Angeles Basin recorded 241 days on which
the state standard for oxidants was exceeded. The present strategy would
reduce this to about 140 by 1975. The goal proposed by EQL was 50 days~90
days less than the present strategy would deliver. The 90 days would be dis-
tributed generally as follows: conversion to gaseous fuels, 16 days; reduced
vehicle use, 15 days; control of gasoline vapors from used cars (evaporative
retrofit), 32 days; vacuum spark advance disconnect, 4 days; additional con-
trols of stationary sources, 23 days. A similar breakdown for the contribu-
tion of various measures to reduced violations of the nitrogen dioxide stan-
dard would attribute a much greater share of the results to the vacuum spark
advance disconnect. Figure 22 shows graphically the break-down for oxidant
air quality in Downtown Los Angeles, where violations were somewhat less
than for the whole Basin.
Such break-downs of the strategy indicate the truth of a remark by Dr. A. J.
Haagen-Smit, chairman of the California Air Resources Board and pioneer-
ing investigator of photochemical smog: "Progress against smog comes in
tiny steps."
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11/2 EFFECTS OF EQl STRATEGY NO.1 IN REDUCING
EMISSIONS AND IMPROVING AIR QUALITY
11/2.1 Introduction
In order to link the air pollution control measures required in this Basin to
the management air quality standards proposed in Section III 1.3, we need
to work out the relatiqns between total pollutant emissions and air quality.
In the absence of a general theory, these relations are established by means
of a statistical model based on air quality monitoring data obtained at the
ground-level stations of the Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District over
the last several years (Section II/2.2).1
In Section II/2.3 the contribution made by each control measure in EQL
Strategy #1 to the reduction in pollutant emissions from motor vehicles or
~tationary sources is discussed in detail. The cumulative effect of all these
measures over the period 1972-1982 is compared with projections of the re-
ductions in emissions that can be achieved by following the present strategy.
By combining the results obtained in Sections II/2.2 and II/2.3, improve-
ments in air quality are projected for the period 1972-1982 in terms of reduc-
tions in the average number of days per year on which the California ambient
air quality standards on oxidants, nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide are
violated (Section II/2:4). Long-range projections of air quality in the South
Coast Air Basin up to 1995 are also made in Section III 2:4, based on afixed
technology and growth rates in total emissions of 2% per year and 4% per year.
(See also Section II/6.)
In Section II/2.5 we examine the additional improvements in air quality
that might be realized after 1975 if new motor vehicles do iI1 fact meet the
stringent 1975/76 federal exhaust emission standards, instead of the 1974
California exhaust emissions standards utilized in the calculations of Sec-
tions II/2.3 and II/2.4.
Finally in Section II/2.6 a few brief observations are made about the air
quality problems for sulfur dioxide and particulate matter in the South Coast
Air Basin.
11/2.2 Relations Between Air Quality and Emissions levels
11/2.2.1 Statistical Model
Air quality monitoring data obtained by the Los Angeles APCD over the
past few years corresponds to a rather limited range of emissions levels
for the major pollutants.2 In order to utilize this data to predict air quality
at any other emissions levels certain simplifying physical assumptions must
ITrijonis, John, An Economic Air Pollution Model. Application: Photochemical Smog in Los
Angeles County in 1975, Summer, 1972.
'Profile of Air Pollution Control, Los Angeles APeD, 1971.
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be introduced. The most crucial (but reasonable) assumption is that for
given meteorological conditions the atmospheric concentrations of carbon
monoxide and the "early-morning" concentrations of reactive hydrocarbons
and nitrooen oxides are directly proportional to their re~pcctiYe emissions
levels.
This assumption implies that changes in emission levels are made in the
same proportion at all points in the Basin, and at the same time. We are also
making the assumption that the meteorological statistics in the Basin change
very slowly over the years, if at all, compared to the time scale for significant
changes in emissions levels.
11/2.2.2 CO and N02
For the case of carbon monoxide (CO) the asslimptions of the model appear
to be well met. CO is very nearly inert over a time span of a day or two,
which is the normal residence time of an air mass in this Basin. More than
98% of the CO emitted comes from motor vehicles, and major reductions in
CO emissions are expected to result from controls on each vehicle.
In the case of nitrogen dioxide (N02 ) the validity of the main assumption
is by no means obvious. In fact N02 is not inert; it is produced mainly by
atmospheric reactions between nitrogen oxide emissions and hydrocarbons.
Fortunately, available experimental data and photochemical reaction theory
indicate that the maximum N02 concentrations tend to be roughly propor-
tional to total NOx input. This proportionality is the basic assumption
utilized in the calculation of N02 air quality.
The assumption that reductions in NOx emissions occur in the same pro-
portion at all points in space and time will not be accurate if motor vehicles
and stationary sources are not equally controlled. However, EQL Strategy #1
calls for controls on both types of sources in almost equal proportion. (Sec-
tion 1/2.2)
The application of the basic assumptions of the statistical model to the air
quality data has already been illustrated in Section 1/2.2 in terms of N02,
which tends to be approximately proportional to the total input of nitrogen
oxides. The solid curve in Figure I corresponds to the air quality date at the
1969 average level of about 1000 tons per day of nitrogen oxides emissions in
the Basin, while the dashed curve labelled "500" corresponds to a new emis-
sions level of 500 tons per day. Figure 2 shows typical improvements in air
quality.
The simple idea (illustrated in Figure 1) is easily generalized: If the orig-
inal emissions level is EO and the new emissions level is E= Q EO, then the
average number of days per year that a given concentration Xs is exceeded at
the new emissions level E is just the average number of days per year that
Xs/O' was exceeded at the old level EO. By following this rule air quality for
N02 in terms of the California standard of 25 pphm3 for one hour is pro-
jected over a wide range of emission levels for several typical stations in L.A.
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County (Figure 2). Evidently the number of "objectionable" days becomes
very small if NOx emissions are reduced by 50% from the 1969 levels.4
The federal ambient air quality standard for NOz (0.05 ppm) is stated in
terms of an annual average instead of a maximum concentration for one hour
(Section IIfl.l, Table 2). At the reference (1969) emissions level of 1,000
tons per day Burbank had an annual average NOz concentration of 0.088 ppm.
In order to achieve the desired air quality level at Burbank, a 43% reduction
in NOx emissions is required.
For CO there are two important air quality standards (Section 11/1.1,
Table 2): (1) a "peak" concentration of 40 ppm for one hour; (2) an "average"
concentration of 10 ppm for 12 hours. By applying the same procedure uti-
lized for NOz to the Los Angeles APCD air quality data for CO, the predic-
tions of air quality vs. emissions shown in Figures 15 and 16 are worked out.
If CO emissions are reduced by 60% from the 1968 level, the number of
"objectionable" days based on the 12-hour average is reduced by about 90%.
11/2.2.3 Photochemical Oxidants
The maximum average one-hour atmospheric concentrations of photo-
chemical oxidants depend (among other things) on the "early-morning"
concentrations of reactive hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides. By "early-
morning" we mean before 9:30 A.M. in Los Angeles, or before photochem-
ical reactions have caused significant changes in reactive hydrocarbon and
NOx concentrations. The dependence of "early-morning" reactive HC and
NOx on their respective emissions levels is worked out along the same lines
as the treatment of CO and NOz. However, the relation between photochem-
ical oxidant air quality and emissions is more complicated than for NO z ,
because the peak one-hour oxidant level depends not only on "early-
morning" concentrations of reactive hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides, but
also on sunlight intensity, temperature and other meteorological variables.
John Trijonis was able to overcome this difficulty by working out separate
"summer" and "winter" correlationsS between the "mid-day" one-hour aver-
age oxidant level in "Central L.A." and the "early-morning" concentrations
of reactive hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides in Downtown L.A., and by
assuming that the distribution of the meteorological variables was indepen-
dent of the distribution of the morning concentrations for these periods. By
"mid-day" we mean until 1:00 P.M. and by "Central L.A." we mean the
Downtown L.A.-Burbank-Pasadena Area.6 An average of the maximum mid-
day oxidant levels measured at the APCD stations in these three locations
was utilized. In computing this average the data was weighted according to
4The situation in the South Coast Air Basin as a whole is discussed in Section 1I/2.2.4.
5The principal difference between summer and winter situations lies in the difference in sun-
light intensity.
6The peak one-hour average oxidant level is almost always reached by I:00 P.M. in this area of
the Basin.
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wind speed and direction so as to correspond as closely as possible to the air
mass that had been in Downtown L.A. in the early morning.
A key concept in this analysis is the notion of a "probability function."
This probability function is d~fin\id il~ folloWB; BUPPOBC that at given emis-
sions levels one knows the average number of days per year on which the
early morning concentrations of HC and NOx lie within certain small ranges
around the values x and y, respectively. The probability function,
p~w) (x,y) or P ~s) (x,y)
'los 'los
is simply a number lying between 0 and 1 that measures the fraction of those
days on which the maximum one-hour average oxidant concentration ex-
ceeds the standard for oxidants ('l;s)' (The superscripts "w" and "s" refer to
"winter" and "summer", respectively.) Typical values of this probability
function for summer conditions are shown in Figure 17 for the case 'l;s ::
10 pphm := 0.10 ppm.? The probability is plotted against the early-morning
NOx concentration (y) for various (constant) values of the early-morning
HC concentration (x) in parts per million of carbon (ppmC).
These probability values are derived from the Los Angeles APCD air qual-
ity data at the Downtown L.A., Burbank and Pasadena stations at the refer-
ence (1969) levels of hydrocarbon and nitrogen oxide emissions. Now the
important assumption is made that this probability function depends on x and
y in the same way regardless of any changes in the emissions levels. In other
words, we are assuming that the early-morning concentrations x and y and
the meteorological factors (sunlight intensity, temperature, etc.) that pro-
duce the oxidant from these concentrations are independent of one another.
This assumption is credible only when separate "summer" and "winter"
correlations are employed, because of the difference in sunlight intensity
between the two seasons.
Suppose that the emissions levels are changed to new values
EHC:: O'EoHC
and
ENO :: f3Eo NO .
x x
Then the early-morning concentrations of HC and NOx will lie within a small
range of the values O'X and f3y, respectively, on the same average number of
days per year on which these concentrations were found in certain small
ranges around x and y, respectively, emissions levels. The new probability
p&w) (O'x,f3y) or p~) (O'x,f3Y)
Zs 'l;s
is found by referring to a diagram such as Figure 17 and picking off the value
of the probability for the pair of concentration values [HC] :: O'X, [NOxJ :: f3y.
By multiplying this new probability by the average number of days per year
'10 pphm happens to be the California standard.
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on which the early-morning concentrations of HC and NOx lie within certain
small ranges around the values x and y, repeating this calculation for all pos-
sible pairs of (x,y) values, and summing up all the results, one finally obtains
the total number of days per year on which the maximum one-hour average
oxidant level exceeds ~S.8 The calculations were performed for three
oxidant standards-O.lO ppm, 0.15 ppm and 0.20 ppm; the results are shown
in Figures 18, 19 and 20.
What Dr. Guy Pauker of the RAND Corporation and the EQL calls the
"perverse nature" of NOx in photochemical smog is well illustrated by Fig-
ures 17, 18 and 19. At very high NOx concentrations nitric oxide (NO) soaks
up the oxidants. At very low NOx concentrations not much NOz can be pro-
duced, so not much atomic oxygen can be generated by photolysis of NOz'
and ozone and oxidant concentrations are low. In the intermediate region of
NOx concentrations the hydrocarbon concentration plays the dominant role
in determining the level of photochemical oxidants in the L.A. atmosphere.
This behavior is especially striking for the maximum one-hour average oxidant
level of 0.20 ppm (Figure 20).
11/2.2.4 Air Quality-Emissions Relations for the South
Coast Air Basin
All of the air qualityIemissions relations obtained so far apply only to the
Central L.A. area. However, we want to deal with improvements in air quality
for the entire South Coast Air Basin. For CO and NOz the results for Down-
town L.A. appear to be representative of the entire Basin in the sense that
other stations seem to have similar air qualityIemissions relations. A simple
multiplication factor might be appropriate to translate the results for Down-
town L.A. into Basin-wide criteria. For example, the number of days per year
on which the California NOz standard of 25 pphm for one hour was violated
was about 50 in Downtown L.A. in 1970 and about 115 at any station in the
Basin, so the multiplication factor is 2.3. For CO the factor is close to unity,
except possibly in special areas on or adjacent to freeways.
The problem of predicting the air qualityIemissions relation for photochem-
ical oxidant in the entire Basin is very difficult. The Basin acts like a large
chemical reactor with the pollutants constantly being added to the air and
constantly reacting as the air mass moves inland from the ocean. Especially
in the eastern portion of the Basin pollutants probably originate in widely
separated regions lying to the west and southwest. The mid-day oxidant level
in the Central L.A. area is considerably lower than values observed at sta-
tions downwind of this area. Thus a single multiplication factor may not be
adequate over a wide range of emissions levels. Photochemical reaction times
may be lengthened when HC levels are reduced. This effect may reduce mid-
day oxidant levels preferentially as compared to oxidant levels reached later
'The details of the procedure are discussed in Trijonis' thesis, where the calculation is expressed
in the succinct language of the integral calculus.
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in the afternoon, corresponding to peak values at inland stations. These
limitations should be kept in mind when using the oxidant air qualityI
emissions relations.
In spite of these reservations, as an interim measure we ~[e going to I1pply
a simple multiplication factor in order to indicate important trends. For
photochemical oxidant these factors are as follows:
1970
OXI DANT LEVEL
10 pphm
15 pphm
20 pphm
DOWNTOWN LA
150 days/year
90 days/year
45 days/year
BASIN
241
180
150
MULTIPLICATION
FACTOR
1.6
2
3.3
The procedure to be utilized in Section 11/2.4 on projected improvements in
air quality is to apply the emissions reductions to be discussed in Section III
2.3 first to the Central L.A. area, and then to use the multiplication factors
listed above (and the factor 2.3 for N02) to predict improvements in air qual-
ity for the entire Basin.
11/2.3 Reductions in Emissions in the South Coast Air
Basin (1972-1982)
11/2.3.1 Reductions in Motor Vehicle Emissions
Extensive data is available on the characteristics of the motor vehicle popu-
lation of Los Angeles County, including the fraction of the population in each
model year, average mileage per year as a function of model year, pollutant
emissions in grams per mile as a function of model years, evaporative losses,
etc. (Appendix A)9 However, it must be kept in mind that the emissions fig-
ures are not precise, but that these numbers represent the best available
estimates. Vehicular emissions are based on typical values measured from
automobiles in the seven-mode driving cycle. Although this cycle is supposed
to be representative, other "representative" cycles give other absolute results
differing by as much as 50%. Professor List has pointed out that a similar
ambiguity of ±30% exists for stationary sources. lO This ambiguity is caused
mainly by uncertainties in the emissions factors, and partly by uncertainties
in total fuel consumption. The numbers used in this report usually follow
those used by the Los Angeles APCD. In certain cases different projections
have been made where it was felt justifiable, but the APCD figures seem to
be representative of what is occurring. l1 Fortunately, improvements in air
'Control of Motor Vehicle Emissions After 1974, TAC of the ARB Report.
IOList, E. J., Energy Use in California: Implications for the Environment, EQL Report #3,
December 1971.
llProfile of Air Pollution Control, Los Angeles APCD, 1971.
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quality depend on the percentage reductions in emissions from their 1969 or
1970 base levels (Section 11/2.2 and Figures 2, 15, 16, 18-20), rather than on
the absolute magnitude of emissions.
The contributions made by each individual control measure to the reduction
in motor vehicle reactive hydrocarbon, nitrogen oxides and carbon monoxide
emissions are illustrated in Figures 3, 4 and 10. The curves labeled "present
strategy" include only the effect of new cars replacing older vehicles. The
projections used in EQL Strategy #1 for the period 1972-1982 are based on
the following control measures:
A.Conversion to Gaseous Fuels
Vehicles converted to gaseous fuels, such as natural gas and propane, have
demonstrated emissions levels lower than the California 1974 standards and
approaching the 1975/76 Federal standards (Table 3).
TABLE 3
Emissions Levels for Gaseous Fuels
Hydrocarbons
Carbon monoxide
Oxides of nitrogen
AVERAGE MEASURED
VEH ICLE EM ISSIONS12
0.50 gm/mi
4.00 gm/mi
0.75 gm/mi
STANDARDS
CAL. 1974 FED. 1975-7613
1.5 gm/mi .25 gm/mi
23.0 gm/mi 2.30 gm/mi
1.3 gm/mi .27 gm/mi
The conversion projection is based on a uniform rate of replacement of
gasoline used in Los Angeles County by gaseous fuels over the period 1972-
1975, until one-third of the gasoline is so replaced by the target date of
December 31, 1975.14 The conversions probably would be a mix of 75%
natural gas and 25% propane, given present supply realities. (See Section
11/3.1 for a discussion of gaseous fuels supply.) Conversions are assumed to
begin with 1970-1972 model year vehicles, and to continue indefinitely year
by year after 1975 in order to maintain the ratio of two-thirds gasoline to
one-third gaseous fuels, so long as emissions from new gasoline-powered
vehicles are significantly higher than emissions from gaseous-fueled vehicles
(Table 3).15 These converted vehicles stay on the road for some years after
they are converted (Appendix), and they account for a significant portion of
12ARB and Pacific Lighting data (vehicles tuned for low emissions).
IJMeasured according to California seven-mode cycle.
14This projection is a conservative one; EQL Strategy # I (1/2.2) calls for mandatory conversion
of all commercial fleet vehicles by the end of 1973.
15If new motor vehicles do in fact meet the Federal 1975/76 exhaust emission standards after
1974 there would be no point in converting these vehicles. (See Section 11/2.5).
52
the differences in emISSions between EQL Strategy #1 and the present
strategy (Figures 3, 4 and 10).
Conversions have begun for car and truck fleets, which typically burn
larser amounts of fuel than th~ aY~rag~ Y~hiClcs l\ml ilrC illrci\uy being
attracted by the economic benefits of gaseous fuels. Since fleet vehicles burn
more gasoline per vehicle, the number of vehicles that would have to be
converted to reduce gasoline consumption by one-third is actually somewhat
less than one-third.
The emissions figures do not show the full potential air quality benefits of
burning gaseous fuels instead of gasoline. Unburned hydrocarbons in the
exhausts of natural gas and propane vehicles have been found to be less
photochemically reactive than those in gasoline exhausts. The hydrocarbons
in gaseous fuels react so slowly with sunlight that they play almost no role
in the formation of smog. Present vehicle emission standards do not dis-
tinguish between "high" and "low" reactivity hydrocarbons, so that the
natural-gas or propane-driven vehicle which meets or approaches standards
is really much "cleaner" than a gasoline-driven vehicle with similar emission
characteristics. Unburned propane hydrocarbons are only about half as reac-
tive as those contained in gasoline, and natural gas only about one-fifth as
reactive." 16
B. Vacuum Spark Advance Disconnect (VSAD)
The vacuum spark advance disconnect is a retrofit device which can be
installed in all used cars up to and including 1970. It disconnects the vacuum
spark advance except when a thermostatic switch senses that the car is
tending to overheat. In that case the advance is reconnected until the engine
cools down. 17 (See Section 11(3.4 for additional discussion.) The effects of
the VSAD on emissions is summarized in Table 4. The most important effect
is the reduction by almost half in oxides nitrogen from 1966-1970 vehicles,
which characteristically emit 6 grams per mile. The retrofit also provides
some reduction in the hydrocarbon emissions, but almost no effect on carbon
monoxide.
In our calculations we assumed that the VSAD retrofit would take place
at a uniform rate over the period 1972-1975, and that by the end of 1975 all
motor vehicles of model years prior to 1971 would be so retrofitted. Actually
the new State law on 1966-1970 vehicles requires the installation of a device
to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions "substantially" by 1973.
16Based on literature survey by John Batchelder using data on photochemical smog, especially
that of A. P. Altshuller.
17At the EQL, tbe undergraduate students in the Clean Air Car Project are investigating the
operating characteristics of a simple disconnect of the vacuum spark advance without the thermo-
static switch. The cost of such a "fix" is estimated at $10.
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-23%
- 6
-44
-10%
+ 7
-24
TABLE 4
Percentage Changes in Emissions
for Vacuum Spark Advance Disconnect (VSAD)18
Pre-1966
Hydrocarbons
Carbon monoxide
Oxides of nitrogen
1966-70 Venicles
Hydrocarbons
Carbon monoxide
Oxides of nitrogen
C. Evaporative Control Retrofit
As indicated in Figure 21, even with the introduction of more effective
evaporative controls in new vehicles in 1970, evaporation losses of hydro-
carbons from older vehicles remain significant through the late 1970's.
Usually about two-thirds of this loss is considered to be reactive hydrocar-
bons. For this reason it is desirable to try to reduce at least part of the contri-
bution to reactive hydrocarbon emissions by the used vehicle population with
an evaporative control system retrofit. The EQL calculations rest on a 50%
reduction in the total evaporative emissions by fitting newer used cars with a
control device similar to the device used in 1970 and later model vehicles.
This step would require retrofitting all 1966 to 1969 vehicles by 1975 (Sec-
tion 11/3.4). In our calculations the retrofit is assumed to begin in 1972 and
proceed at a uniform rate until all 1966-1969 vehicles are so retrofitted by the
end of 1975.
D. Vehicle Emissions Inspection
Mandatory vehicle emissions inspection is an essential part of the EQL
Strategy #1. Without it, the assumption that vehicles meet the standards in
effect for their model year is questionable. The Northrop report to the Cali-
fornia Air Resources Board indicated that tune-up reduced hydrocarbon emis-
sions by 20-25%.19 Presumably the vehicles had on the average declined at
least this much from the standards of their model year if, indeed, they ever
met them.
The inspection system would, therefore, provide a form of insurance that
we are getting the emissions reductions which we are counting on for improved
air quality. Such assurance will be increasingly important as standards
become more stringent and devices more elaborate. Sophisticated control
devices such as catalytic or manifold type reactors will probably be used on
ISBased on ARB data. These performance estimates are very conservative. Recent data indicates
the VSAD plus the "Clean Air Car tune-up" will reduce HC by about 50% and NO and CO
emissions by about 30% on pre-1966 cars. x
19Mandatory Vehicle Emissions Inspection and Maintenance, Part A. Feasibility Study, by
Northrop Corporation for the ARB, June 21, 1971.
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new motor vehicles. Some of the systems being proposed involve complicated
auxiliary devices to preheat the catalyst bed, control mixture ratios, etc. The
experience with the deterioration of the relatively simple devices now in use
indiciltc~ that we can expect greater deterioration of the more sophisticated
systems, unless a mandatory vehicle inspection system plus an emissions
tax exerts pressure on automobile manufacturers to guarantee these devices
and on motorists to maintain them in good working order (Section Il/5).
The mandatory vehicle emissions inspection system is assumed to begin in
this Basin in 1972.
E. Reductions in Emissions Produced by Social and
Economic Incentives
The main purposes of the social and economic incentives and disincentives to
be discussed in Section Il/5 are to encourage the shift to low-pollution motor
vehicles, to encourage the use of multiple-occupancy vehicles, and to halt or
reduce the annual rate of increase in gasoline consumption. For our present
purposes the total effect of all these measures is regarded as a "lumped"
20% reduction in emissions by the end of 1975. Note that this 20% reduction
is imposed after the conversion of one-third of the gasoline to gaseous fuels,
so that the net reduction in emissions is 13% of the initial (1970) emission
levels.
At present, gasoline consumption grows at the rate of about 4% per year
in L.A. County. If all of this 20% reduction in emissions had to be achieved by
reductions in gasoline consumption by gasoline-powered vehicles, it would
amount to holding this consumption constant at its 1970 level for about five
years. However, as discussed in Section Il/5, a wide variety of other measures
and interesting interactions between measures need to be considered.
If these social and economic measures are successful, they would almost
certainly be continued after 1975. However, in the present calculations we
have made the "conservative" assumption that no additional reductions in
emissions are to be attributed to those measures after 1975.
11/2.3.2 Reduction in Stationary Source Emissions
Stationary sources of air pollution have been regulated by the Los Angeles
Air Pollution Control District for nearly 25 years. Hydrocarbon emissions
from petroleum refining and chemical industries have been regulated by rules
that limit the total hydrocarbons emitted or substitute unreactive or "low
reactivity" hydrocarbons as much as possible. A similar procedure has been
applied to the use of organic solvents in industry and in commerCe. The result
has been that the stationary source load of total hydrocarbons is about 750-
800 tons per day and has been constant for several years. The APCD has
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concentrated on the approximately 150-160 tons per day of reactive hydro-
carbons. It has promised to reduce this to about 75 tons per day, probably by
substitution of low reactivity solvents. These reductions could be made by
tighter controls on evaporative losses from petroleum marketing, elimination
of hydrocarbon solvents entirely in situations where nearly complete solvent
recovery or control is not possible, etc. (Section 11/4). In Figure 5 the planned
reductions in reactive hydrocarbon emissions are assumed to occur at a uni-
form rate over the period 1972-1975, and these emissions are held constant
at the new level thereafter.
Oxides of nitrogen result from combustion of fuels in power plants and
industrial, commercial and residential furnaces. Limitations on emissions
from new sources and some reductions of existing sources have stabilized the
NOx emissions at about 280-300 tons per day. Additional reductions of
about 100 tons per day of NOx could be made by application of existing
and new rules (Section 11/4). This reduction is indicated in Figure 6.
11/2.3.3 Overall Emissions
The combined emissions contributions from motor vehicles and stationary
sources for Los Angeles County are summarized in Figures 5 and 6. Reactive
hydrocarbon emissions are cut to 28% of 1970 levels by 1975 if EQL Strat-
egy #1 is followed, as compared with a reduction to 52% of 1970 levels
resulting from the present strategy (Figure 5). By 1975 nitrogen oxide emis-
sions are reduced to 44% of 1970 levels by EQL Strategy #1 as compared to a
reduction to 78% of 1970 values that can be achieved by following the pres-
ent strategy (Figure 6).
11/2.4 Projected Improvements in Air Quality
By combining the results obtained in the two preceding sections, improve-
ments in air quality are projected for the period 1972-1982 in terms of reduc-
tions in the average number of days per year on which the California ambient
air quality standards on oxidants, nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide are
violated. For photochemical oxidant we also calculated the projected im-
provements in air quality based on two higher levels of 0.15 ppm and 0.20 ppm,
respectively, in order to illustrate the sensitivity of the average number of
"objectionable" days per year to the pollutant level that is selected as
"objectionable."20
Figure 22 shows a breakdown of the projected improvements in oxidant
air quality (State standard) for Downtown L.A. according to the present
strategy and according to EQL Strategy #1. Each specific control measure in
ZOThe Loq Angeleq County Medicttl Aqsocitttion htts proposed amaximum one.hour average oxi.
dant level of 0.20 ppm as a "health warning" for persons with coronary artery diseases or chronic
respiratory diseases.
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EQL Strategy #1 makes a modest contribution towards cleaner air, but the
summation of all these steps is impressive. No better illustration could be
found of the statement often made by Dr. Arie Haagen-Smit, chairman of
the ARB, that progr~~~ toward clean air is a painstakinR step-by-gte~ bugi-
ness in which there are no "magic solutions." By using Figure 22 the incre-
mental short-term cost of each specific control measure can be weighed
against the reduction in "objectionable" days that can be achieved by that
measure.
In Figures 23 and 24 we show the reductions that can be achieved in the
average number of days per year on which the two higher oxidant levels of
0.15 ppm and 0.20 ppm are exceeded in Downtown L.A. Similarly, Figures 25
and II illustrate the predicted improvements in air quality in Downtown L.A.
based on the State nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide standards.
By using the multiplication factors for photochemical oxidant and nitrogen
dioxide levels discussed in Section II/2.2A, projections can be made of im-
provements in air quality for the entire South Coast Air Basin. Figures 7, 9
and 26 show the situation for photochemical oxidant, and Figure 8 illustrates
the improvement for nitrogen dioxide. (Carbon monoxide air quality is vir-
tually the same in the Basin as in L.A. County.) The results that can be
achieved by EQL Strategy #1 are summarized in the following table:
TABLE 5
EQl Strategy No. I-South Coast Air Basin
STANDARD/YEAR 1970 1975 1977
Nitrogen dioxide concentration 115 10 5
0.25 ppm for 1 hr.
Maximum daily 1 hr. average oxidant level
0.10 ppm 241 50 30
0.20 ppm 150 15 10
Carbon monoxide 203 15 5
10 ppm for 12 hrs
By 1977 EQL Strategy #1 virtually eliminates the nitrogen dioxide and
carbon monoxide problems in this Basin. It accomplishes the objectives set
forth for photochemical oxidants in Part I and reduces the number of "health
warning" days to 10 or less.
In Figure 7 we observe a "flattening out" of the graph of air quality vs.
time in the late 1970's at a level of about 80 days per year for the present
strategy and about 25 days per year for EQL Strategy #1. This trend reflects
the increasing difficulty of achieving additional reductions in emissions of
reactive hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides, as shown by Figures 3-6. In fact,
if no new steps are taken, these emissions will begin to increase again in the
early 1980's because of growth in population and in the rates of consumption
of gasoline, natural gas and oil. Two highly simplified long-range projections
are shown in Figure 14, based on the assumption that starting in 1982 emis-
sions will increase either at an annual rate of 2% per year or at 4% per year..
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Section II/6 contains a brief discussion of some new approaches to the long-
term air pollution problem in the Basin.
11/2.5 Lower Limits on Emissions and on the Average
Number of "Objectionable" Days Per Year
In Figures 27-29 we illustrate probable lower limits on motor vehicle emissions
of reactive hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides and carbon monoxide in L.A.
County that can be achieved in the 1972-1982 time period. The curves
labelled "conservative" are reproduced from Figures 3, 4 and 10, and repre-
sent either the present strategy or EQL Strategy #1, based on the conserva-
tive assumption that after 1974 new cars meet the 1974 California exhaust
emissions standards. The curves labelled "optimistic" show the reductions
in emissions that can be achieved if after 1974 new cars do, in fact, meet the
tighter 1975/76 federal standards.21 As expected, the differences are small
by the initial target date of December 31, 1975, but are significant by 1980.
Because of the high probability of operational difficulties with the complex
control devices on new post-1974 cars during the first few years after their
introduction, the calculations of improvements in air quality in Section II/2.4
are based on the "conservative" projections of emissions.
By assuming that emissions from stationary sources are unchanged from
the projected values shown in Figures 5 and 6 for EQL Strategy #1, we calcu-
late that the minimum total emissions of reactive hydrocarbons amount to
about 150 tons per day by 1980, and the minimum total emissions of nitrogen
oxides amount to about 250 tons per day (EQL Strategy #1-"optimistic").
Professor List22 has done an independent inventory of emissions minima
obtainable in the South Coast Air Basin, based on reasonably "optimistic"
technology. He credits motor vehicles with performance equivalent to the
1975/76 federal emissions standards. Power plants are assumed to have
emissions factors similar to domestic gas appliances as opposed to high tem-
perature furnaces. Allowance is made for minimum hydrocarbon emissions
from evaporation of solvents and gasoline.
Dr. List's minimum figure of about 200 tons per day of total reactive hydro-
carbons and 240 tons per day of nitrogen oxides are fairly close to the "opti-
mistic" estimates given here.
In Figure 30 we show the improvement in oxidant air quality at the State
standard for both the "conservative" and the "optimistic" projections of
emissions. The average number of "objectionable" days per year reaches a
minimum of about 15, according to the optimistic EQL Strategy #1, and then
rises again beyond 1982 because of the growth in emissions with a fixed
technology.
21As explained earlier conversion to gaseous fuels would cease after 1975 -if new cars met the
tilihter 197~176 federal standards,
"List, E.J.: Energy Use in California: Implications for the Environment, EQL Report #3,
December 1971.
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11/2.6 The Air Quality Problem for Sulfur Dioxide and
Particulate Matter
EQL Strategy #1 concentrates on reduction of rc~ctiyc hydrocarbons,
oxides of nitrogen and carbon monoxide emissions. However, there are two
other pollutants in the Los Angeles atmosphere which currently exceed the
State and federal ambient air quality standards-sulfur dioxide and particu-
late matter.
Sulfur Dioxide
Sulfur dioxide is a problem in the vicinity of the heavily industrialized south-
west coastal and south coastal areas, extending from Torrance east to Long
Beach. Sulfur dioxide emissions, summarized in Table 6, originate mainly
from stationary sources. The ambient air quality standard for California
(0.04 ppm average for 24 hours) is violated almost every day in the vicinity
of these sources. The APCD recently adopted rules 53.2 and 53.3 to control
the sulfur dioxide emissions from the sulfur industry from 115 tons per day
to 10-15 tons per day. Additional controls will probably be needed to reduce
the emissions of the petroleum industry.
The remaining major source of sulfur dioxide is the electric power gener-
ating plants. The plants are already required to burn natural gas when it is
available (Rules 62 and 62.1) and low sulfur oil at all other times (Rule 62.2).
However, the supply of natural gas for power plants is declining rapidly,
and these facilities will have to use more oil. In 1968 the two major electrical
utilities in the Basin burned 86% natural gas and 14% oil. By 1971 the mix was
67% natural gas and 40% oil, and for 1972,36% natural gas and 64% oil was
predicted.23
Ideally, the power plants should be equipped to burn a wide variety of
fuels so that they can choose the fuel with the lowest sulfur content, includ-
ing distillate oils, naptha, and other low sulfur hydrocarbons. This procedure
would require burners that could be adapted to different fuel properties, such
as variation in viscosity.
Particulate Matter
California has separate standards for suspended particulate matter, lead
particulates, and visibility reduction. The sources of direct particulate emis-
sions are listed in Table 7. However, secondary particulate aerosols are known
to form as a result of the photochemical smog reaction, and these aerosols
may amount to as much as 25% of the total in the atmosphere, on the basis of
a yearly average. On particularly "smoggy" days these chemically-produced
aerosols may amount to 75% of the total in the atmosphere.24 These processes
23SCE, 1970 Financial and Statistical Report and 1971 Annual Report; Board of Water and
Power Commissioners, City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power Annual
Reports, 1968-1971.
24Friedlander, S.K., Chemical Element Balances and the Identification ofAir Pollution Sources,
Conference on Science in the Control of Smog, Caltech, November 15-16, 1971.
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are not well understood, and the problem requires more work in order to
formulate a rational control strategy for particulate matter.
In general one can say that EQL Strategy #1 will contribute to a reduction
in particulate levels. For example, conversion of vehicles to gaseous fuels
eliminates direct emissions of lead and carbon, and the exhaust gases are
virtually photochemically nonreactive. Overall reductions in emissions of
reactive hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides should also contribute to a re-
duced production of photochemical aerosols. However, little or nothing is
known about the effects of these changes on the particle-size spectrum distri-
bution of aerosols, which plays a key role in determining visibility reduction.
TABLE 6
Sulfur Dioxide Emissions in L.A. County25
(tons/day)
Industrial
Chemical (Sulfur industry)
Metallurgical
Petroleum
115
5
55
Power Plants
Summer 0
Winter 70 Average 35
Vehicles 35
Aircraft 5
Total
Summer 215
Winter 285 Average 250
"Source: Los Angeles APeD data
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TABLE 7
Particulate Emissions in L.A. County25
(tons/day) (tons/day)
Industrial Commercial 10
Chemical 10 Residential 5
Metallurgical 10 Vehicles
Mineral 5 Gasoline 45
Petroleum 10 Diesel 10
Other 5 Aircraft 15
--
Power Plants 5 Total 130
"Source: Los Angeles APeD data
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PART II: SECTION 11/3
Over the years there have been a· number of ideas for reducing air
pollution in Los Angeles ranging from banning the internal combUMion en-
gine to punching holes in the inversion layer. There has never been any wide-
spread agreement as to which of these were practical and feasible.
In the technical measures discussed in this section, the EQL team con-
sidered only the technology that was "on the shelf," if not yet widely in use.
In a strategy aimed at significantly reducing air pollution within three to five
years, one is necessarily stuck with the internal combustion engine. One is
not, however, limited to gasoline as its fuel. There was considerable data
available to show that motor vehicle emissions could be cut up to 90% and at
least 50% by using a rather simple system for converting them to burn natural
gas, propane, or some other gaseous fuel.
There are problems. Is the supply of these fuels sufficient? The answer
which the EQL team found-with the help of a petroleum industry consulting
firm- is that as much as one-third of the gasoline used in the Los Angeles
Basin could be converted to natural gas or propane within present supply
constraints. Research by one member of the Lab showed that even when
natural gas had to be taken away from power plants to supply converted
motor vehicles, this would clearly be the thing to do, since the reduction in
emissions from burning the gaseous fuel in motor vehicles is so much greater
than burning it in the plants.
The study showed that conversion often paid for itself in fuel and mainte-
nance savings and that safety and insurance really were not important
problems.
The other devices and techniques-vacuum spark advance disconnect,
capacitor discharge "ignition optimization, and the evaporative retrofit device
for controlling escape of gasoline vapors from auto tanks-were found to have
been adequately tested or proved in actual use on new cars. Their'adoption
for widespread use on the existing stock of older cars was considered feasible
both from the standpoint of cost and results.
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11/3 FEASIBILITY Of CONTROL MEASURES FOR
MOTOR VEHICLES
11/3.1 Supply and Distribution of Gaseous Fuels
EQL strategy #1 calls for the replacement of one-third of the gasoline burned
by motor vehicles in the South Coast Air Basin with gaseous fuels, such as
compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquid petroleum gas (LPG).! The most
obvious question raised by this proposal is this: Why advocate the use of
natural gas in motor vehicles in the face of an increasingly serious national
shortage of this fuel?
In addition to studies of the supply question carried out by EQL staff
members, the Lab commissioned the Pace Company of Houston, Texas, a
well-known oil and gas consulting firm, to study the availability of gaseous
fuels for vehicle use in this Basin. The Pace Company report2 concluded
that supplies of CNG and LPG are adequate to replace up to 33% of the gaso-
line burned in the Basin, provided that a "mix" of 25% CNG and 8% LPG is
used to make up the figure of 33%. Details of the supply situation are as
follows:
11/3.1.1 Natural Gas Supply
The Pace Company report indicates that the South Coast Air Basin is now
entering a period during which total demand for natural gas will exceed
supply, and that the shortage will grow during the next few years unless
new supply sources are discovered or developed more rapidly than at present.
However, it should be remembered that consumption of natural gas in this
Basin is so large that only about 7.8% of the projected 1975 supply would be
needed to replace 25% of the gasoline used in vehicles.
Figure 12 illustrates the proportion that this amount of natural gas bears
to total anticipated supply and demand. In 1969 average daily supply in
August was still ahead of total demand, but by 1975 both conservative and
optimistic projections place demand beyond average supply by an imbalance
of from 0.3 billion to 1 billion cubic feet per day.
In other words the relatively small amount of natural gas needed for con-
version-an average of about 0.27 billion cubic feet a day by 1975-will
have to be diverted from other uses. It cannot be taken from homes and other
"firm" gas customers, but it can be taken from "interruptible" users-power
plants and industries-whose supply of gas is presently subject to curtail-
ment or shut-off when supply runs low. Such a diversion could be accom-
plished by means of a small price differential.
Since power plants and industrial furnaces are also sources of pollution, is
it a good idea to take 10% of their natural gas away from them and substitute
residual crude? Clearly, in terms of reduced emissions, the answer is "yes,"
lLPG i~ mainly propane.
'The Pace Company, Evaluation of Gaseous Fuels Supply for Motor Vehicle Usage in the
Los Angeles Basin, prepared for the EQL, Houston, Texas, February 15, 1971.
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according to an analysis by Dr. E. J. List of Caltech. 3 The use of natural gas
in place of gasoline in vehicles results in emission reductions more than ten
times greater per kilowatt hour of energy produced than the use of the gas
in place of r~Giguul crude in indumial and power plant boilers.
Dr. List suggests that there are additional gains to be made by fuel substi-
tution: "Since burning gasoline in power furnaces would not lead to any
hydrocarbon or carbon monoxide emissions to speak of (because of the long
flame residence times), there would be an enormous reduction in these two
emissions if the automobiles burned the methane and the power plants the
gasoline. Such a fuel substitution process is not without precedent. The
British converted virtually all Londoners to burn a smokeless fuel after the
disastrous 1952 killer smog."4
Figure 12 gives the natural gas supply picture for August, during which
"firm" demand for gas is at a minimum, and Figure 32 illustrates the situa-
tion in February. During the coldest months firm demand for gas requires a
large fraction of the entire supply, and there have been some predictions of
shortages for residential and other "firm" users within the next few years
(Figures 31 and 32). It seems quite probable that no gas can be diverted
to vehicles during these months. Converted vehicles will have to be equipped
with the dual-fuel system that allows a switch to gasoline during the winter
months and outside the Basin where fuel supply may be difficult. (Almost all
the current conversions do use the dual-fuel system.) Fortunately, the colder
months are the meteorologically "best" time to burn gasoline in the Basin
because of reduced sunlight intensity.
Gas suppliers have forecast that pressures on the natural gas supply will
be somewhat relieved after 1975 because of coal gasification and importation
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) so that vehicle owners who convert to natural
gas and want to continue using it for reasons of emission reduction, easier
engine maintenance and economy will be able to obtain the fuel throughout
the useful life of any vehicles converted within the next few years.
11/3.1.2 Propane Supply
The existing market for liquid petroleum gas (LPG or propane) in Southern
California is so small relative to that for natural gas that conversion of any
significant number of vehicles to propane would mean an improbably rapid
growth in production and marketing facilities. Even the 8% conversion of
gasoline to propane found feasible in the Pace report involves a doubling
of the California supply in about four years-from the 12.5 million barrels a
year projected for 1971 to 26.1 million barrels in 1975 (Figure 13).
In recent years the market for propane has been rather static and seasonal-
conditions not conducive to calling forth maximum production of propane
'List, E. J., "Energy and the Environment in Southern California," Engineering and Science,
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, November, 1971.
'List, E. J., Energy Use in California: Implications for the Environment, EQL Report #3,
December, 1971.
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from eXlstmg natural gas field processing and oil refining. Nevertheless,
there has been a growing surplus of propane, and it is estimated that U.S.
supply will increase by 27% by 1975.5
Up to now most propane has been a by-product of natural gas processing
in producing fields. But propane is also produced as a by-product of petroleum
refining, and this source will become the major one within this decade.
Refineries will be producing more unleaded gasoline, which involves modifi-
cations of the refining process that will result in a greater yield of propane.
According to the estimates in the Pace report, propane demand in California
will reach 13.7 million barrels a year by 1975 if present trends continue
(Figure 13). When the equivalent of an 8% conversion of the gasoline in the
South Coast Air Basin to propane is added to these estimates, projected
demand increases to 22.6 million barrels a year in 1975. The 1975 propane
supply -17.2 barrels - would fall considerably short of demand if the needs
of the converted vehicles were added. The difference would be made up by
attracting additional supplies from California refineries and field producers
and from producers in heavy surplus areas like west Texas, the Rocky
Mountain region and western Canada. This additional propane is indicated
in Figure 13 by the curve marked "augmented supply." The Pace Report
estimates that a refinery-gate price of ten cents per gallon and a stable
market-which vehicle conversion would provide-would be needed to bring
forth the maximum propane supply for California during the 1971-1975
period. (Currently, refinery-gate propane prices in the Los Angeles area are
in the range of 6 to 6.5 cents per gallon.)6
11/3.1.3 Distribution
At the moment the distribution system for propane as an automotive fuel is
somewhat better developed than that for natural gas. There are 64 service
stations in the South Coast Air Basin selling propane as a vehicle fuel and
477 in California.? A number of others sell the fuel to campers and could
easily get the necessary permit to sell to vehicles if a market developed. In
fact, every service station is a potential propane outlet once the market has
developed enough to justify the capital costs of the tank and dispensing
equipment. Current availability of propane is often better outside urban areas,
since propane now has its greatest market as a household fuel in rural areas
beyond the reach of natural gas pipelines. Small fleet owners who want to
convert to propane but do not want to invest in a central fueling facility
should be able to get their supplies on the existing retail market with increas-
ing ease.
SPace Report, Table 10, p. 43.
6The Pace Report, page 84.
'1972 LP-Gas Refueling Directory, Woodall's National LP-Gas Association.
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The situation for natural gas is somewhat different. Although natural gas
is readily available throughout the Basin, it must be compressed and stored
under pressure for use in vehicles. Generally, fleet owners who convert will
hav~ to in5tall central fueling facilities (Section II} 12). Two Union gervice
stations in Riverside, California, have been selling CNG to motor vehicles
since May, 1972. Dual Fuel Systems, Inc., one of the partners in the pilot
program, indicated that if the venture is successful arrangements will be
made for the sale of natural gas to motorists at a number of other service
stations in the area.8
11/3.2 Economics of Conversion to Gaseous Fuels
A substantial investment is required to modify a vehicle to burn one of the
gaseous fuels, but the investment yields savings on both fuel and maintenance.
If the vehicle is driven a great deal, the savings are often great enough to
justify conversion on economic grounds alone. The economics for the conver-
sion of each vehicle and fleet are different, and the examples given in this
section quote typical numbers for each of the factors which must be consid-
ered in order to determine whether the economics are favorable in a par-
ticular case. Additional detailed information is available in the Gaseous Fuels
Manual, published in March, 1972, by the Caltech Clean Air Car Project.
11/3.2.1 Costs of Conversion
The range of costs is summarized in the following table:
Equipment
Fuel tankage
Installation
NATURAL GAS
$300
$20-40 per gallon
$100-$300
PROPANE
$300
$3.50-$10 per gallon 9
$100-$300
The equipment kit needed for conversion costs about the same for any type
of vehicle, but the costs of installation vary according to the kind of vehicle
and the amount of tankage to be installed. Natural gas tankage is more
expensive because it is heavy and bulky-a gallon equivalent occupying about
two cubic feet and weighing 35 to 40 pounds. For the same reason the range
of natural gas vehicles is usually limited to less than 100 miles. Since almost
all natural gas conversions are of the dual-fuel type, which allows alternate
use of gasoline, the problem of limited range can be overcome by switching
fuels.
For natural gas conversions a central fueling facility must be included in
the initial capital costs. Unlike propane, natural gas is not widely available
at service stations at present. A central fueling facility consisting of a com-
pressor, storage tanks and piping is necessary to transfer the gas from the
pipeline to vehicles. The least expensive facility, which costs as little as
'News release, Dual Fuel Systems, Inc., Los Angeles, May 3, 1972.
9Per gallon equivalent capacity.
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$200 per vehicle, requires connecting the vehicle to the compressor over-
night for refueling. A compressor capable of fueling a vehicle directly from
the gas line in a few minutes is available, but will increase the cost of the
fueling installation to as much as $500 per vehicle.
11/3.2.2 Savings of Conversion
Fuel: Both natural gas and propane are exempted from the California fuel
use tax when used in approved conversion systems. lO With these exemptions
a gallon equivalent of natural gas costs about one-third and propane about
two-thirds the price of gasoline purchased at bulk rates.
Maintenance: Because natural gas and propane burn cleanly, savings are
realized on engine maintenance. Oil and spark plugs need changing less
often and tune-ups are required less frequently than in gasoline systems.
Two specific examples of costs and savings are given here for purposes of
illustration. Example 1 involves the conversion of a 30-truck fleet (garbage
trucks), where the economics is especially favorable for conversion to
gaseous fuels. Example 2 discusses the conversion of a fleet of eight sedans
and eighteen trucks; this case may be more representative. In the first case
the figures indicate that the conversion investment for natural gas would be
paid back within three years without any fuel tax exemption, while the con-
version costs of propane would be made up in five years. However, with the
State fuel tax exemption approved by the 1971 Legislature for vehicles over
6,000 pounds gross weight, the payback periods are one and three-quarters
years with natural gas and one year with propane. In the· second example
the payback periods are five years for CNG and five and one-half years for
LPG, because much less gasoline is used by this second fleet.
TABLE 8
Example 1. CONVERSION OF A TRUCK FLEET
General Assumptions:
1. Fleet consists of 30 trucks (over 6000 pounds gross weight)
2. Trucks drive 80 miles/day, 5 days/week, not more than 14 hours/day;
260 days/year
3. Mileage: 4 miles/gallon gasoline
4 miles/IOO standard cubic feet (unit) natural gas
3.6 miles/gallon LPG
4. Fuel cost: 23¢/gallon gasoline
16¢/unit compressed natural gas (including 7¢/unit State tax)
22¢/gallon LPG (including 4¢/gallon Federal tax and 6¢/gallon
State tax)
including all Federal and State taxes (no exemption)
WUnder the present law the exemption, about seven cents per gallon equivalent, expires at the
end of 1975. A bill to extend this exemption to 1980 is pending in the State Legislature.
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5. Oil changes: (cost of $6.50/change)
gasoline: once every three weeks
natural gas: once every eight weeks
LPG: once every six weeks
6, Tune-ups: (cost of $Z5/tune·up)
gasoline: once every six weeks
natural gas: once every sixteen weeks
LPG: once every twelve weeks
Conversion Costs:
Natural gas: $880/truck, installed, providing a range of 90 miles per truck,
requiring 9 hours concurrent filling time
125 scfmll compressor, cost of $18,000
overnight fill station at $150/truck
30 x $880 =$26,400 conversions
30 x $150 = 4,500 overnight fill
18,000 compressor
1,000 fueling station installation
$49,900 Total
LPG: $425/truck, installed, providing a range of 200 miles per truck
1,000 gallon storage tank, leased at $200 per year
30 x $425 =$12,750 conversions
1,000 storage tank installation
$13,750 +$200/year tank leasing
Other costs:
Fuel:
gasoline: 80 miles/day/truck =20 gal/day/truck
=5,200 gal/yr/truck at 23¢/gal
=$1,196/yr/truck
natural gas: 80 miles/day/truck =20 units/day/truck
=5,200 units/yr/truck at 16¢/unit
=$832/yr/truck
LPG: 80 miles/day/truck =22 gal/day/truck
=5,720 gal/yr/truck at 22¢/gal
=$1,258/yr/truck
Fuel savings: $364/yr/truck = $10,920/yr with natural gas for fleet
Fuel additional costs: $62/yr/truck = $1,860/yr with LPG for fleet
Oil:
gasoline: 30 x $6.50 =$195 every 3 weeks
=$3,380/yr
natural gas: 30 x $6.50 =$195 every 8 weeks
=$1,270/yr
LPG: 30 x $6.50 =$195 every 6 weeks
=$1,690/yr
Fleet oil savings: $2,1l0/yr with natural gas
$1,690/yr with LPG
lIStandard cubic feet/minute.
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Tune-ups:
gasoline: 30 x $25 =$750 every 6 weeks
=$6,500/yr
natural gas: 30 x $25 = $750 every 16 weeks
=$2,440/yr
LPG: 30 x $25 =$750 every 12 weeks
=$3,250/yr
Fleet tune-up savings: $4,060/yr with natural gas
$3,250/yr with LPG
Net savings with natural gas: $1O,920/yr in fuel savings
2,1l0/yr in oil savings
4,060/yr in tune-up savings
$17,090/yr total net savings
Net savings with LPG: $1,860/yr in additional fuel costs
200/yr storage tank leasing
$2,060/YR TOTAL ADDITIONAL COSTS
$1,690/yr in oil savings
3,250/yr in tune-up savings
$4,940/YR TOTAL SAVINGS
$2,880/YR TOTAL NET SAVINGS
Payback time:
Natural gas: $49,900/$17,090 =approximately 3 years
LPG: $13,750/$2,880 =approximately 5 years
Additional savings possible in tax exemptions until 1976:
State tax: 6¢ gallon/LPG, 7¢ unit/CNG
Natural gas: 5,200 units/yr/truck at 7¢/unit
= $364/yr/truck
=$1O,920/yr/fleet
LPG: 5,720 gal/yr/truck at 6¢/gallon
=$343/yr/truck
=$1O,300/yr/fleet
Total savings: $28,000/yr with natural gas
$13,200/yr with LPG
These additional savings greatly reduce the payback time.
Payback time: Natural gas - 1-3/4 years
LPG - 1 year
The economics of each fleet vary greatly and must be investigated on an
individual basis. This is an example in which the economics definitely favor
conversion.
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TABLE 9
Example 2. CONVERSION OF FLEET OF 8 SEDANS
AND 18 TRUCKS
Cost of Fuels/Gallon
gasoline 26¢ regular
propane 14'h¢
+4¢ federal tax
32¢ ethyl
compressed natural gas
5.5¢/100 cu. ft.
1.0¢/100 cu. ft. compression and service cost
6.5¢/100 cu. ft.
(there is nofederal fuel tax on compressed natural gas)
State tax exemptions for both propane and natural gas have been included
Cost of FuelIYear
gasoline
21,280 gallons 28.8¢ (avg.)
year x gallon = 6130/year
propane
25,500 gallons 18.5¢ - $4720
year x gallon - /year
natural gas
2,128,000 cu. ft. x 6.5¢ _ $
year 100 cu. ft. - 1382
please note that 100 cu. ft. natural gas = 1gallon of gasoline and that 1.2 gallons
of propane = 1 gallon of gasoline
Cost of Routine Maintenance/Year
(Oil changes and tune ups)
gasoline $1688
propane 1/3 x 1688 = $563
natural gas 113 x 1688 = $563
Total Fuel and Maintenance Cost/Year
gasoline
propane
natural gas
6130
+1688
$7818
4720
+ 563
$5283
1382
+ 563
$1945
fuel
routine maintenance
total cost/year
fuel
routine maintenance
total
fuel
routine maintenance
total
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Savings/Year
propane cost on gasoline
cost on propane
saving
7818
5283
$2535
We estimate that if natural gas were used, approximately 80% of
the driving would be done on natural gas and the remaining 20%
would be done on gasoline.
cost on dual fuel (natural gas and gasoline)
.2 x 7818 + .8 x 1945 =$3120
natural gas cost on gasoline
cost on dual fuel
saving
7818
3120
$4698
Cost of Converting to Propane
8 sedans at $525/sedan
18 trucks at $450/truck
storage tank installation
4,200
8,100
1,000 estimate
$13,300
23,066
1,000
$24,066 total
= 5.25 years
Cost of Converting to Compressed Natural Gas
cost of conversion and
refueling equipment
installation cost (est.)
Simple Equipment Payoff Times
propane $13,300 total cost
$2535 net saving/year
natural gas $24,066 total cost
--:--'-:-,--:----'---'--'--'--'--- = 5.12 years
4698 net saving/year
(Note that if the use of gasoline rises to 30% the payoff time becomes
5.7 years.)
An additional economic benefit not taken into account is the extended
engine lifetimes for gaseous fueled vehicles. Fleet operators currently using
gaseous fuels report that the lifetime of engines (time between overhauls)
is extended by 50% to 100% over the average engine lifetime burning gasoline.
11/3.3 Gaseous Fueled Vehicles: Safety and Insurance
11/3.3.1 Safety
Gaseous fuel systems have a number of qualities that make them inherently
sale for use in motor vehicles. Gaseous fuel tanks are constructed of heavy
boiler plate steel, since they are pressure tanks. They have more than twenty
times the resistance of ordinary gasoline or diesel tanks in a collision. Gas-
eous fuel tanks are fitted with strong valves and fittings which are recessed
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for added safety and which contain shutoff valves that operate automatically
in the event of a fuel line or valve break. 12 Nearly twenty years ago an
Interstate Commerce Commission report stated:
"It would appear from examination of accident records that ...
liquefied petroleum gas equipment is practically never involved
in a fire accident because of failure or rupture of the fuel system.
This increased safety may be attributed ... to the necessarily
sturdy construction of butane and propane tanks."13
Gaseous fuel systems must meet exacting standards. Conversion equip-
ment must be of a type tested and approved by the California State Air
Resources Board. 14 Gaseous fuel tanks must meet standards set by the
Department of Transportation (D.O.T.)15 or the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (A.S.M.E.).16 The tanks must be reinsyected and
certified every five years or whenever they are repaired or installed.
A U.S. Department of Commerce report recently pinpointed the principal
drawback of gaseous fuels:
"From a fire and explosion safety standpoint, leakage is more
of a problem with gaseous than liquid fuels. With proper
equipment and handling, LPG presents no undue hazards, but
if used by the general public, vehicle engineering and mainten-
ance would have to be more severe than has been the practice
with liquid fuels. Experience with LPG fueled vehicles indi-
cates that this is possible."17
Gas leaks in enclosed spaces are the principal fire hazard associated with
gaseous fuels. When natural gas is leaked into the open atmosphere, it will
rise and dissipate harmlessly. Gasoline "puddles" on the ground and presents
a potential fire hazard. LPG descends to the ground and dissipates as vapor
unless it is confined. In closed buildings, LPG flows down to the lowest
levels when spilled, creeping through ventilators and cracks to the lowest
level of the building. Since many buildings have furnaces in the basement, an
LPG spill presents the same fire and explosion hazard as a gasoline spill
l2"Safety Factors in Operating LP-Gas Engines," National LP-Gas Association Times,
Spring 1970, pp. 25-26.
"Motor Carrier Fire Accidents, 1951, ICC Bureau of Motor Carriers, Section of Safety
(December 14, 1953) p. 38.
I4Cal. Health and Safety Code, Sections 39110-14 (1970).
"49 CFR 173.34 (1971).
16ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (1968). Proposed Regulations of the Department of
the California Highway Patrol, Fuel containers andfuel system for compressed natural gas, lique-
fied natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas (1971); National Fire Protection Association Stand-
ard No. 58; Liquefied Petroleum Gas Safe Handling and Use, American Insurance Association
(1965).
"The Automobile and Air Pollution: A Program for Progress, U.S. Department of Commerce,
December, 1967, Part II, p. 47.
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in a building which is not adequately ventilated for the purpose of dissipating
heavy vapors. Both LPG and CNG contain odorizers which reveal the
presence of gas in the event of a leak. The odorizer condenses out of natural
gas during liquefaction, however. An LNG leak would not be evident because
the revaporized gas is almost pure methane and therefore odorless. New
odorizers are being developed to remedy the problem.
Gaseous fuels have higher ignition temperatures than gasoline, so it
requires a hotter spark to ignite them. Gasoline ignites at 600°-700° F,
compared to 870° F for LPG and 1,300° F for natural gas. The burning range
of LP gas is narrower than that of gasoline. Natural gas has a somewhat
wider burning range, but it dissipates into the atmosphere very rapidly, while
gasoline puddles and slowly vaporizes. On the whole, gaseous fuels pose no
greater fire and explosion hazard than gasoline. R. H. Eshelman, Detroit
Technical Editor for Automotive Industries, recently wrote, "Evidence from
many fleet type operations to date suggest LPG fuel systems may prove as
safe or safer than conventional ones."18
Experience with gaseous fueled vehicles indicates that they are at least as
safe as vehicles burning gasoline. General Telephone Company of Florida
has been using gaseous fuels in its 1,850-vehicle fleet since 1964. Mr. Gary
Powell, General Plant Administrator for Transportation, wrote, "I feel as
far as LP gas being safe, it is much safer than gasoline, if used in the correct
way. With the extra thickness of the tank and the electric lock off, it makes
LP gas' much safer to use as motor fuel than gasoline." The Chicago Transit
Authority (CTA) has run LP gas-fueled buses 716 million miles without ever
suffering damage of significance to the LP gas-fuel systems as a result of
traffic accidents. Some fueling accidents resulted in fire losses, but according
to Mr. Stanley D. Forsyth, former CTA general superintendent of engineer-
ing, "There have been a few small fires in the engine compartments during
this six-year period, but the loss per mile of operation due to all causes is
lower with LP gas than with the other two standard fuels (diesel and
gasoline)."19
The General Services Administration (GSA) recently tested a fleet of
dual-fuel vehicles burning either gasoline or natural gas. The GSA report
said:
"The first year's experience with these dual-fuel vehicles has
resulted in an enviable safety record. None of the data studies
or the people consulted indicates any safety problem when
these vehicles were used under normal conditions....
"The GSA test fleet record shows no fires, injuries or
hazardous incidents...
"Studies have indicated that methane systems should be
appreciably safer than gasoline in accident situations. The
tankage is considerably more rugged, the maximum leak or
18Eshelman, "LP Gas Conversion," Automotive Industries, May 15, 1970, p. 60.
19"Safety Factors in Operating LP Gas Engines," op. cit., p. 26.
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fire is greatly reduced and spillage due to overturning is not
possible."20
The cities of Los Angeles and San Francisco have promulgated stringent
regulations for parking LP gas-powered vehicles inside of buildings. Under
Los Angeles Fire Protection Bureau Requirement No. 35, inside storage of
liquefied flammable gas (LFG)-powered vehicles "may be permitted in areas
designated by the Fire Department. No vehicle shall be stored, parked or
maintained in any building occupied or used as an Institutional or Assemblage
Occupancy." Under the San Francisco Fire Code, an LP gas-powered vehicle
cannot be parked or stored in any building except a building used exclusively
for storing, parking or repairing. The vehicle is not permitted below the grade
level, and buildings used to house them shall have no basement or open
area below grade level. In San Francisco a vehicle powered by LPG cannot
be parked on the premises outside of buildings except in approved locations.
Although such stringent regulations appear to be unreasonable in view of the
safety record of gaseous fuels, it is wise for the fleet owner contemplating
conversion to be thoroughly familiar with fire regulations in his operating
area and follow them to the letter until they are changed.
Mr. R. L. Davis, Assistant Manager for Regional Loss Control, Insurance
Company of North America, stresses the fact that gaseous fuel system instal-
lations must meet all applicable codes and safety standards if they are to be
safely used. Statistics gathered by the National Fire Protection Associa-
tion over 30 years showed 18 accidents where LP gas as an engine fuel was
involved. In every case the cause of the accident was traced to noncompliance
with national standards.21 Gaseous fuels, then, are safe to use as motor fuel
when used in state certified systems which are installed and maintained by
competent personnel in accordance with all applicable codes and safety
standards.
11/3.3.2 Insurance
The insurance industry does not recognize any distinction between gaseous
fueled vehicles and gasoline powered vehicles in its rate structure. Mr. William
G. Meade, Director of the Environmental Sciences Unit for the Hartford
Insurance Group, recently wrote:
"There is no difference in premium between an LP gas-powered
or gasoline-powered vehicle or, for that matter, a diesel-
powered vehicle. The rates and premiums are based upon many
2°A Report on the General Services Administration's Dual-Fuel Vehicle Experiments: Pollu-
tion Reduction with Cost SaVings, General Services Administration. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office (1971), p. 17.
21"Safety Factors in Operating LP-Gas Engines," op. cit., p. 25.
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factors, including use, locations, etc., but the fuel is not one of
the criteria."22
Insurance underwriters insist that conversions meet applicable state and
local standards if they are to insure a vehicle. One standard often referred
to is "National Fire Protection Association Standard No. 58, Storage and
Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases, 1969."23 The Uniform Fire Code,
County of Los Angeles, and the Pacific Fire Rating Bureau, a commercial
rating organization for the insurance industry, both require that vehicles con-
verted to gaseous fuels comply with NFPA standard No. 58. The Los Angeles
City Fire Department specifies strict standards that must be met by gaseous
fuel conversions in the city.24 The State of California requires that the con-
version use a system approved by the California State Air Resources Board
and use tanks which meet D.O.T. or A.S.M.E. standards.25
The insurance industry does distinguish between gaseous fuels and
gasoline in refueling installations and structures in which vehicles are stored.
Both underwriting and price distinctions may be made, depending on the
nature and location of facilities. The Underwriting Manual of the National
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, 1971, establishes a higher basic bodily
injury rate for LPG fueling stations than for gasoline stations. The basic
property damage rate is the same. No rate has been established for natural
gas fueling stations, but analogous rates for natural gas are higher than for
either propane or gasoline. Rates vary, however, depending on facilities,
safety record, and types of coverage sought. Anyone contemplating the
installation of gaseous fueling facilities should contact his insurance com-
pany to determine whether or not his insurance cost will change.
Insurance companies may determine that gaseous fuels are safer than
gasoline for many uses. When Disneyland converted some of its boats to
burn natural gas, its insurance underwriters determined:
"This fueling system should eliminate many of the exposures
that exist with the present gasoline fueling system and should
present no unusual operating problem or excessive exposure
to employees or guests."26
22The conclusion that no rate differential exists between gaseous fueled and gasoline fueled
vehicles was supported by: Mr. Hubbard of the Insurance Services Office, a licensed rating organi-
zation, telephone conversation of September 16, 1971; Mr. John J. Bailey, Fleet Safety Coordi-
nator, American Insurance Association, letter dated June 9, 1971; Mr. Paul E. Lippold, Public
Affairs Manager, Allstate Insurance Company, letter dated June 7, 1971; Mr. Gerold L. Maatman,
Vice President, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, letter dated June 18, 1971; and
Mr. R. L. Davis, Assistant Manager for Loss Control, Insurance Company of North America,
letter dated June 9, 1971.
23NFPA No. 58. Copies are available from the National Fire Protection Association, 60 Battery-
march Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02ll0.
24Los Angeles Fire Department Requirements for Liquified Flammable Gas Powered-Internal
Combustion Engines, Fire Prevention Bureau Requirement No. 35, 5-17-71(rev.). Los Angeles
City Fire Code, sections 57.44.39, 57.44.40 (1971).
"California Administrative Code, Title 8, pp. 451-550, Unified Pressure Vessel Safety Orders.
26Mr. R. L. Davis, Assistant Manager Regional Loss Control, Insurance Company of North
America, letter of March 12, 1970.
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Gaseous fuels are safe and easy to insure if they are installed and used in
strict compliance with all applicable standards and maintained by qualified,
repairmen. Failure to use certified pressure vessels or conversion systems
on gaseous fueled vehicles will increase the potential for accidents and make
it difficult to insure vehicle fleets and terminal facilities.
11/3.4 Feasibility and Costs of Exhaust and Evaporative
Emissions Control Devices for Used Cars
11/3.4.1 Vacuum Spark Advance Disconnect (VSAD)
The vacuum spark advance disconnect interrupts the normal vacuum signals
applied to the distributor from the carburetor. The principal effect is that
ignition occurs later in the engine cycle so that peak temperatures and pres-
sures are reduced, thus leading to a lower rate of formation of oxides of
nitrogen. This improvement is especially significant for 1966-1970 vehicles
becaus'e of their high NOx emissions (Section I1/2.3, Table 4).
Figure 33 illustrates a typical VSAD installation. Normally the vacuum
line runs directly from the carburetor to the distributor. However, in the
retrofit device a thermostatic (overtemperature) switch is placed in the
vacuum line, interrupting the normal vacuum signal when the switch is open.
The switch is connected into the coolant return line (upper radiator hose) so
that it can sense if the engine is overheating and reconnect the advance.
Many vehicles will operate satisfactorily without the overtemperature
switch if the advance line is merely disconnected and plugged. Undergrad-
uates in the Clean Air Car Project of the EQL are investigating the operating
characteristics of pre-I970 gasoline powered cars subjected to the "Clean
Air Tune-up." This procedure consists of the following elements:
1. Test of the cooling system to insure that it is functioning properly;
2. Testing and tuning of fuel and electrical systems;
3. Disconnecting the vacuum spark advance;
4. Tuning for idle engine rpm of 600 in "drive" for vehicles with automatic
shift and 700 for vehicles with manual shift at lean "best idle" (normally
at 14:1 air-fuel ratio).
This procedure is the same as that proposed by General Motors, except
that the thermal vacuum switch which reconnects the vacuum advance at
engine temperatures above 205°F is not included. Preliminary results give
the following percentage reductions in exhaust emissions for pre-1966 cars:
HC 41% CO 32% NOx 32%
Estimated cost is $10-15, including the "tune-up," as compared with a mini-
mum e~tim~ted ccst ()f the VSAD ;Uustrated ~n P~gure ~~ of $20 without the
tune-up.
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As noted in Part I, legislation passed in 1971 requires that beginning in
1973 all 1966-1970 cars must be equipped with a device that will "signifi-
cantly" cut nitrogen oxide emissions. The certification that such a device is
installed on the car is to be made on initial registration, or transfer of
ownership, or on renewal of registration. A limit of $35 is set on the initial
cost of such a device, including installation charges, and the device must not
require maintenance more often than once every 12,000 miles at a maximum
cost of $15. The State ARB recently set the standards for such a device or
control measure. These standards require a 30% decrease in NOx emissions
for engines with a displacement greater than 140 cubic inches, and a 20%
reduction in NOx emissions for engines under 140 cubic inches displace-
ment. Emissions are to be measured by the constant volume sampling (CYS)
7-mode cycle, with a 60 mph cruise mode included.
The motor vehicle population in the South Coast Air Basin is projected at
6.3 million in 1975, and 35% of these vehicles will be 1966-1970 models
(Appendix), or about 2.2 million vehicles. If retrofit of these vehicles is com-
pleted by the end of 1975, the estimated cost of the YSAD itself is about
45 million dollars and the estimated maintenance cost is about 30 million
dollars, or a total of 75 million dollars. If the procedure recommended by the
Clean Air Car Project is adopted, the cost of the disconnect plus "tune-up"
is about 33 million dollars. Additional yearly "tune-ups" at a cost of about
22 million dollars per year for the 1966-1970 cars would probably be required
anyway as part of a mandatory annual vehicle emissions inspection system
for all vehicles. In any case these costs will be borne by the motorists. (See
Section I1/5.3 on emissions taxes.)
11/3.4.2 Capacitor Discharge Ignition Optimization
System
This system was developed by Air Quality Products, Inc., to meet the
emissions standards for 1955-1965 model used car devices set forth in the
Health and Safety Code, Sections 39107 and 39175 to 39184.21 It was
accredited by the ARB on September 15, 1971, in Resolution 71-72. At that
time the board had some reservations about the device, but on December 17,
1971, the ARB adopted Resolution 71-72A, removing all reservations except
that the applicant is required to submit manufacturing and marketing plans
prior to action by the ARB making the device mandatory for 1955-1965
vehicles.
The system installation, shown in Figure 34, involves certain adjustments
of the internal programming of the system to fit the characteristics of each
particular vehicle. In addition, the carburetor is set for an idle speed of
50-75 rpm over normal manufacturer's specification and for lean idle mixture
(1.5% CO in the exhaust).
27Also Title 13 of California Administrative Code, Chapter 3, Sub-chapter 2, Parts 2 and 3.
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The ignition optimization system retards the spark under certain conditions
by interrupting the vacuum advance signal via a solenoid-activated switch
and/ or electronically delaying the spark. This measure lowers peak pressures
and temperatures in the combustion process and reduces NOx emissions.
However, some reduction in hydrocarbon emissions also occurs. The best
explanation of this phenomenon is that combustion probably continues to
take place right into part of the exhaust cycle of the engine, and some resid-
ual HC is burned as it is swept out of the cylinder.
Additional hydrocarbon emissions reduction results from the "leaning
out" of the carburetor away from the normally "rich" setting found in the
older vehicles. The slight increase in NOx that usually accompanies this
change is more than compensated for by the timing changes.
ARB data obtained during accreditation testing shows that an average
reduction of 60-70% in hydrocarbons and 30-40% reduction in NOx is pos-
sible in pre-1966 vehicles. Except for a slightly larger reduction in HC emis-
sions, this performance is about the same as for the simpler YSAD.
This system would also be applicable to 1966-1970 vehicles. These cars
have already been tuned "lean" to meet hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide
emissions standards, but they tend to emit high levels of oxides of nitrogen.
The manufacturer claims that a 50-60% reduction in NOx and 10-15%
reduction in HC are possible on these vehicles. This performance is also about
the same as for the simpler YSAD.
At present the installed cost of this system is claimed to be $40, as com-
pared to a maximum allowable price of $85. 28 By 1975, about 12% of the
vehicles would be in the pre-1966 category, or about 760,000 vehicles in the
South Coast Air Basin. At the estimated price of $40 the cost of the retrofit
would be about 30 million dollars in the South Coast Air Basin.
11/3.4.3 Evaporative Control Retrofit
Evaporative losses of gasoline in pre-1970 vehicles without evaporative
control systems are as follows:
1. Breathing losses from the fuel tank and other parts of the fuel system
because of diurnal heating and cooling;
2. Running losses from the fuel tank and carburetor vents during operation;
3. Evaporation of the fuel from the heated carburetor and other parts of the
fuel system during "hot soak" after the engine is turned off.
The evaporative control standard for 1970-1972 vehicles limits the total
evaporative emissions to 6 gms of hydrocarbons under a test procedure simu-
lating one diurnal cycle and a 21-minute trip with the associated "hot soak."
28Unti1 1971 the maximum allowable cost was $65, but legislation passed in 1971 raised this
limit to $85.
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After 1972 the limit is 2 gms per test. 29 Uncontrolled vehicles typically show
20-60 gms per test. Controlled vehicles seem to be able to meet the standard
easily, and the test results are often reported as "zero."30 A considerable
number of techniques are used in evaporative control systems. Many are
applicable to retrofit systems.
Carburetor losses in operation and during "hot soak" are controlled in
several ways. External vents for the carburetor float bowl and other chambers
are either eliminated, made internal (so the vapors are consumed by the
engine), or manifolded to a vapor storage system such as a carbon canister
or the engine crankcase.
Fuel tank losses are controlled by collecting the emitted vapors in either
a carbon canister or the engine crankcase, after separation from the liquid
gasoline via a suitable standpipe system. Losses occurring during engine
operation are drawn into the engine via the air induction to the carburetor
and/ or the positive crankcase ventilation (PCV) system. The diurnal and
"hot soak" losses are stored in the vapor collection system, which is purged
with outside air when the vehicle is started. The contaminated purge air is
drawn into the engine via the carburetor or the PCV system.
A typical system utilizing a carbon canister for storage is illustrated in
Figure 35. The canister stores both fuel tank and carburetor losses when the
engine is not operating. Purge is accomplished via the PCV system.
The cost of the evaporative control retrofit is currently estimated as high
as $150. Probably the vehicle fuel tank would have to be removed and either
modified or replaced. Installation of the other components under the hood
would have to be made, along with the necessary connections to the engine
and/ or carburetor. The problem is complicated by the large variety of vehicle
makes and models, so that specialized components are required. However,
all the pertinent technology exists. What remains is the design and testing of
the suitable systems. Studies of simpler, less expensive systems are in pro-
gress as part of the EQL Clean Air Car Project.
By 1975, 3.8% of the vehicle population will be pre-1970 vehicles with no
evaporative controls. The 1966-1969 vehicles will represent 25% of the popu-
lation. Assuming that evaporative control systems reduce losses by 90%, all
1966-69 vehicles would have to be retrofitted to achieve the 50% reduction
in evaporative losses projected in the EQL strategy. The cost of this retrofit
would be 230 million dollars for the South Coast Air Basin.
Such an expensive retrofit will almost certainly require some cost-sharing
between the motorist and the general public. In general these devices will
be installed on older vehicles having lower registration fees, so registration
fee deductions would be a poor method of compensation. State income tax
write-offs are a possible method, but most likely a straight cash subsidy of
part of the retrofit cost will be required. The State will have to find an appro-
"California Fuel Evaporative Emission Standard and Test Procedure for 1970 Model Gasoline
Powered Vehicles Under 6,001 Pounds Gross Weight~ARB-as Amended March 19, 1969.
JOSarto, J. 0., et ai, Chrysler Evaporation Control System, The Vapor Saver, 1970 SAE Paper
700150.
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priate revenue source, such as emissions taxes, to finance this control measure
(Section 11/5.3).
If a partial or total subsidy were to be paid to vehicle owners for installation
of an evaporative control device on 1966-1969 vehicles, an equal subsidy
ought to be made available to vehicle owners who take any other step that
would reduce hydrocarbon emissions by a comparable amount. Two examples
are:
1. "Junking" of the vehicle and purchase of a post-1969 vehicle;
2. Sale of vehicle to a new owner who lives and works outside the Basin and
purchase of a post-1969 vehicle. (See also Section 11/5.4 for discussion
of "export" subsidy.)
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Emissions from stationary sources are not the major reason for the poor
quality of air in the South Coast Air Basin today but neither are they negli-
gible. With 35% of nitrogen oxides and 80% of sulfur dioxide coming from
power plants, industry, and other non-mobile sources, it is clear that some
reductions should be made in this area. Moreover, even the 10% of reactive
hydrocarbons attributable to stationary sources will become about 50% by
1975 if the accelerated program of dealing with automotive pollution pro-
posed in this report is carried out.
The EQL team found that a number of conventional techniques for reduc-
ing emissions are not being required of a number of power plants and indus-
trial pollution sources which, when taken together, make a significant contri-
bution to the problem. Thirty-seven small power plants in Los Angeles
County are not required to control their oxides of nitrogen emissions, as
large plants are. One hundred and twenty large industrial boilers and 60
large heaters at oil refineries are not controlled for NOx emissions, nor are
140 large stationary internal combustion engines, whose emissions could be
reduced by much the same techniques as are used for automobile engines.
Altogether, about 80 of the 230 tons of NOx being emitted daily by power
plants and industry in Los Angeles County would be eliminated easily.
There are 11,300 gasoline stations in Los Angeles County. Every time a
vehicle fuel tank or the station's main storage tank is filled, vapors containing
reactive hydrocarbons are released into the air. Though these sources are
dwarfed by hydrocarbon emissions from cars now, in a few years-assuming
success in reducing automotive emissions-service stations will be a major
source. Similarly, very soon it will be necessary to control more strictly hydro-
carbon emissions from paint and from solvents used in drycleaning plants.
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11/4 EQL STRATEGY NO.1 FOR REDUCTIONS IN EMISSIONS
FROM STATIONARY SOURCES
11/4.1 Introduction
In 1971 motor vehicle emissions in the South Coast Air Basin were so large
compared to emissions from stationary sources that additional efforts to
reduce stationary source emissions might not have seemed warranted. For
example, reactive hydrocarbon emissions from stationary sources were
about 15% of the total (Figure 5), while nitrogen oxide emissions were about
28% of the total (Figure 6). But this situation would not hold for very long if
EQL Strategy #1 for motor vehicles were adopted. By 1975 reactive hydro-
carbon emissions from stationary sources would be 50% of the total (Fig-
ure 5) if no reductions were made in these emissions, and nitrogen oxide
emissions would be 65% of the total (Figure 6). Thus it is not surprising that
the 50% reduction in stationary source emissions by 1975 called for by EQL
Strategy #'1 leads to a substantial improvement in air quality (Figure 22).
The responsibility for stationary sources in Los Angeles County rests with
the Air Pollution Control District. The District has broad powers to control
and abate air pollution from stationary sources. These powers come from
the California Health and Safety Code, sections 24260 to 24263.
In the past the District has chosen to utilize its power by constructing a
series of rules on abatement of emissions of various pollutants. A series of
inspection procedures is administered to insure that sources are in com-
pliance with the rules.
Los Angeles County contributes about 75% of the stationary source emis-
sions to South Coast Air Basin totals, so it is the dominating factor, as with
vehicular emissions. The air pollution control boards of the other counties in
the Basin tend to adopt the Los Angeles APCD rules, so that the situation in
these areas is similar to Los Angeles County.
11/4.2 Reductions in Reactive Hydrocarbon Emissions
The APCD has utilized two methods for reducing the amount of reactive
hydrocarbons emitted into the atmosphere. One method is to limit the emis-
sion of total hydrocarbons by recondensing, reabsorbing or burning the
hydrocarbon vapors before they can be emitted into the atmosphere. Alter-
natively, especially in cases where vapor collection and control seemed
highly impractical, limitations on the reactivity of hydrocarbons were
imposed to encourage substitution of lower reactivity materials.
Table 10 gives the principal sources of high reactivity hydrocarbons in
Los Angeles County at present. The two principal sources are evaporative
losses of gasoline and of solvents. The gasoline is lost in transfer to tankage
at filling stations and to automobile fuel tanks. The solvents are emitted in
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the drying of paints and other surface coatings, as well as from solvent
baths used in various industrial processes.
Certain new controls are needed in order to achieve additional reductions
in emissions from stationary sources. The most likely candidates are the
losses of gasoline vapors displaced in the filling of underground tanks at
service stations and the losses incurred in filling of vehicle fuel tanks. Com-
plete control of the former was considered by the APCD in 1962,1 but ruled
out as "too costly." A simpler, less expensive, but also less effective sub-
merged fill system was instituted instead. This system greatly reduced fuel
splashing, but did nothing to control displaced vapors.
A complete vapor recovery system for station filling is illustrated in
Figure 36. The vapor from the underground tank is returned to the tank
truck. Upon return to the refinery the tank truck delivers this vapor to a vapor
recovery system (which is already installed and in use) as it is filled for the
next load.
There are approximately 32,000 underground storage tanks in L.A. County
contributing approximately 17 tons per day of reactive hydrocarbons during
refilling operations. The estimated cost of such a system is about $350 per
tank, including the modification of the truck. 2 (Note: The cost of modifying
the truck is several times as much, but is distributed over many tanks, so it is
a small fraction of the total.) Thus the total cost would be approximately
10 million dollars for L.A. County.
A second system could be used to recover the 37 tons per day of vapor
displaced in the filling of fuel tanks on motor vehicles. Such a system is
shown in Figure 37. A vapor recovery manifold surrounds the fill spigot to
collect the displaced vapors. The station attendant will have to hold the filler
tightly against the vehicle filler pipe opening to maintain the seal. More care
in avoiding careless spillage would also be advisable.
An alternative method is to fit vehicles with standard vapor-tight fuel
connections and an associated vapor return passage. This method would
allow unattended filling at a higher cost. The vapors are returned to the
underground storage and then to the tank truck when the storage tank is
refilled.
The cost of this system is estimated as follows: additional piping for each
tank-$300. Each tank is considered to supply three pumps, which require
a $200 new hose and delivery nozzle with the vapor return. Thus each tank
costs $900 to modify. The L.A. County cost is 30 million dollars.
Considering that the. gasoline retail sales in L.A. County are one billion
dollars per year, these costs seem rather small. The estimated recovery of
over a million dollars per year in gasoline not evaporated pays a small part
of the system cost.
1Burlin, R. M. and Fudurich, A. P., Air Pollution from Filling Underground Storage Tanks APCD
Report, December 1962.
'Cost figures are based on A Study of Vapor Emission Control in Gasoline Marketing report to
Gi1barco, Inc., Dec. 1967, (C-69599) of Arthur D. Little, Inc.
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On January 17, 1972, the San Diego APCD adopted Rule 63 requiring the
control of hydrocarbon vapors resulting from the transfer of gasoline to
underground storage tanks at service stations, and from vehicles when they
are refueled. The Los Angeles APeD i~ prc~cntly con~id~ring thi5 problem,
Solvent losses are another likely area for further emissions reductions.
Rule 66 places an upper limit of 20% on the total high reactivity material in a
solvent and specific lower percentage limits on certain classes of reactive
compounds.
Present APCD data indicate that the reactive hydrocarbons are 20-25% of
the total solvents being emitted. This figure suggests that most solvents con-
tain nearly the legally allowed fraction of reactive material. Recently, mod-
ifications were made to Rule 66 to encourage further reduction in the use of
reactive organic solvents. This issue is a very complex one which we will not
attempt to cover in depth. However, some typical specific measures that could
be considered are:
1. Use of trichloroethylene (TCE) degreaser should be discontinued and non-
reactivie 1,1,1-trichloroethane substituted. No substantial cost seems to be
associated with this change. This step accounts for 20 tons per day of re-
active hydrocarbons.
2. Better solvent recovery systems could be used in certain dry-cleaning
establishments utilizing reactive solvents. The cost is estimated at a million
dollars to eliminate five tons per day of reactive hydrocarbons.
A summary of the proposed program for reducing reactive hydrocarbon
emissions in L.A. County is given in Table 11. EQL Strategy # 1 calls for
reductions in these emissions by about 74 tons per day by the end of 1975.
11/4.2 Reduction in Oxides of Nitrogen Emissions
The principal stationary sources of NOx are listed in Table 12. The largest
contributors are the boilers at electric power generating plants. The petroleum
industry contributes NOx emissions from boilers and heaters as well as
from fixed internal combustion engines used to power process equipment.
Commercial and residential use of fuel also contribute to NOx production
from a very large number of small sources.
Most of the NOx reduction effort has been concentrated on the large
power plants. Attempts to reduce sulfur dioxide by requiring a shift from oil
to natural gas in power plants effected some decrease in the NOx levels,
because the combustion of the gas can be better controlled to achieve lower
NOx emissions.
However, recently the APCD has taken a more active role in limiting and
reducing the i NOx emissions. Rule 67 sets a strict upper limit on the total
emissions of anyone new source (140 pounds/hour NOx) so as to prohibit
any new large sources unless the technology improves significantly. Rule 68
imposes stricter emissions limits on NOx emissions from existing large
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sources by requiring reductions m the stack concentrations, as shown in
Table 13.
Several techniques have been used to achieve these reductions without
affecting the boiler efficiency. One is multiple-stage combustion, which
achieves some reduction in the peak temperatures of the combustion flame.
This reduction can be further augmented by flue-gas recirculation, but recir-
culation is more difficult to retrofit to existing boilers. Another technique
involves reducing the excess air, so that combustion is closer to stoichio-
metric, while carefully avoiding any increase in hydrocarbon or carbon
monoxide emissions.
Similar techniques could be applied to many other industrial boilers and
heaters in use. The petroleum industry is the largest contributor. Most likely
additional rules will be required so that Rule 68-type constraints are applied
to these NOx producers.
Industrial plants also use large internal combustion engines (operating
with process-produced fuel gas) to supply mechanical power for pumping,
etc. These engines would respond to the same NOx control techniques
used for automobiles, such as exhaust gas recirculation, manifold or catalytic
exhaust reactors, etc., to reduce their NOx emissions. However, additional
rules would be needed, since these sources are not controlled by any of the
present regulations.
A feasible control program is outlined in quantitative terms in Table 14.
The strategy involves achieving some reductions from each of several source
types by one of the possible control techniques. Additional reductions of
about 14 tons per day are possible in large boilers and small power plants by
utilizing flue-gas recirculation, as well as low excess air, at an additional
cost of about 14 million dollars.
One problem facing the NOx reduction program is the difficulty in
obtaining sufficient natural gas to meet the fuel requirements over the next
few years. This shortage will necessitate burning oil, with resultant higher
NOx levels because of poorer combustion control.
TABLE 10
Sources of Reactive Hydrocarbons (tons/day)
Industrial
Chemical 15
{ Station Filling 17
Petroleum 60 Auto Filling 31
Other 12
Other (Solvents) 55 }Commercial (Solvents) 10 Total Solvents 80
Residential (Solvents) 15
--
TOTAL 155
Source: Los Angeles County Air Pollution ControL District, Profile, 1971.
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TABLE 11
Reactive HC Reduction (L.A. County)
CURRENT EMISSIONS COST:
NUMBER EMISSIONS % REDUCTION M JLLlONS
SOURCE CONTROL MEASURE OF SOURCES TONS/DAY REDUCTION TONS/DAY OF UOLLARS
Gasoline Station Tank Vapor recovery
Filling system 34,000 20 100 20 10
II Gasoline Station Auto Vapor recovery
Filling system 11,300 40 100 40 30
III Solvent Degreasing Switch to zero
reactivity solvent 26 100 26 zero cost
IV Dry Cleaning More complete vapor
00 recovery system 25 5 100 5 1
00
TOTAL 91 91 41
Source: Trijonis, John, "An Economic Air Pollution Model. Application: Photochemical Smog in Los Angeles County in 1975," Summer, 1972.
Another problem that requires careful attention is the increasing use of
gas turbines by electric utilities in this Basin for peaking power. Because of
their relatively small size, these units meet the standards set by Rule 67,
even though they produce much higher NOx emissions per unit of electrical
energy generated than well-designed steam plants of much larger capacity. A
consistent program for reducing NOx emissions in this Basin may require
that no new gas turbine installations be permitted after a certain date.
TABLE 12
Sources of Oxides of Nitrogen (1971)
NOx (TONS/DAY)
Industrial
Chemical
Metallurgical
Mineral
Petroleum
Power Plants
Commercial
Residential
TOTAL
10
15
10
95
100
25
25
280
l 130
Source: Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control District, Profile, 1971.
TABLE 13
Rule 68 -limitations on NOx Concentrations from
Power Plants
GAS OIL
By December 31, 1971
By. December 31, 1974
225 ppm
125 ppm
325 ppm
225 ppm
Source: Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District, Rules and Regulations, June 7, 1971.
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TABLE 14
Stationary Source NOx Reduction Program for L.A. County
CURRENT EMISSION COST:
NUMBER EMISSIONS % REDUCTION MILLIONS
SOURCE CONTROL MEASURE OF SOURCES TONS/DAY REDUCTION TONS/DAY F DOLLARS
1 Large industrial boilers Low excess air 120 24 40 10 2.4-
('>30 MBTU/hr)
II Large refinery heaters Low excess air 60 14 40 6 1.8
(>90 MBTU/hr)
III Small Refinery heaters Low excess air 160 10 40 4 3.2
IV Large power plants Combustion control & 8 76 40 30 12.0
~ (>175MW) not flue gas recirculation0 meeting Rule 68
V Small power plants Low excess air 37 23 30 6 3.7
VI Large stationary ICE's Exhaust recirculation 140 25 75 18 0.28
VII Small compressor Exhaust recirculation 360 7 75 5 0.22
ICE'sl
TOTAL 885 179 48 81 23.6
ICE' = Internal Combustion Engine
Source: Trijonis, John, "An Economic Air Pollution Model. Application: Photochemical Smog in Los Angeles County in 1975," Summer, 1972.
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PART II: SECTION 11/5
In the long discussion of possible solutions to air pollution there has been a
"black box syndrome." There is a tendency to assume that the answer must be
some add-on device for cars and factories that would work as magically as the
television enzymes chewing up wash-day dirt. The EQL team looked for but
found no magic boxes. They assumed none existed, at least for the next few
years when we will be striving to meet the new federal air quality standards.
The technical measures proposed by the EQL team represented technology
they felt was actually available and practical between now and 1977. Clearly
it is not enough, particularly for the control of automotive emissions.
This is the reason why socio-economic measures designed to cut emissions
by reducing the use of motor vehicles were added to the proposals. Their
feasibility is much more difficult to argue than that for the technical measures.
But if one assumes that an all-out effort should be made to meet the air quality
goals and deadlines of the Clean Air Amendments, then it is clear that var-
ious steps must be taken to control vehicle use. The EQL team settled for a
modest 20% reduction in the number of vehicle miles driven within the Basin,
realizing that public acceptance of such a different approach will be prob-
lematical.
The central proposal in this area is a system of taxing emission from motor
vehicles. The taxes, if high enough, would promote a whole range of alterna-
tives that would reduce automotive emissions. One alternative would be to
drive less and use other forms of transportation more. Others would involve
shifting to less-polluting vehicles, for example, newer ones or others using
gaseous fuels.
Necessarily, emissions taxes depend on mandatory inspection and testing
of motor vehicles, a system that would also insure that all technical measures
for reducing emissions from both new and used cars were working at maximum
efficiency-or at all.
Other socio-economic measures are proposed to reinforce the results of tax-
ing emissions. A scheme for subsidizing the export of older, high-emission
cars from the Basin is put forward. A system of incentives and penalties to
more directly promote the kinds of transportation alternatives people would
need in order to reduce their emissions taxes is outlined. Essentially, it pro-
poses the freeways as immediately available "tracks" for a mass, rapid transit
system. Buses and car pools would be given the advantage over driver-only
cars with reserved freeway lanes or priority access to freeways, and the effect
of these measures would be reinforced by cheap parking for car pools, expen-
sive parking for driver-only cars, and expanded and cheaper bus service. A
scheme for rationing gasoline is proposed "as a last resort."
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11/5 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND
DISINCENTIVES DESIGNED TO REDUCE EMISSIONS
11/5.1 Introduction
Part I of this report and Sections 3 and 4 of Part II propose a series of new
"technical" controls on stationary sources of emissions and on used motor
vehicles. But even in the short run (1972-1977) these technical measures
alone are not sufficient to achieve the management air quality standards set
down in Part I, page 9, and Part III, Section 1.3. We found it necessary to
down in Sections 1/2.1 and 11/1.3. We found it necessary to combine the tech-
nical measures with a set of social and economic incentives and disincentives
designed to encourage a shift to low-pollution motor vehicles, to encourage
the use of multiple-occupancy vehicles (buses, carpools, etc.), and to reduce
the annual rate of increase in gasoline consumption in the Basin.
There are three main reasons for turning to these social and economic
measures: (1) the rapidly increasing incremental cost of cutting emissions by
means of technical controls alone once the total emissions in the Basin are
reduced to about 50% of their 1970 levels;l (2) the annual rate of increase in
total emissions in the Basin attributable to growth that would eventually
overwhelm even the best control technology likely to be available in this
decade (Figure 14); (3) the advantages, in terms of efficiency, of economic
incentive systems in comparison to purely technical-regulatory approaches.
The measures we propose in this section will work in the short run to speed
up the process of achieving improved air quality and to introduce some flex-
ibility into our proposed strategy. In the longer run these socioeconomic
measures will continue to provide incentives to reduce emissions even after
all automobiles on the road meet the 1975/76 Federal standards. It will be
argued in Section 11/6 that fundamental changes in life-styles and technolo-
gies are needed to provide a long-term solution to the problem of controlling
air pollution in this Basin. Although the measures discussed in this section
have more immediate impact, they would help prepare the way for larger
social change.
In Section 11/5.2 we discuss the basic concept of "internalization of risk"
and the need to stimulate the development of a widely varied and flexible
menu of alternatives to clean up the environment. One way to put a policy
of risk-internalization into operation is by means of an emissions tax based
on the total amount of "harmful" emissions emitted by an automobile
(Section 11/5.3). This control measure, designed to induce motorists to
pollute less, could be made more efficient by a system of incentives to pro-
mote the export of old high-emission cars out of the Basin (Section 11/5.4).
The provision of economically and socially viable alternatives to the
payment of the emissions tax is clearly an important part of the strategy.
'Trijonis, John, An Economic Air Pollution Model Application: Photochemical Smog in Los
Angeles County in 1975, Summer, 1972. Copies available from the EQL on request.
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In Section II/5.5 we propose a system of mutually reinforcing incentives and
disincentives that promote the use of multiple-occupancy vehicles such as
buses, carpools and jitney cabs, and that penalize driver-only cars.
Finally, in Section II/5.6 we discuss two possible gasoline rationing
schemes that would reduce the annual rate of increase in gasoline
consumption.
The measures discussed in this section represent relatively new approaches
to the problem of controlling motor vehicle emissions. Each measure needs
further study and discussion. Ways in which these measures might best be
combined among themselves and with subsidies and regulatory programs
need to be investigated. These measures, then, are not exclusive responses,
nor are they "final." Research on this aspect of air pollution control is con-
tinuing at the EQL. The main purpose here is to introduce some ideas,
analyze their advantages and disadvantages, and stimulate badly needed
discussion among the public and the policy-makers.
11/5.2 The Public Policy Issues
What is the appropriate concept to use in order to design an effective strategy
to deal with the problems of the environment? According to conventional
wisdom, the appropriate rationale is internalization of the costs of environ-
mental degradation. Firms and individuals would be required to spend
such amounts to improve environmental quality as will make the marginal
benefits equal to the marginal costs. However, it will be argued here that
despite its intrinsic logic, internalization of costs doesn't provide an opera-
tional concept adequate to deal with the problems of the environment. What,
then, is the appropriate concept? Whil~ there isn't any ideal concept, a better
approximation to reality is "internalization of risk."
The concept of cost internalization relies on cost-benefit analysis, but
there are two serious problems with cost-benefit analysis. One of them is that
even if the costs and benefits could be precisely measured, there isn't any
obvious way to take into account the fact that each person will be affected
differently, both as he perceives the benefits and is affected by cost internali-
zation. Hence, there is no unarbitrary way to relate individual costs to social
costs and individual benefits to social benefits. How, in fact, these calcula-
tions get made depends in large part on the nature of the political process.
A second and even more serious limitation of cost-benefit analysis is the
absence of theories that would enable us to predict the potential benefits
in economic terms. There is no way to provide a damage function for human
receptors, because the consequences to present and future generations of
people can be foreseen only as incalculable risks (e.g., the risk that smog
will result in a substantial increase in the incidence of respiratory diseases).
And whether policy makers act now or wait to impose air qualit~ manaBe-
ment standards unta more is known about the risk, they are, in either event,
engaged in very arbitrary judgments.
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Thus, the problems facing the country in dealing with degradation of the
environment aren't those of "static efficiency," that is, of choosing among
existing alternatives and balancing predictable costs against predictable
benefits. They are, rather, "dynamic efficiency" problems, which means
they are problems of making decisions in the face of strong uncertainties
(uncertainties which cannot be reduced to a known probabilistic basis) and
of resolving a host of conflicts between theory and practice. The aim is to
produce a better menu of alternatives, thus reducing the risks to society
as a whole.
There is no correct method of deciding beforehand how much society
should spend on the prevention of environmental degradation. That will
become clearer only when more is known about the risks, for example, when
as much is known as, say, is now known about the effects of smoking on lung
cancer. It should be apparent, however, that just as there are risks of doing
too much, so are there risks of doing too little.
Risks for society as a whole are not necessarily risks for the individual
business firm or person. The immediate policy question is how risks for society
as a whole can be translated into risks for the business firm and the indi-
vidual, that is, how such risks can be internalized.
A. The Appropriate Concept: Internalization of Risks
The argument for risk internalization doesn't rest simply on its theoretical
appeal. The fact of the matter is, it isn't only an interesting theory: it works.
For one thing, it has played a major role in the economic development of
this country. Econometric analysis has revealed that during the period
1919-1957 only about one-eighth of the increase of the gross national pro-
duct per worker can be explained by the increase in capital per worker-
leaving seven-eighths to be explained as a mysterious new form of energy
called "technological change." There is good reason for believing that tech-
nological competition played a very important role in producing this "new"
form of energy. Furthermore, it can b<; stated that technological competition
played a major role in making this country the undisputed technological
leader of the world from, roughly, the beginning until the middle of this
century. Starting in agriculture, shortly after the Civil War, the concept of
technological competition soon spread to industry. There are substantial
reasons for believing that, in part, the U.S. enjoyed a comparative advantage
in trading with the rest of the world because of the role technological competi-
tion played and, in part, because of broader sociological factors which fav-
ored a highly pragmatic society adept at dealing with conflicts between
theory and practice.
Of course, no one could have predicted in, say, 1900 just what would be
the outcome of all the competition, flexibility and pragmatism which char-
acterized this country.
However, the test of good economic theory doesn't consist of being able
to predict the unpredictable, but rather of trying to understand the conditions
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which produce certain kinds of beneficial mutations, and how to translate
risks for society as a whole into market risks for the individual firm or person.
B. Implementing A Policy of Risk-Internalization: Some
of the Key Issues
How might a policy of risk-internalization be put into operation? One way, to
be discussed in detail in the next section, is through an emissions tax. Here
the idea is only briefly described to show how it is related to the concept of
risk-internalization and what general kinds of policy issues arise from imple-
menting such a concept.
Assume that an automobile emissions tax is levied in conjunction with an
inspection scheme. Assume, further, that the difference between owning a low
emitting car and a high emitting car is a difference of, say, $300 a year. The
immediate impact of such a tax would be on the consumer: Presumably, he
would drive less or discover in some cases that a second car was unnecessary
(i.e., several studies have indicated that carpooling becomes a very attractive
option at about $300 per year), and! or shift to a lower polluting type of car.
How might such a tax bring about an internalization of risk-taking? For one
thing automobile dealers would be more conscious of the risks to society as a
whole of pollution devices which weren't easy to maintain. People would
scream if they had to pay high taxes because a "clean-on-delivery" car turned
out to be very difficult to maintain. And their screaming might force automo-
bile dealers to offer a 20,000 mile warranty on the air pollution devices.
In addition, an emissions tax would provide a way to introduce into the
automobile industry a concept of dynamic workable competition in which
automobile emissions became a major factor in determining a manufac-
turer's share of the market. Thus, the effect of adding an emissions tax up to,
say, $300 a year would be like adding an excise tax of $300 a year; and the
effect of producing a car which didn't have to pay any emissions tax would be
like being exempt from such a tax. Whether dealers were forced to absorb
such a tax or whether it resulted in a direct loss of sales, it certainly would
provide manufacturers with strong incentives to push as hard as they could
for continued improvements in emissions control technology. The risks
associated with being technologically backward in the anti-pollution field
wouldn't be small and they would be measurable in dollars.
The more general policy issues which this example raises are the following:
(1) the respective roles to be played by incentive schemes and direct regula-
tion; (2) how to take care of "hardship" cases in getting users to adopt the
best set of available technologies; and (3) how to insure that industry will,
in fact, compete.
1. The Relationship Between Incentive Schemes and
Direct Regulation
On~ of the })rincipal virtues of the present method of regulation is that the
requirements placed upon industry are in terms of performance specifica-
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tions rather than technical specifications. The government tells industry
what reductions in emissions must be achieved by particular dates, but it
doesn't say how industry ought to go about achieving these reductions. Regu-
lation in term5 of performance ruther than technical 5pecification5 is the
appropriate method, because technical specifications impose additional con-
straints on the developer-and thereby make development much more
expensive.
On the other hand the central defect of present regulatory procedures is
the assumption that regulators can, in fact, produce high-confidence esti-
mates of achievable goals - when, in fact, they can't. The inability of the
regulatory agencies to unearth that which can be discovered only in the
process of research and development puts them in double jeopardy. Either
they are criticized for being too easy on industry or they promulgate rigid
standards which simply cannot be met-and thereby risk defeat of their own
purpose.
In order to avoid this kind of dilemma the role of regulation should be to
provide minimum targets, which if unmet by, say, auto manufacturers would
mean that they simply wouldn't be permitted to sell automobiles in high
pollution areas. And those manufacturers who do better should be cor-
respondingly rewarded. In other words, the incentives should be continuous.
Moreover, as better alternatives are discovered, the minimum target should
be progressively tightened.
2. Hardship Cases
A main concern which frequently is voiced has to do with promoting the
adoption of already developed technology: gaseous-fueled vehicles for fleet
use and evaporative control devices for older cars are cases in point. The
simplest way to handle "hardship cases" would be not to recognize any; for
example, as in the case of Britain to make propane (or its equivalent) manda-
tory for all taxi cabs in London. Just as with the income tax the general
argument against providing loopholes is that there is no natural stopping
place. On the other hand, it also must be recognized that politicians some-
times aren't willing to be as harsh as they might, because they regard the
political risks as too great. Hence, all that really can be said is, to the extent
subsidies or exemptions are used, the legislation should contain a self-
terminating feature which would make the subsidy or exemption expire
when it had achieved its intended purpose.
There is, however, one point which is much less controversial: That
subsidies (if permitted) ought to be created on the basis of meeting certain
performance specifications rather than in terms of adopting particular
technical devices. Thus, fleet owners should be given the same treatment
whether they use gaseous-fueled vehicles or find some other equally satis-
factory way to reduce emissions. Similarly, a private owner should receive
the same subsidy whether he installs a new $150 evaporative control device
on his automobile, manages to find an equally effective device for $50, or
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decides to scrap his second car and join a carpool. The purpose of providing
equal treatment for equally effective remedies is simply to increase the odds
that if people don't like one way of becoming a friend of the environment,
they can find another. Moreover, equal treatment clauses also provide a
way of increasing the menu of alternatives. For example, given the proper
inducements, manufacturers of electric golf carts might be persuaded to
penetrate the highway transportation market.
3. Making Dynamic Competition Work
The concept of dynamic competition supplies a highly relevant means for
internalization of risk. But will it work? The honest answer is that no one
knows. As in sports the teams sometimes compete vigorously. But again
they don't. And should dynamic competition prove to be unworkable, it will
become necessary for the government to face up to some basic issues in the
antitrust field. Moreover, especially insofar as projects involving a high
degree of risk are concerned, it may in any event become necessary for the
government to initiate a much larger publicly supported R&D effort. It is
true, of course, that policy makers are often disinclined to face up to such
basic issues: The almost inevitable response to a crisis is a series of "patch-
ups" accompanied by the proclamation that prosperity is just around the
corner.
On the other hand what are the alternatives to increasing the performance
of business concerns via a policy of risk internalization? The only real one is
an increasing degree of government regulation and control. But there is
good reason to suspect this is not a viable alternative: In the first place, to
date at least, not one of the government's regulatory efforts can be said to
have been highly successful. In the second place, given the highly dynamic
character of environmental problems, there is good reason to doubt that
regulation alone will be even as successful in the pollution control field as it
has been with other problems in the past. If it has not been possible for the
government to keep up with the problems of the railroads, how about the
environment?
11/5.3 The Motor Vehicle Emissions Tax as an Air
Pollution Control Measure
11/5.3.1 General Considerations
An emissions tax based on "harmful" automotive emissions can be thought
of as a payment by a motorist for the privilege of driving an automobile
which contributes to the pollution problem. There are many ways of defining
and collecting such a tax, and they vary in their impact on the many decisions
made by the motorist. We will consider explicitly five types of decisions:
(1) the choice of the age and model of car owned; (2) the decision on how
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much the car will be used; (3) the amount of maintenance to be performed on
the car; (4) the type of fuel used in the car; (5) the number of occupants in
the car.
The emi~~ions tax is not the only method available for innuencinR these
decisions, and we will discuss several very different methods in Section II/5.5.
All share a common characteristic: they impose a penalty on those motorists
who insist on owning a type of car, or using it in a manner which makes an
excessive contribution to air pollution. The emissions tax imposes a financial
penalty. Other measures, such as the introduction of restricted access to
freeways (Section III5.5) impose a penalty in terms of time spent in commut-
ing. We will not be able to choose the proper "mix" of these methods until we
have determined which penalty gives more leverage on important decisions.
The use of a tax to affect automobile purchase and use decisions is based
on the assumption that motorists do give some consideration to the cost of
automobile travel. The extent to which this assumption is justified is a matter
of considerable debate; therefore, we must be careful to institute a tax
scheme in a manner which makes its cost visible and easy for the motorist
to determine. A concealed tax is worse than useless: It imposes a financial
burden, which may be substantial, without inducing the environmentally
appropriate behavior which we desire.
11/5.3.2 The Types of Emissions Tax
There are three basic rationales which have been used to recommend the
institution of an emissions tax. Depending on the rationale chosen, the tax
will be set at varying levels, and the type and amount of information needed
to determine the charge will differ. We label the types of scheme which result
from these rationales the emissions charge, the emissions tax and the emis-
sions fee.
A. The Emissions Charge
Some economists propose that an emissions charge be used as the funda-
mental device both for choosing and for achieving desirable levels of air
pollution. The charge is set at a level which reflects the value of the incre-
mental damage done to society by an additional unit of emissions. Then, it
is argued, each motorist will choose to reduce his contribution to pollution
until the cost of an additional unit of emissions reduction equals the charge
which he must pay for the privilege of putting out that unit.
When the charge equals the damage done by an additional unit of emis-
sions, it follows that the cost of further reduction in emissions exceeds the
damage which would be avoided by reduction in emissions. Therefore, it is
argued, the level of air quality achieved by the emissions charge is the
"desirable" level, in the sense that it minimizes the sum of the damage done
by pollution and the costs incurred in reducing pollution.
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The major difficulty with this concept of emissions charges is that the
damage done by air pollution has proved itself nearly impossible to measure. 2
Moreover, in talking about "damage to society" we inevitably make some
value judgment about how to compare the damage suffered by one person
with the damage suffered by another person. The criticisms levelled at cost-
benefit analysis apply equally to the effluent charge proposal. There is no
ethically neutral way to define the "social damages" of air pollution, and it
is not the role of social scientists to make these ethical choices. Although we
recommend the use of financial penalties to bring about improved air quality,
we recognize that the emissions charge approach is not the correct way to
determine what the penalties should be.
B. Emissions Tax
The political system decides who shall pay for and who shall benefit from its
measures as part of its day-to-day business. In designing an emissions tax
we take as given some political decision as to the desired level of air quality,
together with the benefits to society which such a choice implies.
The emissions tax is designed to achieve the predetermined standard and
to do so in a manner which minimizes the undesirable economic impact of
pollution control. By raising the cost of using an automobile which emits
excessive quantities of harmful emissions, the emissions tax leads to changes
in the amount of driving and in the characteristics of automobiles being
driven, and thus brings about an improvement in air quality. By leaving each
motorist a free choice among many options for reducing his contribution to
air pollution so that he can respond in the manner most advantageous to
himself, the emissions tax removes the danger that motorists will be forced to
pay for unnecessary or ineffective pollution control measures. In this manner
a properly designed emissions tax can minimize the economic burden of pollu-
tion control, and can be determined without reference to the concept of"dam-
age to society."
C. Emissions Fee
The emissions charge and the emissions tax, as we have defined them, serve
two functions: to give an incentive to reduce emissions and to allocate the
necessary reduction in emissions among motorists in an "efficient" manner.
The emissions fee serves only as an incentive. To set the fee we must deter-
mine in advance a set of desirable steps to be taken to reduce automotive
pollution. The emissions fee enters the picture because we do not enforce the
law absolutely. Rather, we impose on any motorist who does not observe
the obligations of the law a fee for the privilege of continuing to use his car.
By setting the fee higher than the average cost of compliance, we give an
incentive to motorists to satisfy the previously determined standard.
~See, for example, the pessimistic conclusions reached in Ronald G. Ridker, Economic Costs
of Air Pollution, New York, 1967.
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The emissions fee approach is attractive because it is relatively simple to
decide on an appropriate charge level. It also allows the individual motorist
some flexibility in his choice of actions, and unlike, for example, the absolute
prohibition of cars failing an emissions test, it insures that no motorist will
face a catastroph:c penalty. No one can be forced to incur a cost greater than
the fee.
Unfortunately, the emissions fee approach shares a fundamental defect
of all schemes based on standards applying to individual automobiles. It is
infeasible to state the standards in sufficient detail and with sufficient pre-
cision to cover all the ingenious ways by which a motorist could reduce his
contribution to pollution.
Writing standards in sufficient detail to include all eventualities compares
in magnitude to the task of central economic planning. In this case it is
administratively impossible and unjustified in terms of the relation between
effort and result. We should not abandon the coordinating role of emissions
taxes by falling back on rigid standards and fees.
Moreover, a system of fees designed to bring about specific, predetermined
actions can reduce the probability that responses will go in the predicted
direction. Note that although we cannot yet predict that a tax of X dollars
will produce a decrease of Y percent in emissions, we all believe that with
some tax, emissions will not increase. The tax to achieve a specific action is
capable, because of the very real unpredictability of individual choice, of
violating this law. The individual is much more familiar with his particular
circumstance than the planner: there is a significant probability that he will
find a way out of the dilemma posed by the specific incentive which involves
increased emissions. If, on the other hand, we tax emissions directly, then the
only way a person can reduce his tax bill is by reducing his emissions.
In summary, we find that the emissions tax is administratively workable,
more efficient than uniform standards and regulations, and potentially effec-
tive in achieving desirable levels of air quality. In the remainder of this
section we will develop and defend specific proposals for emissions tax
programs.
11/5.3.3 Decisions and Instruments
The motorist makes a number of decisions which affect his contribution to air
pollution. There are also a number of ways in which we could construct and
impose an emissions tax. Roughly, our approach is to choose those decision
areas which are most effective in reducing pollution, and choose the tax
scheme which concentrates incentives on those decision areas. Moreover,
the decision areas must be not only effective in reducing pollution but
responsive to economic incentives.
Let us assume for the moment that we can measure precisely the number
of grams of pollution put out by an automobile during the course of a year.
Then we can impose a yearly tax equal to O'P, where 0' is the tax rate in
dollars per gram of emissions, and P is total emissions during the year.
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How will the motorist respond? One person may find that he can get a
tune-up and reduce his emissions by 50%. Then during the period during
which benefits of the tune-up last the motorist will save a sum equal to one-
half of this emissions tax. If the tune-up costs less than half the emissions tax,
the motorist will save money by getting a tune-up. Another motorist may
find that a tune-up is not worthwhile, but that he would prefer driving 25%
less (perhaps by joining a carpool) in order to pay 25% less tax to c~ntinuing
to drive the same amount and paying a larger tax.
A third motorist with a car he would trade in in a year anyway may find
that by buying a new car with much lower emissions he will save enough to
justify trading in his old car immediately.
The point of the emissions tax is to leave each motorist a free choice
among many options, so that he can respond in the manner most advanta-
geous to himself.
It has already been stated that a uniform emissions tax tends to keep total
expenditure on pollution control at the lowest level consistent with the
achievement of desired air quality. To establish this point we must distinguish
between expenditures made to pay the tax and expenditures made on reduc-
ing emissions (in which we include the monetary valuation which the
motorist puts on things he gives up). If each motorist chooses that combina-
tion of emission reduction (through tune-ups, trade-ins, reduced driving,
etc.) and tax payment which is most advantageous to him privately, then by
setting a high enough tax we can make polluting sufficiently expensive that
aggregate emissions are reduced to some desired level. This tax will also
result in each motorist choosing such abatement techniques that total expen-
ditures made on emissions reduction are as small as possible while still
achieving desired results.
The revenues generated by the emissions tax represent an additional cost
to the motorist, but not to society, since they are pure transfers. If these
taxes simply go into the general fund and replace, for example, property
taxes, the net financial burden of the emissions tax strategy will be just the
expenditures made directly on reducing emissions. Since the property tax
causes a loss by distorting the allocation of goods (and the emissions tax does
not), the real economic cost of the strategy will be less than the cost of
reducing emissions. If the taxes are used to finance the introduction of other
measures recommended in this report, they again disappear, since they
simply represent a source of money for programs which must be funded in
some way. Because of its beneficial (rather than detrimental) allocation
effects, the emissions tax is a good source of such funds.
A theoretically perfect emissions tax would be one in which each automobile
had a device on its tailpipe (and fuel system and crankcase) which continu-
ously analyzed the composition of waste gases and recorded the mass of
emissions. With 7.2 million cars in the Basin this degree of precision is too
expensive to be warranted. Some surrogates closely, and hopefully invariantly,
related to total mass emissions must be chosen and used to levy taxes.
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The first step in constructing a surrogate is to factor total emissions into
two components-the average emission rate measured in grams per mile and
the number of miles driven. The most appropriate way to measure average
emissions is the mandatory annual or semi-annual inspection of each auto-
mobile, to discover the grams per mile which it emits under :1Ver:1Re drivinR
conditions. Of course,. emission rates as measured at an annual test are only
a surrogate for actual emission rates in real driving conditions. But as long
as the driver is unable to make decisions which change the relation between
estimated emissions and actual emissions -as for example by spending more
time sitting in traffic jams-the surrogate will be a good one.
Some emissions tax proposals use an estimate of average emissions in
conjunction with an estimate of average mileage to compute the total mass
emissions which are to be taxed. There are two ways of collecting such a
tax: one is to impose the tax as an excise or sales tax, and the other is to bill
the motorist periodically. In either case the tax is unrelated to the mileage
driven by any particular motorist, since it is computed on the basis of Basin-
wide average annual mileage.
One such proposal has the tax based on estimated emissions and estimated
miles driven throughout the life of the car.3 The tax is collected at the time
of original sale of a new car. Since one important reason why new car emis-
sions standards provide only a slow reduction in air pollution in the South
Coast Air Basin is the slow rate at which old cars die off and new cars are
purchased, this proposal by itself is unworkable. It would raise the price of
new cars relative to old cars, and thus be detrimental to air quality by reduc-
ing the demand for new cars.
We could, however, construct a tax based on estimated emissions and
average mileage until next resale, and impose the tax every time a car is
sold. Such a tax would not vary with the actual miles driven, and thus gives
no incentive to reduce driving. Its virtue is that it would not discriminate
against new cars.
Taxes collected as a sales tax would give no incentive to maintain a well-
tuned automobile, and they would tend to make it desirable to keep a car as
long as possible. If each motorist received an annual tax bill based on his
performance on the emission inspection, there would be an incentive to
operate a well-tuned car even if the tax did not vary with actual miles driven.
If the motorist is to pay the tax, however, there is a simple way to make the
tax vary with actual mileage. The odometer of each automobile can be checked
at the annual emissions test, and the motorist sent a bill based on measured
emissions and actual miles driven. This annual payment of a tax might still
have little effect on the number of miles driven, even though it in fact varies
with miles driven. If, however, each motorist is required to report his
odometer reading monthly, and pay an emission tax monthly, the impact on
miles driven will be greater. The incentive to report inaccurately under such
'Suggested by Donald N. Dewees, Automobile Air Pollution: An Economic Analysis, unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, -September 1971.
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a system would be minimal if the odometer reading were checked at each
emissions inspection. Then the motorist would know that he must pay, each
year, a tax based on his true mileage and that any under-reporting will simply
result in a larger final bill. Both these odometer reading schemes suffer from
the problem that it would be difficult to exempt miles which are driven out-
side the South Coast Air Basin. Some method of abating the tax in propor-
tion to miles driven outside the South Coast Air Basin must be provided.
We can reach some general conclusions as to the kind of decisions each
type of emission tax will affect. Any tax which is collected at the time a car
is sold will have no effect on the decision to drive less, to join a carpool, or
to maintain the car once purchased. It will only affect total driving if it makes
it impossible for some people to own a car at all. It will affect the type of car
chosen and, if so constructed, the decision to convert a new car to a gaseous
fuel. The decision as to how much to drive a car and the maintenance deci-
sion will be affected by taxes based on actual mileage collected throughout
the life of the car. Indeed, an annual tax would provide an incentive to
operate a well-tuned car even if it did not vary with miles driven. It appears
that the more often a tax is collected the greater will be its impact on the
number of miles a car is driven.
Finally, it should be pointed out that in theory a tax scheme which imposes
increased costs per mile of driving a car with high emissions will divert
demand away from such cars. Eventually as motorists become aware of the
fact that because of the emissions tax car X costs 2¢ per mile more to run than
car Y, identical to X in all respects but emissions, they will become unwilling
to buy car X unless the seller reduces the price. The effect on the decision
to purchase a car of a per mile tax will be similar to the effect of a tax at
time of purchase. Because of the difficulty in knowing in advance what
emissions tax a particular car will incur, the effect will, however, be weaker.
If organizations like the Consumers' Union provide such information, the
impact on purchase decisions would be increased. Manufacturers would be
given an additional incentive to produce new cars with lower lifetime
emissions (Section II/S.2).
We do not believe, however, that a tax collected from the motorist periodi-
cally throughout the life of an automobile will have a strong effect on the
purchase decision, because of the difficulties of estimating lifetime emis-
sions and the long time interval between the making of the purchase decision
and the payment of the emission tax. The effect of the sales tax on the pur-
chase decision must be balanced against the effect of the periodic tax, pro-
portional to mileage, on driving, maintenance, etc.
11/5.3.4 The Specific Proposal
We propose that an emissions tax based on average emissions, as measured
at the emission~ inGp~~tion, llnd actual miles driven b~ 1Mtituted as a paot
project in the South Coast Air Basin, and that the tax be collected at monthly
intervals. Vouchers similar to those used for payment of Federal estimated
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tax should be provided so that the motorist can compute and pay his monthly
tax due. Such a scheme will have the greatest impact (of all feasible alterna-
tives) on the decisions on how much to drive, how well to maintain the vehicle,
what type of fuel to use (i.e., gasoline or a gaseous fuel) and whether to Join
a carpool. Since the effect of the decision about what type of automobile to
buy will be weaker than in a time of purchase tax scheme, we propose that
the emissions tax be supplemented by measures to facilitate the exporting of
old high emission vehicles from the Basin and the importing of low emission
used vehicles (Section III 5.4). The periodic emissions tax based on actual
mileage, when combined with this plan for reducing the number of older
cars in the Basin, forms a system which is clearly superior to the time of
purchase tax.
Under this proposal the motorist will pay a tax computed in the following
manner: If the tax is imposed at a rate a, and if E = average grams per mile
of emissions and M = miles driven in the South Coast Air Basin, the motorist
will face a total tax equal toO'·E M or a tax ofa·E for every mile he drives.
Clearly the more a car emits, the greater the incentive to reduce driving
mileage.
If the declared mileage were measured by periodic odometer checks, there
would be no way to determine how much driving took place outside the Air
Basin. This problem can be resolved by abating the tax for any motorist who
presents receipts for gasoline purchased at locations more than a specified
distance outside the boundaries of the South Coast Air Basin. The actual
mileage driven outside the Basin can be estimated from gasoline consumption
by applying a factor equal to the average miles per gallon obtained by the type
of car driven. Such mileage would be subtracted from the total in order to
determine the number of miles driven for which an emissions tax must be
paid.
11/5.3.5 How High a Tax?
There are two methods by which we can determine an appropriate level of
taxation to achieve the standard. The first is to develop a large-scale model
of the demand for automotive travel, in order to predict how auto use will
change if the cost of driving certain vehicles in certain ways is increased.
We can then choose a tax structure which will produce a predicted response
that achieves air quality goals. The advantage of this demand-projection
approach is that in estimating the model we will discover the interactions
between various ways of reducing motor vehicle emissions. We may find
nonlinearities which can be exploited to bring about desired behavior in the
most efficient manner, and we can also expect to discover any unexpected
perversities of behavior which would defeat the purpose of the tax. We can
certainly expect to find which decisions are most responsive to economic
incentives and concentrate our leverage on them. The drawback of this
approach is the time which it would take to develop such a model and the
quality of the data required.
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Because of the immediacy of our air pollution problem, we cannot depend
on such a large-scale study alone. By delegating the authority to set the level
of emissions tax to an air quality management agency, we would make it
possible to determine the appropriate level experimentally. A pilot project
to make such a determination in the South Coast Air Basin is what we
recommend.
The project would work in the following way: On the basis of rough
predictions of response an initial level of taxation could be chosen. Air
quality levels prior to the institution of the tax would be measured and
recorded. After the tax had been in effect for, say, six months or a year, new
measurements would be made. The influence of fleet conversion to gaseous
fuels, mandatory retrofit, natural dying off of old high-emission cars and all
other mandatory improvements during the trial period would then be esti-
mated and removed from the measured improvement in air quality. If the
remaining improvement were less than desired, the level of the emissions tax
would be raised. If the improvement was measured to be more rapid than
desired, the tax would be reduced.
Because of meteorological and other factors which cause unpredictable
changes in air quality, it may be necessary to measure the effect of the tax
indirectly during the first year or so. Such parameters as changes in declared
mileage, changes in average performance on emissions tests, or changes in
trade-in patterns could substitute for direct estimation of changes in air
quality during this initial period.
Additional complexities are introduced by the fact that there is a natural
lag in certain responses to the tax. Not everyone will immediately trade in
an old car which is charged a high emissions tax for a newer, cheaper one,
but over longer periods we can expect such changes in behavior. Therefore,
even with the iterative, experimental approach to the determination of the
emissions tax, we will need some estimate of the underlying structure of
auto use decisions. In particular, in order to determine whether or not the
tax is producing adequate progress toward the air quality goals, we will need
an estimate of the average length of time by which changes in behavior lag
behind the introduction of new incentives.
Even before studies are made we can reach two conclusions about the
nature of the emissions tax: (1) It must be positive for all automobiles. The
use of subsidies is administratively cumbersome and difficult to finance in
an equitable manner. (2) If we wish to minimize the total expenditure incurred
by all motorists in changing the emissions for which they are responsible, we
must set one tax rate which is applied to all automobiles on the basis of their
total emissions.
An important objection to a system which minimizes total expenditure is
that it ignores the burden which the tax places on particular people (e.g., the
poor). If the emissions tax goes to replace oth~r ~Q\lr~CB of revcnue, it is not a
net cost for motorists in the aggregate, but it may still be a net cost for cer-
tain individuals if their other tax payments are reduced by an amount less
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than the emissions tax. If the emissions tax replaces part of the income tax,
for example, the poor may find that their income tax falls by less than the
amount of the emissions tax. This is a crucial problem, but it can be dealt
with by providing exemptions from the tax for any person who has an income
below a certain level. For example, we could exempt any family with an
income of less than $5,000 from the first $75 of emissions tax, and any family
with an income of less than $3,000 from the first $150, when the tax rate is
0.15«r per gram on all emissions. Although this exemption seems to make the
tax nonuniform, it has the advantage that whether or not the exemption can
be claimed does not affect or depend on any auto use decision. If these fami-
lies in fact own automobiles which pollute so much that they still owe some
tax, the tax rate is high enough that they have an incentive to reduce their
emissions or driving.
In order to achieve desired air quality with this exemption, we may have to
raise the uniform tax rate above what it would be if the poor paid the tax
without exemptions. This procedure is acceptable because the poor are shel-
tered from the increased rate by their exemption, and the outcome is that the
rich pay proportionately more than the poor for cleaning the environment.
Detailed consideration of the tax structure must await the experimental
results of the pilot project. We can, however, find a reasonable initial level
for a uniform base tax rate by considering some political constraints.
If we are concerned about the eventual use to which tax revenues are put,
we should be careful to see that all the revenues collected from the tax are
spent to benefit roughly the same population which pays the tax. This
requirement imposes an additional constraint on the level at which the tax
can be set, which mayor may not be consistent with the long-run constraint
that desired air quality be achieved. In choosing an initial level for the tax,
however, we should be sensitive to political realities, viz the expectation that
motorists in the South Coast Air Basin will find the tax more palatable if
they see the· revenue going to pay for improved air quality in the Basin. This
consideration suggests that it would be reasonable to set the tax initially at
a level at which it will just provide sufficient revenue to finance the other
measures recommended in this report.
The tax revenue to the State which is lost by removing the tax from gaseous
fuels when used in an approved system must be replaced. The installation of
retrofit devices on used cars to control evaporative emissions, which we have
recommended, is to be mandatory, but revenues from the emissions tax
could well be used to subsidize the installation of such devices. Mandatory
emissions inspection also requires financing. It has been estimated that
these measures would account for almost one billion dollars over four years. 4
How high must the tax be to raise this revenue?
Total emissions from vehicles in Los Angeles County of reactive hydro-
carbons and nitrogen oxides in 1972 are approximately 1,500 tons per day.
'See Part I.
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By 1975, if EQL Strategy #1 is adopted, the total will fall to 500 tons per day.s
If the totals decline linearly over that time, they will average 1,000 tons per
day during the four-year period, or 3.65 x 105 tons per year. Converting to
grams gives 3.65 x 1011 grams per year.
A tax rate of one-tenth of a cent (0. I<1:) per gram on combined hydrocarbon
and nitrogen oxide emissions would provide an average annual revenue over
four years of 365 million dollars, and a tax rate of I Y2 tenths of a cent (0. I5<1:)
per gram would provide 547 million dollars per year. In Table 15 the actual
taxes which would be paid in 1972 by automobiles of various ages with aver-
age emissions and mileage for their year are computed.
In 1960 there were in the Los Angeles area 256,418 families with incomes
between $3,000 and $5,000 per year, and 216, 554 families with incomes below
$3,000. If tax exemptions of respectively $75 and $150 are given these families,
the loss in revenue would be between 50 million and 140 million dollars an-
nually (depending on specific car ownership patterns among low income
families).
On the grounds of being used to benefit air quality in the Basin, a tax in
the neighborhood of 0.15<1: per gram of combirted HC and NOx emissions
should provide a politically acceptable starting point for the experimental
determination of an appropriate tax rate.
To see the incentive which is given to any particular motorist to purchase
a newer car, consider the second line of Table 16. A motorist whose need
for transportation is fixed will find that by switching from a 1969 to a 1972
automobile he could reduce his emission tax by 55%. If he drives 10,000 miles
per year, this trade-in would save him $83.50 per year with a 0.15<1: per gram
tax rate (for example).
Line 3 of Table 16 shows the annual saving to the average motorist if he
resorts to measures such as tune-ups and repairs that reduce his emissions
by one gram per mile.
If a motorist converts to CNG or LPG, he saves about 80% of the tax for a
1972 model vehicle and about 90% of the tax for a 1969 model vehicle, in
addition to his savings on state fuel taxes and maintenance (Section IIj3.2).
The first line of Table 16 lists the emissions tax expressed as an increased
cost of motoring in cents per mile. A very rough estimate of the effect of this
increased cost on driving mileage is obtained if we regard it as being equiva-
lent to an increase in the cost of gasoline.
In Los Angeles the average motorist gets about 12 miles per gallon and
pays about 36<1: per gallon, for a cost of 3<1: per mile. A motorist driving a 1972
model vehicle would experience an effective increase of about 23% in the cost
of gasoline, while a motorist with a 1969 car would experience an increase of
about 50% in this cost. Houthakker and Taylor6 give estimates of elasticities
'See Figures 3 and 4 of this report.
6\1. ~. \louthakker and L Taylor: Consumer Demand in the United States, 1929-1970, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1966.
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TABLE 15
Emissions Taxes for Various Model Year Vehicles
MODEL YEAR 1972 1971 1970 1969 19b~ 1967 1966 1965 & OLDER
Average Mileage Per
Year ( x 1Ol) 15 13 11 9.6 8.4 7.6 5.3 5.0 - 3.5
Average Emissions of NOx
and He (gm/mi) 4.5 6.2 8.2 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1
Average Emissions Per
Year (gm x 1Ol) 67.5 80.6 90.2 96.9 84.8 76.7 53.5 75 - 52.5
Tax at 0.15¢/gm $101.25 $121 $135 $145 $127.20 $115 $80.30 $112_ 50 - $78.75
Tax at O.l¢/gm $67.50 $80.60 $90.20 $96.90 $84.80 $76.70 $53.50 $75 - $52.50
I-'
I-'
0
TABLE 16
Tax Savings for Emissions Reduction
MODEL YEAR 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 &OLDER
Tax per mile at
O.15¢/gram .675¢ .93¢ 1.23¢ 1.51¢ 1.51¢ 1.51¢ 1.51¢ 2.25¢
Total tax at 0.15¢/gram
paid by motorist who
$93drives 10,000 mi./yr. $67.50 $123 $151 $151 $151 $151 $225
Tax savings for average
motorist per 1 gram/mi.
reduction in emissions
(at 0.15¢/gram) $22.50 $19.60 $16.20 $14.00 $12.90 $11.20 $8.00 $7.50 - $5.00
which imply that a 10% increase in the price of gasoline will cause a reduc-
tion in demand that lies between 0.5% and 0.75% in the short run, and between
1.5% and 2.25% in the long run. National rather than Southern California
data were used in obtaining these estimates, and the estimating technique
used by Houthakker and Taylor has been criticized. Therefore, these fig-
ures should be taken only as rough indications of the influence of price on
demand for gasoline in the Los Angeles area.
If we assume that no change in the pattern of automobile ownership takes
place after the price of gasoline is increased, so that there is no change in the
average gasoline mileage of cars on the road, we can translate decreased
gasoline consumption into decreased driving. We find that a motorist owning
a 1972 car would decrease his driving by 1.2-1.7% in the short run and 3.5-
5.2% in the long run. The owner of a 1969 vehicle would reduce his driving by
2.5-3.8% in the short run and 7.5-11.3% in the long run. This last figure
amounts to about one-half the magnitude of reduced automobile use called
for in Figures 3, 4, and 10.
11/5.4 Export of Old High Emissions Cars Out of the Basin7
The emissions tax scheme proposed in Section I1/5.3 will undoubtedly provide
some inducement to motorists to buy automobiles which cause less pollu-
tion. It should be supplemented by measures which directly increase the cost
of older automobiles with characteristically high emissions. We propose a
system of direct incentives to promote the export of old high-emissions cars
out of the Basin and to facilitate the importation of newer, cleaner cars at
reasonable prices.
Any individual owning a 1970 or earlier model year automobile would be
paid a sum of money for removing his automobile from the Basin. The amount
paid would depend on the age, condition, and estimated emissions of the
particular automobile. Owners of such older automobiles would benefit
from the scheme to the extent that the "export bounty" exceeded the cost of
finding a buyer outside the Basin. We can indeed hope that one result of the
bounty would be the appearance of "middlemen" who will offer a price,
somewhat above the going market price, for older cars. Having obtained a
stock of older cars the middlemen would export them in bulk to reduce trans-
portation and marketing costs and as a result gain a clear profit from the
bounty.
At the same time, we will tax old cars brought into the Basin (the
parameters determining the various differences in cars being neglected at
this point). The revenue will be used to defray the exportation costs.
The effects would be as follows. To outsiders the Basin would be a rela-
tively cheap source of supply of old cars. Their efforts to purchase (for resale
elsewhere) Basin cars would exert upward pressure on old car prices. As old
cars became more expensive, the demand would begin to shift to the newer
models. Presumably there would be little effect on new car prices since thege
'Based on suggestions by Dr. Charles Plott, professor of economics, Caltech.
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can be freely imported. The magnitude of the resulting equilibrium stock of
old cars would depend on the amount of export subsidy and import tax.
This scheme fits in neatly with an emissions tax computed on a per mile
basis. The weak effect of such a tax on the purchase decision becomes irrele-
vant, because direct incentives to export an old car and purchase a newer
one are given. It is equally important to note that the stock of used cars
will change at a faster rate because of this import-export system, so that an
incentive at a certain level will produce greater response.
11/5.5 Moving More People in Fewer Vehicles
11/5.5.1 General Considerations
Aside from taxing automotive emissions there are other public policies
which could cause motorists to behave as if they shared the risk of damage
from air pollution. Everyone does, of course, share the risk, but it is not always
in the immediate best interests of an individual to behave as if the risk were
real. The reason is that whatever he does as an individual will probably
have no effect on the problem. If he goes to the trouble of carpooling for the
sake of cleaner air, he won't get the cleaner air unless a very large number
of people make similar sacrifices. The public policies which should interest
us, therefore, are those which cause enough people to behave in ways that
yield cleaner air.
When we tax automotive emissions, we expect people to search among
their options for those which minimize their penalty for polluting the air.
Since we are especially interested in promoting choices that reduce driving,
we want a system of mutually reinforcing incentives and disincentives that
promote the use of multiple-occupancy vehicles like buses, carpools and
jitney cabs, and that penalize driver-only cars.
The complementary relationship between emissions taxes and, say, good
bus service is clear if you consider the dilemma of an individual deciding
whether he would be better off paying the tax or riding the bus. He will pay
a high tax to avoid a very slow, inconvenient and uncomfortable bus ride.
But this is not the choice we want him to make if cleaner air is the objective.
The policy-maker's choices are: raise the tax, improve the bus ride, or both.
The encouragement of more and better transportation alternatives is an
important adjunct of effective public policy in this area. Moreover, it is only
fair to the penalized motorists-especially those of low income.
Following are brief discussions of some of the measures which might be
part of an effective system of incentives and disincentives. Implicit in all the
suggestions is the assumption that there is a necessity and an opportunity to
use Los Angeles' extensive freeway system as the basis for more efficient
mass transportationS without years of delay and massive expenditures. Such
'''Efficient mass transportation" is here defined as moving more people with fewer vehicles,
or with fewer emissions per person, not as moving more vehicles over the existing freeway
system.
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an assumption is not, of course, meant to suggest that some very much more
elaborate transportation system will not be a part of the long-term solution
to air pollution and other urban environmental problems.
11/5.5.2 On the Freeways, Give Priority to Buses, Carpools
and Other High-Occupancy Vehicles;
Discriminate Against One-Person Vehicles
A. Control Access to the Freeway on the Basis of Vehicle
Occupancy
The instrument for carrying out such a policy exists. The California Division
of Highways already controls access to Los Angeles area freeways during
the morning rush hours at a number of onramps. Freeway access is con-
trolled by a traffic signal which admits one car per green light and is timed
to slow entering traffic to some rate that will relieve congestion. Cars might
wait as long as 15 minutes to enter the freeway. The master plan is to install
such controls on most freeway onramps in the Los Angeles Basin within
ten years.9
The controlled freeway access program has the potential merit of encour-
aging multiple-occupancy vehicles while it discourages driver-only cars.
Buses, carpools, and other vehicles with, say, two or more persons would go
ahead, while one-person cars would wait for long periods. However, we will
not get the reduction in emissions we want if the penalized cars sit, morning
after morning, in long lines with engines idling and traffic backing up on
surface streets. But buses and carpools would enjoy an advantage which
previously they never knew: top freeway speeds during the peak rush hours.
The long waiting lines of private cars might then disappear as motorists
joined carpools, took a new look at the faster bus service, or parked their
cars at rendezvous points along freeways and flagged jitney cabs.
If the master plan for controlling freeway access could be moved ahead
to full implementation within a year or two, and if we could begin to add up
the capacity of our freeways in terms of people, not vehicles moved, then
the controlled-access program might be used as a powerful sanction against
driver-only vehicles.
Probably a very sizable pilot demonstration project would be required
to determine whether the idea would work. The San Fernando Valley, with a
limited number of freeway onramps, a very large population of commuters,
and relative isolation from the central section of Los Angeles is a likely loca-
tion for a test of this sort of social policy.
'California Division of Highways, District 7, Freeway Operation Dept., A Program to Upgrade
and Control the Los Angeles Freeway Network, July 1970.
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B. Reserve a Special lane on Freeways for Carpools
and Buses
Another approach would be one that uses present morning and evening rush
hour congestion on freeways as an effective incentive for carpooling and bus
riding. If a lane were reserved exclusively for carpools and buses, persons
choosing these "more efficient" forms of transportation would immediately
realize a benefit in the form of faster commuting time. At present carpool
and bus riders suffer the same impeded movement as people in private
cars. This being the case, the commuter reasons, why not endure the con-
gestion in comfort and privacy?
The enabling legislation for reserved freeway lanes already exists in
California. Assembly Bill No.1, which became law in November, 1970,
authorized the Department of Public Works to designate reserved freeway
lanes for high-occupancy vehicles. Accordingly, on December 8 last year, the
department launched an experiment that involved reserving an exclusive lane
for buses and carpools on approaches to the Oakland Bay Bridge during the
6 to 9 a.m. rush hours on the Oakland side. As an added incentive for car-
pooling, cars with three or more persons were exempted from the 40-cent toll.
Within less than two weeks the number of carpools had almost doubled from
1000 to nearly 2000. Nearly half the morning commuters into San Francisco
across the Bay Bridge were already on buses, but bus company receipts
indicated no passengers had been lost to carpools. Early traffic counts,
however, did not confirm a significant decline in the number of vehicles
crossing the bridge. Plans were to continue the experiment. lO
The first exclusive lane for buses, designated in 1969 on a stretch of the
Shirley Highway linking northern Virginia suburbs and Washington, D.C.,
increased bus ridership 15-20% within two months and significantly reduced
commuting time on buses. ll A recent detailed study supported by the
Department of Transportation found the concept of freeway lane reserva-
tion potentially effective in reducing traffic and feasible in implementation.
Analyzing the Memorial Shoreway in Cleveland, the study found that if only
5% of the commuters shifted from private cars to carpools and buses, a
reserved lane would carry 50% more people 20 miles per hour faster than the
unreserved lands. Traffic would move faster on the unreserved lanes as well. 12
A slower and more expensive approach is to construct a special lane for
buses. An II-mile busway is presently under construction along the San
Bernardino Freeway between EI Monte and the outskirts of downtown Los
Angeles. Sponsored by the Division of Highways and the Southern California
Rapid Transit District, the busway will cost an estimated 52 million dollars
l"Information from telephone conversations with supervising traffic engineers at the Department
of Public Works in Sacramento and at the Oakland Bay Bridge.
"Turner, Francis C. "Moving People on Urban Highway," Traffic Quarterly, July, 1970, p. 325.
"U. S. Department Ql Tnm~portation i\MY·KOoI.III4, FPil~ibility and Evaluation ~Iudy oj
Reserved Freeway Lanes for Buses and Car Pools. prepared by Alan M. Voorhees & Associates,
Inc., Jan 31, 1971.
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and is expected to be in operation in 1972. 13 Given the entrenchment of the
automobile in the life style of Los Angeles, perhaps the construction of
special busways is a realistic first step toward mass rapid transit. But such
large capital construction projects could play only a minor role in a strategy
aimed at major reductions in automotive emissions with the next few years.l 4
11/5.5;3 Improve the Alternatives
A. Expand Bus Service
As a by-product of either of the traffic control policies discussed above,
commuter bus service would automatically improve in terms of faster transit
time. The recent sales tax subsidy for urban transit voted by the state legis-
lature might be used to expand and revise rush hour service to accommodate
new bus riders as conveniently and comfortably as possible. Revenues from
the proposed emissions tax could also be so used. Information on bus sched-
ules and routes could be disseminated much more broadly.
B. Facilitate Other Types of High Occupancy Vehicles
I. Carpool matching: A few civic organizations, government agencies, and
businesses have provided their employees and members of the public with
information services to help them find or organize suitable carpools.
Operation Oxygen is an organization of concerned citizens which has
developed and promoted the idea of using computers for carpool-matching
in large organizations. IS The service is provided for a fee by several firms.
2. Parking incentives and disincentives: In congested areas such as down-
town Los Angeles, parking has become increasingly difficult and expen-
sive. The response of many businesses and organizations has been to
increase parking facilities for employees. Instead, management could
adopt policies of free parking only for carpools, while those who drive to
work alone would pay the full unsubsidized cost of parking. Employees
who could not carpool could be given free or subsidized bus passes.
3. License jitney cabs: City councils could license jitney taxis similar to those
common in many countries in the world. Passengers and taxis would
rendezvous at established taxi stands; routes and schedules would be,
within limits, flexible, allowing for short detours to drop off passengers
near their destinations. Departures would depend on filling up the cabs.
Jitneys would provide a middle ground between ordinary taxis, which are,
of course, prohibitively expensive for commuting, and buses with their
13The Los Angeles Times, December 21, 1970 and October 22, 1971.
I4The two freeway traffic control policies discussed here are probably not complementary.
Obviously, if access control were applied to an extent which drastically reduced traffic on freeways
during rush hours, an exclusive lane would offer buses 'and carpools no advantages.
150peration Oxygen is headed by Mr. Jack Novack and is headquartered at Burroughs Corpora-
tion in Pasadena.
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obvious disadvantages. The jitney operators could be full time or part
time. The part-time operators might be low-income car owners whose
jitney license would provide them with a small additional income for
perhaps two trips a day-to and from work-in effect, a paid carpool.
4. Provide rendezvous points and parking along freeways: In the pattern of
suburban commuting on the East Coast, motorists might prefer to leave
their cars or to be dropped off at freeway "stations" near their homes.
There they could take buses, flag jitney cabs, meet their carpools, or
even pick up a stray commuter who might be the extra person needed to
gain entrance to the freeway.
5. Incorporate smog alerts into traffic control: As suggested elsewhere, smog
alerts could be used to discriminate against low-occupancy cars as well as
high-emitting cars. When alerts are called, single-person cars could be
banned from freeways not only during rush hours but throughout the
duration of the alert.
6. Provide the public with information: While it seems unlikely that public
information/ education programs can by themselves quickly and radically
change widespread behavior, such programs are an indispensable part
of the system of incentives and disincentives proposed here. It is impor-
tant that the public understand why it is being burdened; that it be per-
suaded that its sacrifices are fair and will be productive of clean air. Such
a program will be an important part of enforcement, which can never be
100% perfect and must rely on widespread voluntary compliance. A
Department of Public Works official recently reported that the great
majority of complaints received when the exclusive bus and carpool lane
was put into effect in Oakland came from persons who resented not their
sacrifices but the lack of cooperation by cheaters they had observed.
11/5.6 Reducing the Annual Rate of Increase in
Gasoline Consumption
Clearly the total tonnage of undesirable emissions from motor vehicles in
the Basin is related in some complex manner to the amount of gasoline burned
in the Basin. It is only natural to assume at first that, if the annual rate of
increase in gasoline consumption of about 4% is reduced, the rate of growth
in motor vehicle emissions will also be reduced. However, measures to limit
gasoline consumption, if taken by themselves, might not have the desired
effect at all. For example, motorists might purchase automobiles that deliver
more miles per gallon than their present cars, so that the intensity of driving
and the amount of emissions would change but little. In fact some makes of
cars with low fuel consumption produce more grams per mile of undesirable
emissions than some "gas hogs." In the short run it is by no means impos-
~ibl~ thut in th~ ub~~nc~ of other complementary mCa~urc~ limitation~ on
gasoline consumption could result in more emissions rather than less.
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A combination of the emissions tax (Section 11/5.3) and restrictions on
gasoline consumption might be effective, since each measure has advantages
lacking in the other. The shift to cars with low fuel consumption but high
emissions in grams per mile that might otherwise be enCOUfaRed by regtric-
tions on gasoline consumption would be discouraged by the emissions tax.
On the other hand the tendency of motorists owning newer cars with lower
emissions in grams per mile to drive more miles per year than the average16
would be restrained to some extent by limitations on gasoline consumption.
After considering a number of means designed to hold gasoline consump-
tion close to its present level,17 we have concluded that there are two meas-
ures worth detailed study: (1) limitation of aggregate sales of gasoline in the
Basin to four billion gallons annually,18 less conversions to gaseous fuels;
(2) coupon-auction system for motorists. 19
The limitation on aggregate sales of gasoline could be accomplished, for
example, by periodically auctioning to the refineries the rights to sell gaso-
line in the Basin, at the rate of one right per gallon, with a certain fixed ceiling
on total rights. 20 We call this scheme a gasoline market approach. Such an
approach appears to make any additional coupon or rationing system unnec-
essary, because the existing gasoline market would take care of the problem
of allocation. This approach also has the advantage that it does not require
information about the elasticity of demand for gasoline and for automobile
travel. Such information is not needed if the total supply is limited; the mar-
ket would automatically establish the new price of gasoline (equivalent of
the tax).
One obvious objection to the gasoline market approach is that the inevitable
increases in the price of gasoline would generate additional revenue for the
refineries and marketeers at the expense of the motoring public. An alter-
native gasoline rationing method involves the issuance of a certain number
of coupons in I-gallon and 5-gallon denominations to each motorist in the
Basin, with the total equivalent gallonage held at the present level, less con-
versions to gaseous fuels. These coupons would have to be presented at
the gasoline station for cancellation (e.g., punching) to match gasoline
purchases. There are advantages in permitting and even encouraging "free
trading" in gasoline coupons by licensed brokers. Those who have more
coupons than they need could sell them through these brokers to motorists
"Section II/5.3, Table 15, line I and Table 16, line I.
17After allowance fQr conversion of gasoline-powered vehicles to gaseous fuels, corresponding
to one-third of the present gasoline consumption in the Basin.
181969 figure.
19A third possible measure is an environmental surcharge (or tax) on gasoline. However, this
measure resembles the emissions tax (Section II/5.3) in its main effects on driving, so that we con-
cluded that the desired changes in behavior could be stimulated just as well by increases in the
emissions tax rate.
20Revenues received by the State from the sale of these rights could be recycled into other
emissions control activities.
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demanding more coupons than they receive from the State. The floating
price of the coupons would establish an effective new price for gasoline.
Of course, all the usual objections to rationing schemes hold with equal
(or greater) force here. Strict precautions would be necessary to guard
against "bootlegging" into the Basin of additional gasoline. Several con-
tiguous basins might have to be included in the scheme to reduce the incen-
tives for "bootlegging." Americans do not take easily to rationing schemes
except in times of war, local disasters, or temporary emergency, and public
acceptance is an essential ingredient of any successful rationing program.
For these reasons we have suggested a limitation on the total consumption of
gasoline in the Basin only as a "last resort" measure to be introduced only if
the socioeconomic measures proposed in this section fail to produce the 20%
reduction in automobile use required to help meet the management air
quality standards.
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PART II: SECTION 11/6
State and local air pollution officials have predicted that the present control
program will lead to clean air-that is, air that meets California air quality
standards-by 1990. Calculations by the EQL team indicate this could not be
the case. The reason is growth in sources of emissions; additional vehicles,
additional plants, and additional pollution-making affluence.
The present strategy will not lead to clean air; nor will the EQL program.
By about 1982 air quality will begin to deteriorate again. The real rationale
for EQL Strategy #1, which is to say the rationale for doubling what we are
presently doing about air pollution, is to get much closer to the clean air goal
before we are overtaken by growth. This will also give us much more time to
make the really radical changes in life-styles, transportation modes, and
technology that are needed for a long-term solution to the air quality and
other environmental problems.
With so many people and so many pollution sources in the Basin, it is not
low emissions but zero emissions that are required. Small battery-operated
commuter cars would be an example of zero-emissions transportation mode
that may be no further away than the next decade. But they would have to be
coupled with zero-emissions energy' sources such as nuclear power plants
located outside the Basin. Solar energy conversion is another zero-emissions
energy source which could play an increasingly important role in the long-
term.
Nuclear energy has proved controversial but only mildly so compared to
some of the socio-economic measures that must be considered for the ulti-
mate cure to air pollution. Growth itself will have to be directly dealt with.
The finite carrying capacity of the Los Angeles Basin became apparent in
the 1970's. Incentives for resettlement elsewhere accompanied by zoning
rollbacks and embargos on utility hook-ups for new customers are examples
of interrelated, growth-control policies which may have to be considered.
The final implication of this detailed look at exactly what is involved in
making exactly what improvements in air quality is this: our present way of
life is not consistent with clean air.
We should be arguing about the really fundamental changes needed in the
way we use energy. Instead the discussion has centered on whether we should
take ineffectual steps that ultimately will prove no solution. We have been
looking for a technological fix that won't cost much. We have been distracted
from the real issues by an unrealistic promise of clean air in the distant
future at bargain prices.
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11/6 A GLIMPSE AT THE POST·1982 SITUATION AND
LONG-RANGE NEEDS
Some time in the early 1980's emissions of reactive hydrocarbons, nitrogen
oxides and carbon monoxide into the atmosphere of the Basin will begin to
increase again, and so will the average number of "objectionable" days per
year. The projected growth in population and in the rate of consumption of
oil, gasoline and natural or synthetic gas in the Basin makes this outcome
inevitable, if no new measures are taken. Figure 14 shows the projected
deterioration in oxidant air quality beyond 1982, based on growth rates in
reactive hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides emissions of 2% per year and 4%
per year, respectively.
If EQL Strategy #1 is fully implemented, ambient air quality will deterior-
ate rather slowly beyond 1982, because the "minimum" emissions levels
reached in the early 1980's are much lower than the 1969 base levels. For
example, total reactive hydrocarbon emissions in L.A. County in 1982 are
estimated at about 20% of the 1969 level (Figure 5). Thus, a growth rate of
4% per year in these emissions in the post-1982 period amounts to a growth
rate of less than 1% per year in terms of the 1969 base level. Starting at the
new 1982 "base level," the "characteristic time" for deterioration in oxidant
air quality from 25 "objectionable" days per year to 50 such days is about
10 years (Figure 14). This characteristic time is still uncomfortably short, but
at least it is beginning to approach the "system time lag" or "lead time" for
the introduction of new technology and new social and economic measures
and for institutional changes that are designed not only to arrest the deterior-
ation in ambient air quality, but to improve air quality, if possible. l
Members of the EQL staff have begun to identify and examine the main
features that any long-range (1982-2000) strategy for air pollution control in
this Basin must contain. The purpose of this section is to outline some of
these features; a considerable amount of work is required to fill out the
details. The main components of a long-range strategy are as follows: (1) in-
troduction of new prime-movers and energy sources with low emissions, or
even "zero emissions"; (2) provision of a balanced transportation system;
(3) limitations on population, industry and commerce in this Basin; (4) com-
munity development and redevelopment, land use planning, and changes in
communication and "life-style" designed to reduce air pollution.
As an example of new technology in prime movers one can visualize the
introduction of small, battery-operated commuter cars beginning in the early
1980's. If these cars were to replace internal combustion engine-powered
vehicles at a (conservative) rate of 2% of the total car population in the Basin
per year, the rate of increase in reactive hydrocarbon and nitrogen oxides
emissions from automobiles would be reduced by about the same amount. 2
'This "lead time" is estimated to be on the order of 15-20 years.
'Two percent of the car population per year will amount to about 170,000 cars per year in the
early 1980's, or about 20% of the new cars to be purchased in the Basin each year. At first these cars
might be manufactured mainly for use in critical air basins, such as this one.
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Emissions of these substances from automobiles constitute one-half to
two-thirds of the total (Figures 5 and 6), so the rate of increase in total emis-
sions would be reduced by at least 1% per year. In other words, a projected
growth rate of 4% per year in total emissions would be reduced to 3% per year
by means of this new technology alone. By interpolating between the curves
for 2% and 4% annual growth rate shown in Figure 14, we can see that the
time scale for significant deterioration in oxidant air quality is "stretched out"
to perhaps 15 years.3
Of course, new electrical generating capacity would have to be provided to
supply the electrical energy required to recharge the batteries of these elec-
tric cars. Based on an overall efficiency of 50% for the electric car, and a re-
charging time of eight hours, about 20,000 MW(e) would be needed if all the
cars in the Basin were replaced by electric cars. If the birth rate of electric
cars is 2% of the total car population per year, about 400 MW(e) per year is
required, or about 500 MW(e) of new generating capacity per year, allowing
for the usual 20% margin over demand. This figure amounts to an increment
of about 2% per year in the electrical generating capacity projected for this
Basin for the early 1980's. Because of the "tight" electrical energy supply
situation in this Basin, this increment is significant.4 These considerations
show that an integrated master energy-transportation-air pollution control
plan must be developed for the post-1982 period if this path is followed.
For example, the additional electrical energy required by electric cars and
by many other activities in the Basin could be generated by nuclear power
plants located at remote sites outside the Basin (possibly with all or part of
the plant underground) or on off-shore floating barges. As coal gasification
begins to produce significant quantities of synthetic gas, combined-cycle gas-
and-steam turbine generating plants could also be located outside the Basin,
possibly near the sources of coal. Along these same lines, existing fossil-fuel
generating plants in the Basin could be phased out gradually and replaced
by plants outside the Basin in order to reduce nitrogen oxides and particulate
emissions. One could go a step further and replace large industrial furnaces
and boilers using fossil fuels by electrically-operated units, or substitute pure
oxygen for air in the combustion process (at increased cost).
About 8% of total energy consumption in this Basin is devoted to space
conditioning, and an additional 6% of total energy is used for heating water,
most of it involving fossil-fuel combustion at present. These sources of air
pollution could be reduced by utilizing solar energy in thermal conversion
and storage systems for new homes and buildings. Since new living units
are added at the rate of about 3% per year, and new commercial floor space at
about 5% per year, the effect of introducing solar energy systems is felt only
gradually. Nevertheless, this option is an essential part of a long-range strat-
egy of energy conservation and reduction in air pollution. It may also be
'Other examples of probable new automotive technologies could also be examined, such as
"~lH\tifi~l.l·~M.rgc" internal combustion en~ine~, M~te9.m turbines.
4Lees, L., Implications of the Growth in Demand for Commercial and Industrial Electrical
Energy in the South Coast Air Basin, EQL Report #2, November, 1971.
123
possible to retrofit existing homes with solar energy conversion units for
heating water, thus greatly increasing the rate of impact of this new
technology.
Even the supposedly "technical" measures just described raise a wide
variety of environmental, economic, land-use and "life-style" issues that are
presently unresolved; But the second component of a post-1982 air pollution
control strategy, namely a balanced transportation system, obviously involves
a complex "mix" of social, economic, legal and technical factors at every
stage of its development. So far as energy conservation, air pollution and con-
gestion are concerned, the situation is straightforward. The present ground-
based vehicular transportation system in this Basin absorbs more than 30% of
the total energy budget and produces a major share of the air pollution. The
"average motorist" in the South Coast Air Basin travels 25 miles per day on
two gallons of gasoline with an equivalent energy of about 60 KWH(t) per
capita. A typical Los Angeles bus on the other hand uses eight gallons of
gasoline to cover 25 miles, but it carries an average of 40 passengers, so the
energy expenditure is about 6 KWH(t) per capita, or a factor of ten less than
the single motorist.5 The bus could be powered by a. gaseous fuel or by a
steam turbine, so the reduction in air pollution per capita could be even
larger, depending on the distribution of emissions in grams per mile in the
motor vehicle population.
. Of course the problem is to get the people out of their cars and into the buses
(Section 11/5.5). The usual dirty subways or uncomfortable buses running
infrequently would hardly entice people away from their own comfortable
cars that· provide door-to-door service. Some incentives to stimulate this
process are already suggested as part of EQL Strategy #1 (Section 11/5.5).
In the EQL we have begun a study that will (I) assess possible and future
urban transportation systems; (2) analyze transport demands (both passenger
and freight) for large urban centers; (3) analyze the social, economic and insti-
tutional problems, including financing and authority over capital expendi-
tures; (4) attempt to synthesize (1)-(3).
Almost everyone agrees that population, industry and commerce cannot
continue to grow indefinitely at a constant annual rate in this Basin. But
the surprising thing to most people is that the finite "carrying capacity" of
the Basin should make itself felt so abruptly in the 1970's. This abrupt impinge-
ment is quite typical of exponential growth processes. The question now is
not whether the growth rate will be reduced, but by how much and with what
implications? Any program to limit the Basin's population to a certain level
would be considered fairly radical. But incentives to settle or resettle else-
where are not out of the question. And permanent regional zoning and zoning
"roll-backs" to preserve the single-family home over wide areas of the Basin
are now under consideration. In addition to these measures one large electric
utility recently gave public notice that it may have to embargo connections to
'Similar remarks apply to fixed-rail rapid transit. Of course the energy expenditures for the
single motorist could be reduced by designing motor vehicles with much higher mileage per gallon
of gasoline.
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new customers in certain areas.6 About one-third of the growth rate in
demand is attributed to new customers and two-thirds to increased use of
electricity by existing customers. Although such an embargo was discussed
publicly for the first time because of the tight electrical energy supply situa-
tion, the concept may have wide applicability. Finally, we should not over-
look the effect of rapidly rising unit energy costs on energy demand. Studies
have been made in the past of price elasticity in particular power-intensive
industries, such as non-ferrous metals, but not much is known about the
effect of substantial increases in unit energy costs in less power-intensive
industries, and in the commercial, residential and public sectors.
Another approach to controlling growth is to guide the growth in such a way
that a reduction in harmful emissions occurs naturally. For example, if
industrial-commercial and residential areas were interspersed, it would be
possible for people to live closer to their work and thus not have to drive so
much. In principle, such integrated community development and land-use
planning could reduce emissions even if the automobile population increased.
Future two-way electronic communication over common carriers and cable
TV-FM might also cut down on the need for travel from home to market or
office.
A quite different approach to achieving cleaner air is based on the recogni-
tion that the atmosphere in this Basin can absorb more pollutants at some
seasons than at other seasons, both because there is more air moving through
the Basin and because there is less sunlight and a higher inversion layer. Even
within a given season the air movement through the Basin varies consider-
ably from day to day. This observation suggests that it might be desirable to
vary our activities in accordance with the ability of the atmosphere to absorb
pollutants. We already do that in a crude way by permitting power plants to
burn oil in the winter time but requiring them to burn natural gas in the sum-
mer. The suggestion in EQL Strategy #1 described in Section 112 that we
begin to call meaningful smog alerts in July, August and September when
the number of smoggy days has been significantly reduced is also a step in
that same direction. More extensive measures could be taken to restrict per-
sonal, industrial and commercial activities on days that have a high potential
for undesirable levels of pollutants.
This approach would require first of all an extensive and effective monitor-
ing system plus a good predictive model to determine when activities should
be curtailed. Secondly, there would have to be adequate social machinery to
implement the curtailment. In a sense the situation would be similar to that
which exists in some cities when it snows, and which has always existed in
almost all agricultural areas where people adapt their activities to the weather.
The significant difference is that people would be adapting to a potential for
an undesirable situation. If effective, the program would assure that the per-
son who was adapting his behavior would never see smog. This plan would
6Supplemental testimony by Robert M. Coe, Vice-President, Southern California Edison Com-
pany, in California Public Utilities Commission Case No. 9007, December 7, 1971.
125
require a great deal more understanding and sophistication than merely
staying home from work when faced with four feet of newly-fallen snow. It
would also require means for the community to impose restraints on the indi-
vidml for th~ ~ommon good to II much grellter extent than it now does.
The kinds of approaches that have been discussed to limit or control
growth and to modify individual or collective behavior patterns are illustra-
tive of the kinds of measures that may be required in the post-1982 era to
reduce emissions levels. Most of these kinds of measures are different from
those taken in the past to achieve social purposes. Thus, there is an imperfect
understanding of how to assess the probable effects of such measures, partic-
ularly the side effects. Extensive studies should be undertaken to improve our
understanding of these effects, and, since the lead-time for social changes is
usually fairly long, the studies should be undertaken sooner rather than
later. Because the situation is very complex and the methods for predicting
the outcomes of social actions are not well developed, some experimentation
will be required. As a society we must be prepared to accept some mistakes
and to change direction when needed if we are to cope with these situations.
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APPENDIX
Projection of Automotive Emissions
The automotive emissions for L.A. County that are projected in this report
have been made on the following data base:
1. The birth and death of new vehicles as per Table 17.
2. The annual mileages driven by vehicles of different ages as per Table 18.
3. Projected increase in vehicle use for L.A. County as per page 45 of
"Profile of Air Pollution Control," L.A. APCD, 1971.
4. Exhaust emissions levels for present and future vehicles as per Table 19.
5. Emission reduction ratios for VSAD as per Table 4.
6. Emissions levels for gaseous fuels as per Table 3. Propane exhaust is con-
sidered half as reactive as gasoline; natural gas exhaust one-fifth as
reactive. \
7. Non-exhaust emissions as per page 47 of "Profile of Air Pollution Control,"
L.A. APCD, 1971.
As an example, this data is used to predict the emissions levels for reactive
hydrocarbons in 1975 (Table 20). The average emissions level of a vehicle in
1975 is calculated as the sum of the contribution of each class of vehicle,
based on the fraction of the mileage driven by that class (from Tables 17
and 18) and the characteristic hydrocarbon emissions of that class (Table 19).
The total reactive exhaust hydrocarbons are then calculated from the APCD
projection of the growth in vehicle use (gasoline consumption).
Evaporative and crankcase losses must be added to get the total automotive
hydrocarbons. Two-thirds (.67) of the total weight emitted from these
sources is considered reactive.
The effect of typical control measures can be assessed by considering the
effect on the vehicle emissions. Using the reduction factors for hydrocarbon
emissions resulting from VSAD of 1970 and older vehicles, the total reduc-
tion in reactive hydrocarbons can be calculated.
The effect of converting portions of each year's vehicles to gaseous fuels
can be similarly calculated. Conversion of vehicles to gaseous fuels is con-
sidered to begin in 1970, with one-third of the fuel use by 1970 and later
models being a mix of 75% natural gas and 25% propane. The emissions
attributed to such vehicles are given by Table 3. (This is a compromise in
estimation. Conversion of earlier vehicles produces a more substantial impact
than does conversion of newer vehicles with their already controlled emis-
sions.) For the "optimistic" projection, 1975-1976 and later, vehicles are not
'Based on unpublished literature survey by John Batchelder of the Clean Air Car Project, using
data on photochemical smog, especially that of A. P. Altshuller.
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AGE (years)
considered to be converted because they are cleaner than the gaseous fueled
vehicles.
The actual reduction in auto use that can be achieved by various measures
discussed in the report is not known, tlowever, to illustrate the potential
effect of such measures a projection is made for a 20% reduction in the use of
gasoline automobiles. This is considered to occur in addition to the conver-
sion to gaseous fuels, and hence represents a 13% reduction in total use, or
about 3-4 years normal growth.
Reductions in the evaporative emissions are based on the population by
year, but not use, with the control system assumed to be 90% effective. Retro-
fit of 1966 through 1969 vehicles is found to reduce emissions by 50% by 1975.
TABLE 17
Birth-Death Schedule for Vehicles in l.A. County
AGE (years) PERCENT OF POPULATION
o 11
1 11
2 11
3 10
4 10
5 9
6 8
7 7
8 6
9 5
10 4
11 3
12 2
13 2
14 1
15 1
Source: Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District
TABLE 18
Average Mileage vs. Vehicle Age
ANNUAL MILEAGE
(in thousands of miles)
o
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 and older
Source: California ARB
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15.0
13.0
11.0
9.6
8.4
7.6
5.3
5.0
4.4
4.2
3.5
TABLE 19
Exhaust Emissions Levels for Present and Future Vehicles
REACTIVE CARBON OXIDES OF
HYDROCARBONS HYDROCARBONS MONOXIDE NITROGEN
YEAR gm/mi gm/mi gm/mi gm/mi
Pre-1966 11 8.25* 80 4.0
1966-1969** 4.1 3.08 37 6.0
1970 2.2 1.65 23 6.0
1971 2.2 1.65 23 4.0
1972-3 1.5 1.2 23 3.0
1974 1.5 1.2 23 1.3
For optimistic projections
1975 0.23 0.0 2.3 1.0
1976 0.23 0.0 2.3 0.27
* Exhaust hydrocarbons are considered to be 80% reactive. However, for
1975 and later vehicles in the optimistic projection, reactive hydrocarbons
are considered to be zero, based on the assumption that the cars are fitted
with catalyst systems which eliminate reactive hydrocarbons.
** The observed deterioration of the hydrocarbon and carbon dioxide emis-
sions levels with increasing automobile mileage has been included in
these numbers, based on ARB data. Oxides of nitrogen have increased
as compared to pre-1966 vehicles.
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TABLE 20
Sample Calculation - Exhaust Emissions of Reactive
Hydrocarbons for 1975
FRACTION OF
MILEAGEMODEL YEAR
Basic Calculation
CHARACTERISTIC
EMISSIONS
(gm/mi)
TOTAL
EMISSIONS
(gm/mi)
65 & older
66-69
70-71
72-75
0.054 x
0.142 x
0.181 x
0.623 x
11
4.1
2.2
1.5
.594
.582
.398
.935
2.509
gallons miles
Vehicle use in 1975 =9.8 x 106 -d- x 15.5 -I-l-
ay ga on
.. f . HC milesExhaust emissions a reactive = 1.52 x 108--
day
= 1.52 X 108 miles
day
x 2.509 gm
l
· (1975 average) x .75 (Reactivity factor)
mle
tons tons
x 1.1 x 10.6 - =315-
gm. day
TABLE 21
Effect of VSAD
CHARACTERISTIC TOTAL
FRACTION OF EMISSIONS VSAD EMISSIONS
MODEL YEAR MILEAGE (gm/mi) FACTOR (gm/mi)
65 & older 0.054 x 11 x .90 .535
66-69 0.142 x 4.1 x .77 .448
70 0.081 x 2.2 x .77 .137
71 0.100 x 2.2 .220
72-75 0.623 x 1.5 .935
--
2.275
miles gmExhaust RHC =1.52 x 108-- x 2.275 -.-' (1975 average after VSAD)
day mile
. tons tons
x .75 (Reactivity factor) x 1.1 x 10-6 - = 285-
gm. day
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SPECIFIED ATMOSPHERIC CONCENTRATION OF NITROGEN DIOXIDE (PPHM)
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Figure 1
EFFECT OF REDUCTION IN NITROGEN OXIDES
EMISSIONS ON NITROGEN DIOXIDE AIR QUALITY
FOR DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES
1000 Tons/Day = 1969 Level
/
State Standard (25 PPHM)
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Figure 2
NITROGEN DIOXIDE AIR QUALITY VS,
EMISSIONS FOR VARIOUS STATIONS
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BREAKDOWN OF REDUCTIONS IN
REACTIVE AUTOMOTIVE HYDROCARBON
EMISSIONS FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY
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Figure 4
BREAKDOWN OF REDUCTIONS IN AUTOMOTIVE
O)lIO~~ O~ NITnOC~N ~MI~~ION~ ~on
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
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Figure 5
1400
REDUCTION IN TOTAL REACTIVE HYDROCARBON
EMISSIONS FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY
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Figure 6
REDUCTION IN TOTAL OXIDES OF NITROGEN
EMISSIONS FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY
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Figure 7
IMPROVEMENT IN OXIDANT AIR QUALITY
FOR THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN (0.10 PPM)
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Figure 8
IMPROVEMENT IN NITROGEN DIOXIDE AIR QUALITY
FOR THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN
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Figure 9
IMPROVEMENT IN OXIDANT AIR QUALITY FOR THE
SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN (0.20 ppm)
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Figure 10
BREAKDOWN OF REDUCTIONS IN AUTOMOTIVE CARBON
MONOXIDE EMISSIONS FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY
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IMPROVEMENT IN CARBON MONOXIDE AIR QUALITY
FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY
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Figure 12
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF NATURAL GAS IN
AUGUST 1975 FOR SOUTHERN CAliFORNIA
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Figure 13
SUMMARY OF PROPANE SUPPLY AND DEMAND
ANNUAL AVERAGES FOR CALIFORNIA
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Figure 14
LONG RANGE PROJECTION OF OXIDANT
AIR QUALITY FOR THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN
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Figure 16
CARBON MONOXIDE AIR QUALITY VS.
EMISSIONS FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY
CARBON MONOXIDE EMISSIONS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY (TONS / DAY
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Figure 17
PROBABILITY THAT THE MID- DAY MAXIMUM ONE
HOUR AVERAGE OXIDANT LEVEL IN CENTRAL LOS
ANGELES IS GREATER THAN 10 PPHM (SUMMER)
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OXIDANT AIR QUALITY VS. EMISSIONS
FOR DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES (0.10 PPM)
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Figure 21
EVAPORATIVE EMISSIONS OF HYDROCARBONS FROM
AUTOMOBILES FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY
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Figure 22
BREAKDOWN OF IMPROVEMENT IN OXIDANT AIR QUALITY
160 FOR DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES
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Figure 23
IMPROVEMENT IN OXIDANT AIR QUALITY FOR
DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES (0.15 ppm)
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Figure 24
IMPROVEMENT IN OXIDANT AIR QUALITY FOR
Cl DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES (0.20 ppm)
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IMPROVEMENT IN NITROGEN DIOXIDE
AIR QUALITY FOR DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES
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Figure ZO
200 IMPROVEMENT IN OXIDANT AIR QUALITY FOR THE
SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN (0.15 ppm)
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Figure 27
VARIOUS PROJECTIONS OF REDUCTIONS
IN AUTOMOTIVE REACTIVE HYDROCARBON
EMISSIONS FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY
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Figure 29
VARIOUS PROJECTIONS OF REDUCTIONS IN
AUTOMOTIVE CARBON MONOXIDE EMISSIONS
FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY
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Figure 30
VARIOUS PROJECTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
IN OXIDANT AIR QUALITY FOR THE SOUTH
COAST AIR BASIN
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Figure 31
1969 £EASONAL VARIATION IN NATURAL GAS DEMAND
FOR THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN
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Figure 32
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF NATURAL GAS
IN FEBRUARY 1975 FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
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TYPICAL CAPACITOR DISCHARGE IGNITION
OPTIMIZATION SYSTEM INSTALLATION
t-'
0'\
.p.
Engine
Vacuum Advance Line
Capacitor Discharge Ignition
Optimization System
To Distributor Points (Red)@)m rDistributor
Vacuum Advance
Actuator
To Ignition SNitch
and Battery
,
Ignition Coil
• .:31- .... --
TYPICAL EVAPORATIVE EMISSIONS CONTROL SYSTEM
---------
Carbon
Canister
Extended Filler Neck
Fill Limiter
Engine
@m
Carburetor
L
· ~ 'IVoot on' /LF',,,B,wl ~~ ~: '"'wO"
I-'
0'1
(J1
Figure 36
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present he is on leave from the JPL to serve as senior
staff member with the Environmental Quality Labora-
tory, where he co-authored the first EQL Report,
People, Power, Pollution.
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California, Los Angeles, Law School where he served
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served as research assistant at the Environmental
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atory until 1970 when he entered the Department of
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control techniques and in studies relating to the energy
crisis in California.
JAMES HENRY began working on automotive emission
control technology in 1970 as an undergraduate partic-
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at Caltech and practical auto mechanics in high school,
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sponsored Clean Air Car Project. The project tests and
evaluates automotive emission control techniques.
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ment at the RAND Corporation and has been consultant
to numerous federal government agencies. He served
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nomic Advisers and as a special assistant to the Secre-
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of California, Los Angeles, and a consultant to the
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Science Department of RAND Corporation. He is author
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in engineering at Caltech. He is co-author of Gas
Power-The Fleet Owner's Guide to Gaseous Fuels, a
booklet written as an introduction to natural gas and
propane motor vehicle operation.
JOHN TRIJONIS, aCaltech graduate student in environ-
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PATRICIA J. HORNE, art director of the Environmental
Quality Laboratory, graduated from California State
College at Los Angeles and holds a secondary teaching
credential from the State of California. For her work as
director of the Caltech Environmental Action Council's
Reclamation Center, she was designated co-ordinator
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sity of Southern California's World Game. She inter-
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WALT MANCINI is a recent graduate of California
State College at Los Angeles. He has worked for the
past few years as a free-lance photographer. Currently
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Laboratory.
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